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ABSTRACT 
A Security Management System (SMS) connects security requirements to the technical 
application domain. On the one hand, an SMS must allow the security administrator/officer to 
translate the security requirements into security configurations that is known as the enforcement 
process. On the other hand, it must supply the administrator/officer with monitoring features (SIEM, 
IDS, log files, etc.) to verify that the environments’ changes do not affect the compliance to the 
predefined security requirements known as the monitoring process.  
Nowadays, guarantying security objectives requires a human intervention. Therefore, the 
SMS enforcement process is disconnected from the monitoring process. Thus, an SMS cannot 
dynamically guarantee that security requirements are still satisfied when environment behavior 
changings are observed. As part of the European project PREDYKOT, we have worked on closing the 
management loop by establishing a feedback on the dynamic behavior, captured from the 
environment, to impact the enforcement process. As a result, expressing and applying a dynamic 
security policy will be possible.  
However, many policy expression and enforcement approaches exist currently. Each security 
management solution is dedicated to some specific issues related to authorization or to 
system/network management. Each solution provides a specific policy language, an architectural 
model and a management protocol. Nevertheless, closing the management loop implies managing 
both authorizations and system/network configurations in a unified framework.  
Our contribution tackles the following three main issues: 
S Feedback: The monitoring process captures the highly dynamics of the behavior through 
events. However, each event is not semantically associated with other events. We propose to 
get more semantics about behavior’s changings thus introducing the concept of “situation” to 
be dealt with in security management applications. This concept aggregates events and links 
relevant security requirements, relevant behavior changes, and relevant policy rules. A new 
management agent, called the situation manager, has been added. The latter is responsible for 
the management process of the situations lifecycle (situation beginning and ending, etc.). We 
implement this software module using the complex event processing technology. 
S Policy Expression: We propose to specify dynamic security policies oriented by situations. 
By doing so, the expression of the security policy rules becomes simpler to understand, easier 
to write and closer to the business and security needs. Hence, each relevant situation orients 
automatically the policy evaluation process towards a new dynamic decision that doesn’t 
require updating the policy rules. We apply the attribute-based expression approach because of 
its ability to represent everything through attribute terms, which is a flexible way to express 
our dynamic policy rules.  
S Enforcement Architecture: we propose a unified and adaptive architecture that supports 
situations-oriented policies enforcement. We choose to build an event-driven architecture. 
Exchanging management messages in terms of events allows our architecture to be 
independent from the management protocols. Thus, it covers in a unified way authorizations 
as well as configurations management approaches considering both provisioning and 
outsourcing policy control models. In addition, management agents are adaptable and can be 
upgraded dynamically with new management functionalities.  
Our framework has been implemented and is compliant with the OASIS XACMLv3 standard. 
Finally, we evaluated our contributed according to four different scenarios to prove its generic nature. 
Keywords 
Policy-Based Management   Security Policy   Situation Management   ABAC/XACML 
Security Management   Adaptability   Dynamic Authorization   Configuration Management 
  
  
 RÉSUMÉ 
Les systèmes de gestion de la sécurité (SGS) font le lien entre les exigences de sécurité et le 
domaine d’application technique. D’un côté, le SGS doit permettre à l’administrateur sécurité de 
traduire les exigences de sécurité en configurations de sécurité (appelé ici le processus de 
déploiement). De l’autre, il doit lui fournir des mécanismes de supervision (tels que des SIEM, IDS, 
fichiers de logs, etc.) afin de vérifier que l’état courant du système est toujours conforme aux 
exigences de sécurité (appelé ici processus de supervision). 
Aujourd’hui, garantir que les exigences de sécurité sont respectées nécessite une intervention 
humaine. En effet, les processus de déploiement et de supervision ne sont pas reliés entre eux. Ainsi, 
les SGS ne peuvent garantir que les exigences de sécurité sont toujours respectées lorsque le 
comportement du système change. Dans le cadre du projet européen PREDYKOT, nous avons tenté 
de boucler la boucle de gestion en intégrant les informations sur le changement de comportement du 
système et en les injectant dans le processus de déploiement. Cela permet de faire appliquer des 
mesures de sécurité dynamiques en fonction des changements de comportement du système. 
Toutefois, il existe diverses approches pour exprimer et mettre en œuvre des politiques de 
sécurité. Chaque solution de gestion est dédiée à des problématiques de gestion des autorisations ou à 
celles des configurations de sécurité. Chaque solution fournit son propre langage de politique, son 
propre modèle architectural et son propre protocole de gestion. Or, il est nécessaire de gérer à la fois 
les autorisations et les configurations de sécurité de manière unifiée. 
Notre contribution porte principalement sur trois points : 
S Le retour d’information de supervision : Le processus de supervision capture le 
comportement dynamique du système au travers d’évènements. Chaque évènement transporte 
peu de sens. Nous proposons de considérer non pas les évènements individuellement mais de 
les agréger pour former des situations afin d’amener plus de sémantique sur l’état du système. 
Nous utilisons ce concept pour relier les exigences de sécurité, les changements dans le 
système et les politiques de sécurité à appliquer. Un nouvel agent, appelé gestionnaire de 
situations, est responsable de la gestion du cycle de vie des situations (début et fin de situation, 
etc.) Nous avons implanté cet agent grâce à la technologie de traitement des évènements 
complexes. 
S Expression de la politique : Nous proposons d’utiliser le concept de situation comme 
élément central pour exprimer des politiques de sécurité dynamiques. Les décisions de sécurité 
peuvent être alors automatiquement dirigées par les situations sans avoir besoin de changer la 
règle courante. Nous appliquons l’approche de contrôle d‘accès à base d’attributs pour 
spécifier nos politiques. Cette approche orientée par les situations facilite l’écriture des règles 
de sécurité mais aussi leur compréhension. De plus, ces politiques étant moins techniques, 
elles sont plus proches des besoins métiers.  
S L’architecture de gestion : Nous présentons une architecture de gestion orientée événement 
qui supporte la mise en œuvre de politiques de sécurité dirigées par les situations. Considérer 
les messages de gestion en terme d’évènements, nous permet d’être indépendant de tout 
protocole de gestion. En conséquence, notre architecture couvre de manière unifiée les 
approches de gestion des autorisations comme des configurations (obligations) selon les 
modèles de contrôle de politiques en externalisation comme en approvisionnement. De plus, 
les agents de gestion sont adaptables et peuvent être dynamiquement améliorés avec de 
nouvelles fonctionnalités de gestion si besoin. 
Notre cadriciel a été complètement implanté et est conforme au  standard XACML v3.0 
d’OASIS. Enfin, nous avons évalué la généricité de notre approche à travers  quatre scénarii. 
Mots-clés 
Gestion à base de politique   politique de sécurité   gestion des situations   surveillance des situations   
adaptabilité   autorisation dynamique   ABAC/XACML   gestion des configurations   gestion de la sécurité 
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General	Introduction	
“A problem well stated is a problem half-solved.” 
Charles F. Kettering 
Quote number 40299  
 Retrieved December 16, 2014, from Quotes.net 
Security of complex and highly dynamic information systems is a key property. Security 
management aims at ensuring and maintaining this property. Effective and efficient security 
management becomes a challenging task to achieve with business requirements (e.g., mobility, 
portability, and ubiquity).  
Management of security to protect organizations’ assets ensures that business requirements 
are met inside each element of the managed environment. To always keep all managed elements on 
the track of specified requirements, security management systems entail the creation of two sides: 
downward (security governance task) and upward (security supervision task) (Figure 1.1). The 
downward stream involves electing and refining security specified requirements into tangible 
enforcement rules. The upward stream involves monitoring the organization assets in order to 
measure the impact of the applied rules; defined during the downward stream.  
Figure 1.1: Today’s generic architecture of 
Security Management System 
The scope of this work concerns ensuring that applied rules are always meeting the specified 
requirements despite the dynamic behavioral changes of the managed elements. In Figure 1.2, the 
downward governance task aims at expressing the specified requirements into security rules 
applicable to the heterogeneous managed elements. To apply these rules, there are two 
communication possibilities between the security management system and the managed elements. 
One possibility is that the communications are predefined. This is the case of interactions between the 
managed elements and authorization systems (e.g., RADIUS, Cisco TACACS). Accepting this 
possibility requires the managed elements to contact the authorization system to inform about 
permissions and prohibitions. Rules at this possibility are centrally applied at the authorization system 
level. On a second possibility, the rules must be transformed into a configuration that is at once 
complied with requirements and understandable by the managed element.  Configurations can be 
either independent (abstract) or dependent (technical) of the technology used at the managed 
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elements. Technical configurations are directly applied to the managed elements (e.g., Cisco, Linux, 
Unix, Windows). Abstract configurations are represented in form of abstract classes (e.g., using 
Managed Object Format (MOF) syntax from the Common Information Model (CIM)) or in form of 
high-level settings using configuration tools (e.g., Management Information Base). Abstract 
configurations can then be transformed into a more concrete technical form (e.g., SNMP 
configurations). The upward supervision task aims at monitoring the actual behavioral states of all 
managed elements. The monitoring process works on collecting interesting relevant information and 
reporting it to reflect the environment status. Interesting information could be related to different 
elements (e.g., servers, routers and different machines log files, intrusion detection systems (IDS) to 
inform about attacks, analyzed and structured information from SIEM (security information and event 
management), and other centralized management information). Interesting information is either used 
directly in their produced form as technical events or is treated (grouped, analyzed, filtered, etc.) to 
create readable indicators for humans. These report indicators participate in identifying whether the 
requirements are still met or not. 
Today’s presented vision of managing security is not effective and efficient enough (Figure 
1.2). The disconnection between the reported information during the supervision task and the applied 
rules during the governance task prevents security management systems from guarantying that 
requirements are always respected by the managed elements (i.e., continuously at any given time). 
Although the administrator(s) can identify the affected requirements, the question raised is “why the 
disconnection is still a problem”? Highly dynamic environments are full of modifications and changes 
in terms of the managed elements’ behavior. The problem source returns to the difficulty and the 
complexity produced from having the disconnection between the triples: rules, requirements and 
behavioral changes. With such disconnection, it is hard to recognize due to certain behavior changes, 
which rule(s) is/are still valid and still meet(s) the associated requirement(s). 
Figure 1.2: Today's detailed vision of Security Management 
We were part of the European project “PREDYKOT”. The project aims at ensuring that the 
Policy always REfined DYnamically and Kept On the Track; all along the duration of its application. 
Theoretically speaking, the project proposed to connect the downward and upward streams to 
overcome the illustrated disconnection between governance and supervision. Thus, it creates 
conceptually two security loops: a large and a small one. The large loop did exist before. It represents 
a manual loop involving the human to participate in refining the rules based on the provided reports 
concerning the behavior. The innovative small loop is an automatic loop which application creates an 
adaptive solution. The small loop helps detecting the behavior and (re) acting with security 
configuration to adapt the behavior back to meet the requirements. Thanks to the reasoning box 
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(Figure 1.3), the small loop is created. So, the innovation the project brought is to propose capturing 
the supervised feedback coming from monitoring the environment behavior changes. The feedback 
refers to semantically representing technical raw events or even analyzed SIEM events (e.g., alert of 
an attack). 
Figure 1.3: PREDYKOT innovation as generic architecture 
The thesis contribution is related to the small-automated security loop of PREDYKOT.  To 
realize our contribution, we have chosen to research in the trend of policy-based management (PBM). 
PBM is a management approach effective to use for complex systems with highly dynamic 
environments. PBM aims at self-adapting the policy due to dynamic changes within the managed 
elements without interrupting the management system functionalities.  
Nevertheless, the management community initially founded the policy-based management. 
Hence, the approach aims at performing management tasks (e.g., quality of service, service level 
agreement) by ensuring requirements such as adaptability, reliability and scalability. Afterwards, the 
security community integrated the necessary requirements for ensuring the security property (i.e., the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA)). In consequence, studies were conducted based on 
two objectives: management using configurations (with obligation-oriented policies) and security 
(with authorization-oriented policies). Performing automatized security management requires both 
objectives, and this therefore requires a unification solution.  
I .  Research Questions 
From observing the state of the art, studies have shown that both worlds of security and 
management consider two axes in their solutions: a language for the policy expression, and 
architecture for the policy enforcement. Therefore, the challenge that the PREDYKOT generic 
architecture requires is finding a generic implementation. From comparing both figures 1.2 and 1.3, 
one can distinguish three interesting points to question about the feedback. 
RQ 1: First point to question comes at the connection between the behavior feedback and the 
specified requirements. Studies hold variety of policy expression languages and models. 
The question is therefore how to unify all existing policy expressions in one solution that 
represents the behavior feedback and the heterogeneous requirements? 
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RQ 2: The reasoning box is the innovation point that represents the observing of behavior 
changes and sends them as a meaningful feedback. Therefore, the question is how to 
express such a meaningful feedback and how to manage the lifecycle of the policy? Does 
the feedback representation help bringing closer the expression of the high-level 
requirements with the low-level policy rules? Why reacting on raw or simple events is not 
enough anymore as a feedback? 
 
RQ 3: Current infrastructures are heterogeneous and incompatible with each other. Therefore, the 
enforcement of policy decisions once taken should be adaptably enforced to overcome 
such heterogeneity. So, the third point is what enforcement architecture could apply both 
authorization and configuration decisions into any technical environment? 
II .  Thesis Contribution 
We imagine that any security management system could be visualized as a middle-box 
between the requirements and the managed environment (cf. Figure 1.3). Considering PREDYKOT 
results, the small loop renders the security management system automatic and adaptive to behavior 
changes. This means, the security management system is aware of the behavior changes in form of a 
meaningful feedback and is able to adapt to this feedback by enforcing the correct policy (i.e., 
managing the policy lifecycle). Our contribution takes place in finding an implementation to the small 
loop. 
With many heterogeneous expression solutions for both security and management objectives, 
it is very difficult to make all the solutions converge into one (e.g., a meta-model solution (Barker et 
al., 2009)). However, it is possible to use an abstract and generic approach that can fulfill both 
security and management expression objectives. Attribute-based is a generic expression approach first 
advertised as an access control model called ABAC (attribute-access control model) (McCollum, et 
al., 1990). Any object is characterized with attributes and this is the feature of the approach. Every 
expression is based on the term “attribute”. For instance, the role of a subject is doctor. The role is an 
attribute.  Technically speaking, XACML proposes both a standard architecture and a language 
featured with its support for the attribute-based access control approach. Therefore, we used XACML 
version 3 in our security management solution to express the policy. (Kabbani et al., 2013) 
Nevertheless, adequately using the attribute-based approach alone is too abstract. Such an 
abstraction produces difficulties when technically controlling and analyzing the low-level behavior. 
For instance, describing all the environmental events with different types of attributes and then 
considering them into the policy is a hard process. Therefore, the behavior changes should be 
represented using a specific-attribute that could semantically express what is happening inside the 
environment. Moreover, this meaningful representation as the feedback needs to be expressed inside 
the security management policy. Our contribution then is introducing the definition of such specific-
attribute to be the term “situation”. Situations represent conditions and circumstances in which one 
object of the managed system (e.g., firewall) finds itself. Situations start and end, and therefore have a 
lifetime. Expressively, situations are feedbacks on what is happening inside the managed environment 
(e.g., during the night, any access is prohibited). They are also possible to characterize objects as 
attributes inside the policy (e.g., the firewall is under attack). Technically speaking, situations need to 
be identified. Situation identification is the reasoning on what starts, ends and keeps a certain situation 
ongoing. To monitor behavior changes, we use the Complex Event Processing technology to identify 
meaningful situations. We build the “Situation Manager”, with reference to (Adi et al., 2004), as the 
agent responsible for identifying the relevant and accurate situations and providing them to the policy 
decision process. It manages the entire identification process and keeps informing about whether a 
situation is and is not valid for authorization decisions. (Kabbani et al., 2014) 
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As an outcome of using the situation term, we overcome the limitation of current security 
policies by avoiding frequent rules updates. Moreover, the expression of situations provides the policy 
with a more abstract view of the behavior by analyzing the monitored events instead of basing the 
policy on events. However, we still need to enforce security and management decisions in order to 
adapt the managed environment upon the situations identification. We are proposing an adaptable 
enforcement architecture that could apply both authorization and configuration decisions without 
restrictions on the used technology inside the managed environment. Our contribution is based on an 
event-based architecture that follows the Bus technology (Publisher/Subscriber messages exchange) 
(Laborde et al., 2014). 
III .  Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation is divided into four parts. The first part contains Chapter 1 considering the 
general introduction. Part II discusses our research background and presents the state of the art. It 
contains two chapters dealing with policy expression and deployment architecture. The third part 
presents our contribution within the PREDYKOT project. Our vision is detailed in depth through 
three chapters dedicated to expression, architecture and concrete scenarios as a proof of concept. The 
fourth part concludes the thesis work with the final chapter and proposes future directions. 
In Chapter 2, we present the current approaches to express the policies in both management 
and security communities. We found that the security community uses access control models and 
languages to express the security policy. As for the management community, the management policy 
is expressed using obligation languages.  
In Chapter 3, we present the management and security architectures state of the art. We insist 
on their characterization by providing sound examples.  
In Chapter 4, we present the contribution to the policy expression. Integrating the notion of 
situations into the security management policies as an attribute. We define the situation notion and 
explain the identification phase in profound. Finally, we present the functionalities of our situation 
manager. 
In Chapter 5, we present the expected architecture in order to comply with the presented 
policy expression. We present the “adaptability” as a key concept to this chapter and explain why and 
how an architecture is considered adaptive. Afterwards, we present our adaptive unified architecture 
that combines XACML, Event-Based and Situation Manager architectures. 
In Chapter 6, the objective of this chapter is a proof of concept. It promotes the generic and 
unity of our contribution through presenting three different scenarios. The first scenario is broadened 
inside the healthcare environments. A second scenario discusses the importance of having security 
management of configuration that is flexible and dynamic. Previous scenarios have security-oriented 
objectives. Therefore, and towards proving the generic concept, we investigate our security 
management contribution on a third scenario with management-oriented objectives. It is about 
ensuring dynamic authorization inside energy management systems. With these three different 
scenarios, we expect no limitation for applying our solution to any environment. We finalize this 
chapter by evaluating our framework through testing the SCD architecture performance. 
In Chapter 7, we conclude the presented work highlighting our answers to the listed research 
issues. Moreover, as a result of observing our contribution, we propose an outlined methodology with 
structural procedures that we followed in each presented scenario. Then, we mention future directions 
for which this thesis could be considered as the foundation stone on unified and dynamic 
authorization based environments.  
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PART II 
 
STATE OF THE ART 
 
 
The second part presents the state of the art. We present in two 
chapters the studies related to the thesis work in term of policy 
expression and implementation. Our target studies are ones related to 
both security and management trends. Chapter 1 lists the background 
on different policy languages and security models. Chapter 2 lists the 
background on different implementation architectures for the policy 
application and enforcement. 
X 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
Security Policy & Management Policy 
Expressions 
The following chapter deals with the different methodologies to 
express a security management policy. These methodologies have always 
been a matter of heterogeneity. The chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first one focuses on the expressions of the security policy in term of 
access control models and authorization languages. The second section 
focuses on the expressions of management policy through two types of 
languages: configuration and obligation.  
 
Summary 
I.  Security Expressions 
Ø Expressing Policy using Models 
1) Historical view on models 
2) RBAC - Role Based Access Control and its family 
3) Models influenced by RBAC 
4) UCON - Usage Control model 
5) ABAC - Attribute-Based Access Control 
Ø Expressing Policy using Security Languages 
1) XACML  
2) PERMIS 
3) WS-POLICY 
II. Configuration Management 
Ø Expressing Management Policy through Languages 
1) CIM/PCIM-SPL (DMTF management solutions: Common Information Model/Policy Core 
Information Model - Simplified Policy Language) 
2) IETF PIB - Internet Engineering Task Force, Policy Information Base 
3) PDL - Policy Description Language 
4) The Ponder Policy Specification Language 
5) NETCONF: network configuration language 
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C h a p t e r  2 :  S e c u r i t y  P o l i c y  &  
M a n a g e m e n t  P o l i c y  E x p r e s s i o n s  
“To those who have exhausted politics,      
nothing remains but abstract thought.” 
Honoré De Balzac 
Columbia World of Quotations 
 Retrieved October 08, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
Introduction: 
Security management has to be considered as a binominal concept that intersects with the 
world of management and the world of security. Therefore, the challenge is finding the best policy 
expression for the management of security. Policy expressions are subject to different objectives. 
Studies are carried on expressing policies with orientation towards either the management or the 
security objectives. On the one hand, the observation that one can retain from the security literature is 
their dependence on models in order to express the policies. The policy languages are either 
representing specific-language or model-based authorization solutions. On the other hand, the 
management community presented studies on different languages that match their objectives. 
Modeling in management was not interested in expressing the policy, but in representing the managed 
information for configurations. 
In the 60s, studies on policy emphasized security objectives first with constraints related to 
single time-sharing of mainframe computers. Solution expanded later to contain individual enterprise 
constraints. Afterwards, policy evolved to target environments with multi-layers networks. In the late 
60s, the United States department of defense was not satisfied with the management of rights 
limitations (read, write, etc.). Bell labs were recruited to present the first security policy that is 
considered the earliest access control model.  
In Figure 2.5, an illustration of the access control models’ history evolution is presented. The 
draw starts the story from 1973 to 2005. By 1972, the security consideration was no longer a 
monopoly by the US military. Studies were published to secure the files management into the existing 
operating systems at that era. At this point, the security objectives were derived to fulfill both military 
and organizations requirements. The big achievement in the period of 1977 to 1989 was basically on 
three research axes. The first research axis was interested in defining models for the security of 
operating systems as a reasoning logic through preserving the ownership of resources exclusively to 
the users (discretionary) or to decouple the relationship (non-discretionary). Military requirements 
have encouraged the second axis to focus on improving the security of transmitted and processed data 
(i.e., namely in term of integrity and confidentiality). The scope of the third axis was even broader as it 
required studies to focus on both security and business objectives. Therefore, this research axis was 
pushed toward finding security commercial solutions adapted to business organizations. With the 
expanding of Internet, security objectives to manage users accounts and roles were crucial. Therefore, 
RBAC1 was a revolutionary solution that presented a template to express security policies with 
consideration to a hierarchy of their roles and work domains. At the same time, the management 
                                                
 
1 Role-Based Access Control 
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community was interested in presenting languages that help expressing solutions of controlling and 
administrating the networks complexity (e.g., Clark’s policy for network administration, Border 
Gateway Protocol and Inter-Domain Routing Protocol). 
 Figure 2.5: History of security models with security and management languages 
Significantly, the production line of the security models and the implementation of languages 
for both worlds have rapidly increased since 1993 (i.e., as will be explained at the following state of 
the art). The more security objectives evolve, the more security models and templates production 
increase (privacy, availability, etc.). Likewise, the more management objectives evolve, the more the 
language production increases (autonomy, scalability, etc.).  
The 1999’s innovation was the presentation of the policy framework to the management 
community that abstractly considers some security objectives. As a consequence, Ponder born as a 
management language, applies RBAC security templates. It could be then considered as the first trial 
towards a security management solution.  
Chapter 2 aims at more detailing the historical progress illustrated in Figure 2.5. It goes even 
beyond this history panorama by stressing the heterogeneous security and management expressing 
solutions in the literature. Chapter 2 is structured to present first security expression solutions, 
represented by the different existing models and languages. Second, the Chapter presents management 
expression solutions represented by the different existing languages. 
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I .  Security  Expressions 
“A model is a graphical, mathematical, or verbal representation of a concept, 
phenomenon, relationship, structure, system, etc.” 
Business Dictionary 
I .A .  E x p r e s s i n g  P o lic y  u s in g  M o d e ls  
As security policy is a structured statement that represents the agreed security requirements. It 
is based on the security policy that secured systems must enforce. Therefore, software engineering best 
practices recommend models to represent the conceptual understanding of the security requirements. 
The advantages of having a model are to facilitate the understanding by highlighting necessary 
features and eliminating the unnecessary ones. This helps the decision maker in designing and 
simulating scenarios. 
In 1970, Hoffman first presented formally the access control model in the domain of computer 
systems privacy. Until today, models have expressed the security policy in order to be easily 
represented in a policy language that can be enforced and deployed in the managed environment. 
These models have become a sort of templates for security policy writers. It is enough to determine 
what security features and quality should be respected to meet the requirements in order to choose a 
security policy model that matches this determination. Actually, choosing models becomes almost 
axiomatic in the business process plan. The requirements should just describe on what the system will 
be essentially based (e.g., roles, tasks, teams, organizations, etc.) in order to choose the right model. 
The drawback appears when the requirements, the environment, or the business plan changes. 
In using traditional access control models, which do not consider dynamicity and flexibility, the 
solution was to simply change the model and pick one that should meet the new changes. In 1993, the 
first appearance of models that could adapt to environment changes was introduced (Abrams et al., 
1993; Thomas & Sandhu, 1993). Since then, access control model makers keep presenting new models 
to follow the technological advances in the environment and business. The secret behind adapting to 
the environment changes is keeping the conceptual templates heterogeneous as much as possible to 
cover all kinds of security requirements⎯that is, by representing flexible notions (views, contexts, 
domains, organizations, etc.) and pushing the dynamic to be at the level of the policy rules. Changing 
the rules to pick the one that adapts to the environment changes and managing them by the flexible 
notions gives the dynamic to access control models. Moreover, the linking between the conceptual 
level (e.g., roles) and the low-level rules (e.g., firewall rules) imposes more engineering efforts, such 
as role engineering. 
I.A.1. Historical view on models 
Two of the most famous traditional access control models are discretionary access control 
(DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). 
In 1985, the Department of Defense (DoD) presented the DAC model at the National 
Computer Security Center. The DAC model is implemented essentially in the Unix/Linux operating 
systems to control access to files. The DAC model recognizes that the subject, object, and action 
define the state of the system. The access control matrix lets subjects define permissions for actions on 
their own objects (Harrison, Ruzzo, & Ullman, 1976). The operations on a matrix include entering or 
deleting an action in the matrix and creating or deleting an object or a subject. The DAC model 
supports the permission delegation for information’s owners in order to decide who can do what on 
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their information (Bell, 2005; Bus & Harrison, 2006). Such flexibility may allow wrong decisions 
regarding access control restrictions or maliciously set insecure or inappropriate permissions. The 
DAC model does not enforce information flow control at the level of process in which the model 
allows information leakage for users that are not allowed to read it (i.e., harm the integrity of the 
information). In terms of dynamicity, for example, the operation chown permits granting and revoking 
permissions, bypassing the system administrator control (Hu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2006; Park & 
Sandhu, 2002). To the contrary, non-discretionary access control (NDAC) identifies the contexts in 
which authority is vested in some users, but there are explicit controls on delegation and propagation 
of authority (Damianou, Bandara, & Sloman, 2002). NDAC policies have rules that are not created by 
the owners and can be changed only through administrative actions. 
Most organizations own the property of information rather than the end user. The MAC model 
follows the non-discretionary concept by means of administrative predefinition of control information 
to overcome the confidentiality of information (i.e., system entities have no control) (Cullough, 1990). 
The MAC model introduces the security clearance concept that is calculated based on the sensitivity of 
information contained in each resource. The subjects are first controlled by this manner to satisfy the 
military requirements of the United States DoD. The sensitivity level of objects and subjects 
determines their classification or category. For instance, lattice-based access control is a MAC model 
that defines the following security levels: Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Unclassified. MAC-
based systems are difficult to use and administer because of the restrictions and limitations imposed by 
the operating system.  
Sophisticated security models that formalize security policies for commercial purposes include 
the Clark–Wilson model (Clark & Wilson, 1987), the Bell–LaPadula model (Bell, 2005), and the 
Chinese-wall model (Brewer & Nash, 1989). The Clark–Wilson model aims at ensuring the integrity 
of the accounting system and improving its robustness. The Clark–Wilson model recommends well-
formed transactions and enforces the separation of duty. Well-formed transactions preserve and ensure 
the integrity of data. Separation of duty partitions the tasks and associated privileges by means of 
creating cooperation between multi-users to complete sensitive tasks. This reduces the possibility of 
fraud or damaging errors. The Chinese-wall policy is applied essentially to financial information 
systems. It helps individual consultants by preventing conflicting information flows (known with 
conflict of interests). “The Chinese Wall policy combines commercial discretion with legally 
enforceable mandatory controls. It is required in the operation of many financial services 
organizations and is, therefore, perhaps as significant to the financial world as Bell-LaPadula's 
policies are to the military.”  (Brewer & Nash, 1989). 
In September 2006, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) presented a list 
of concepts that every access control would need (Hu,  2006, NISTIR7316, p. 3). Objects are defined 
as entities that store and receive information and imply access to this information (e.g., records, fields 
in a database record, blocks, pages, files, directories, network nodes, electrical switches, relays, etc.). 
Subjects are seen as active entities that represent a person, process, or device. They cause information 
to flow among objects or change the system state (Gasser, 1988; Gallagher, 1988). Operations are 
active processes launched by a subject. Permission (privilege) is the right granted to a subject to 
perform some authorized actions on the ecosystem (Ferraiolo, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2003).  
An access control list (ACL) is a list planted inside an object that contains identification of all 
the subjects that are allowed to access this object. Entries of the list are formed in pairs (subject, set of 
rights). Each ACL represents a column in the access control matrix, a table with rows representing 
subjects’ identification and columns representing objects. The cells of this table are access rights that 
link a subject to an object. Separation of duty (SOD) is a principle that implies that under no 
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circumstances should a user have enough permission to abuse the system. Safety is a concept that 
measures that the leakage of permissions to an unauthorized principal will not be produced by the 
access control configuration. A safe configuration exists when no permission leaks to an unauthorized 
or unintended principal (Hu,  2006, NISTIR7316, p. 4). 
The limitation that can be considered from analyzing the above-mentioned traditional models 
is their rigidity⎯strong attachment to specific properties, categories, or metrics. For instance, the Bell-
LaPadula model is concerned about confidentiality and presents a confidential policy to prevent 
unauthorized access. The MAC model is based on the regulations mandated by a central authority 
(Boutaba & Aib, 2007). These models were only sufficient to classical computing systems such as 
databases and file systems. 
I.A.2. RBAC and its family 
A new era in access control modeling started when security researches began to drive an 
access control based on classifications, or categories. Role-based access control (RBAC) has been 
defined to classify the access rights based on roles inside organizations. For instance, a doctor can 
access her patient information. A trainee doctor, on the other hand, could not modify the patient 
information. This methodology of identifying a subject by its role has reduced the management 
headache, as it groups the characterizations of individuals. But what if enterprises needed to make the 
authorizations based on individuals themselves or their tasks, or another property? 
RBAC imposes a difficult process of understanding the organization’s structure from the role 
point of view only. The output of this process links access rights with the defined roles. Therefore, 
RBAC imposes role engineering to facilitate this process, which is the process of developing an 
RBAC structure for an organization. Large firms often discover the need for hundreds of roles, which 
they must structure into an efficient hierarchy to manage permissions for the various roles of the 
organization’s many IT systems. Some organizations also include non-IT permissions in roles. 
(Coyne, Weil, & Kuhn, 2011) 
Figure 2.6: RBAC Model (ANSI INCITS 359, 2004) 
Defining roles by an engineered approach is called a top-down method, as the bottom-up 
approach is rather interested in data mining techniques by extracting patterns from the databases and 
users’ permission lists (i.e., role mining). RBAC is based on the principle that the most crucial 
information to access a resource is the role that a user plays in the system (Chadwick, Otenko, & Ball, 
2003). RBAC defines a role as “a job function within the context of an organization with some 
associated semantics regarding the authority and the responsibility conferred on the user assigned to 
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the role” (Gavrila & Barkley, 1998; Gouglidis & Mavridis, 2010). That means that a user is associated 
to a role and that permissions are associated to that role. Currently, Gartner’s recent market analysis 
considers RBAC as one of the most commercially adopted means of access control (O’Connor & 
Loomis, 2011).  
After introducing RBAC to organizations, researchers were going through creating a family 
for this model and making this family grow bigger with the requirements’ evolution. The traditional 
access control models no longer satisfied organizations. They claimed the need to align requirements 
with technological advances, but keeping the role structuring valid. Therefore, researchers worked to 
produce models that are dynamic in the way that roles are assigned differently when the context 
changes, but the role assignment strategy and the context definition depend on the model’s creation 
objectives. Here are some examples of the RBAC family to explain this type of dynamicity: 
 Privacy-Aware. P-RBAC extends RBAC to support privacy issues. Its objective is to 
keep limited to the public privacy policies, privacy statements, and privacy acts like 
HIPPA in healthcare applications (Ni, Bertino, & Lob, 2008). 
 Dynamic Coalition in Distributed Environments. dRBAC is applied in cloud computing 
to handle policy administration, role mapping and role delegation, such as in multi-tenant 
policy management issues (Freudenthal, Pesin, Port, Keenan, & Karamcheti, 2002). 
 BTG-RBAC.RBAC is a rigid model with only two access control decisions: Allow or 
Deny. In healthcare environments, Break The Glass (BTG) scenarios require flexible 
policies that allow users to bypass the access control by breaking or overriding the policy 
in a controlled and reasonable manner. The BTG-RBAC model aims at providing an BTG 
option, which allows users (originally unauthorized) to break the glass and have access 
(Ferreira et al., 2009). 
 Temporal-RBAC (TRBAC). This RBAC extension tackles a dynamic aspect with regard 
to the role availability as it differs between users at certain time-slots, known as temporal 
dependencies among roles. TBAC supports enabling and disabling roles periodically and 
temporarily (Joshi et al., 2001). 
 There are many other models in this family. For instance, here are some extensions of the 
RBAC model: I-RBAC: Isolation Enabled Role-Based Access Control (Gunti, Sun, & 
Niamat, 2011); RBAC+: Dynamic Access Control for RBAC-administered web-based 
Databases (Bouchahda, Thanh, Bouhoula, & Labbene, 2010); PuRBAC: Purpose-Aware 
Role-Based Access Control (Masoumzadeh & Joshi, 2008); CRiBAC: Community-based 
Role interaction-based Access Control model (Jung & Joshi, 2012); ROBAC: Role And 
Organization Based Access Control Model (Zhang, Zhang, & Sandhu, 2006). 
I.A.3. Models influenced by RBAC 
AC models, other than RBAC and its family, drive the authorization system to deliver 
authorization decisions on giving or taking rights based on a class or a category, other than roles. 
Access control models based on the concept of team, task, and token have been introduced. Task-
based access control (TBAC) is a task-oriented and traditional subject-object access control that is 
proposed in boundaries of agent-based distributed computing and workflow management. During the 
completion of tasks, the model involves authorizations in accordance with some application logic 
(Thomas & Sandhu, 1997). However, work on managing the workflow has been treated in the research 
without the need to create yet another model (Laborde, Kamel, Barrere, & Benzekri, 2007). Team-
based access control (TMAC) is applied in collaborative environments where activities are 
accomplished through organized teams. The abstract notion of a team encapsulates a collection of 
users in special roles, assigning them specific tasks or goals. This model follows the concept of 
activating a context to assign permissions. Finally, token-based access control is implemented in the 
cloud-computing environment. With interest in efficiently managing jobs, the model defines six types 
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of access levels and an enforcement strategy that reduces the number of jobs required (Khaled, 
Husain, Khan, Hamlen, & Thuraisingham, 2010). 
AC models are based on context, organizations, states, etc. In smart spaces, context-based 
access control (CBAC) is a model aiming at managing authorizations based on the trust level of the 
participants, calculated based on their context: location, current date, device type, etc. (Smirnov, 
Kashevnik, Shilov, & Teslya, 2013). A competing model to CBAC is the situation-based access 
control (SitBAC) model. It is a conceptual model that represents mainly healthcare organization 
scenarios by defining phenomena describing the access to patient data (e.g., patient's data-access 
scenarios). The SitBAC formally represents access situations as a concept ontology that includes 
patient, data requestor, medical record (MD), task, and response with their attributes and relationships 
(Beimel & Peleg, 2010, 2011). SitBAC is introduced to cover essentially one-security management 
requirements: confidentiality in healthcare. To control authorizations on mobile devices, the stateful 
access control model (SACM) aims at creating new rules or deleting old rules in order to dynamically 
distribute them to mobile devices. The authorization decisions then are delivered based on the stored 
state in the model (dos Santos et al., 2013). Another model is Nephele, which constructs hyper-groups, 
a special form of network domains, and keeps the authorization and authentication of users controlled 
locally at each of these domains (Margaritis, Hatzieleftheriou, & Anastasiadis, 2013). The risk-
adaptable access control (RAdAC) model, or contextual risk-based access control, presupposes that 
there is a risk factor and a necessity associated with each access. Therefore, for each access or 
operation, the system based on this model should measure and assess the risk and the necessity. The 
calculation is made of the risk of accessing a certain resource against the denied access cost (Diep et 
al., 2007; McGraw, 2009). 
The final dynamic access control we present here is the organization-based access control 
(ORBAC or OrBAC).  OrBAC considers the organization as the most important term to base the 
authorization decisions on. Organization is considered as an abstract layer that lets role, activity, and 
view concepts abstracting the subject, action, and object concepts. It aims at defining a security policy 
independently from the implementation. Based on the behavior of the organizations, the authorization 
decisions may change. The behavior is represented by contexts in which they are defined as logical 
rules, and reasoning on them activates these contexts. Like all access control models, OrBAC faces a 
matter of conflicts and defines strategies to overcome the rule incoherence (Kalam et al., 2003). 
It is essential for this work to mention that every dynamic access control model mentioned 
above is dynamic because it works on activating, changing, and modifying the rules of the security 
policy. Therefore, dynamic access control models are subject to conflicts, as they involve activating 
contexts, tasks, teams, etc., thus violating old rules. Hence, the refinement must be performed 
frequently and repeatedly during the runtime. 
I.A.4. Usage Control model 
A new model recently introduced aims at separating the usage control from being managed by 
the access control, which will be a reason to create more models. UCON was officially introduced to 
define the usage of rights upon digital objects (Park & Sandhu, 2002). UCON includes trust 
management, to assign authorization to unidentified subjects in an open environment like Internet, and 
digital rights management (DRM), assures the control at the client-side (Feltus, 2008). UCON 
supports the usual access control functions: authorization, obligation, and conditions. Authorization 
evaluates subjects before the usage to decide if they deserve the access or not. Obligation verifies, both 
before the usage and during it, that the subjects respect predefined conditions. Conditions are based on 
the environment or the system. The new proposition by this model is the ongoing decision process that 
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goes before and during the usage and the manipulation of objects or subjects by updating them during 
or after the usage. However, UCON shows weaknesses in detecting and handling policy conflicts, 
hierarchies, and temporal constraints along with revocation of user rights. The model also adds 
administration complexity in term of users’ identities, especially in highly heterogeneous and dynamic 
environments (Danwei, Xiuli, & Xunyi, 2009; Lazouski, Martinelli, & Mori, 2010; Zhang, Parisi-
Presicce, Sandhu, & Park, 2005). 
Figure 2.7: UCON model and its properties (Zhang, Parisi-Presicce, Sandhu, & Park, 2005). 
I.A.5. Attribute-Based Access Control 
Knowledge is a very important aspect during the security policy expression, especially for a 
brand new system or network. This knowledge is only gathered by well defining and analyzing the 
future designed system or network in order to provide well-defined security requirements. Then, the 
effort on expressing the security policy comes based on these requirements. However, the more the 
knowledge about the system or the network in terms of expected behaviors (e.g., context of the system 
or the network) and the environment capabilities, the more accurate and comprehensive the expression 
with regard to the security and expression requirements. 
From analyzing the access control models methodology, the need for a generic approach to 
express the security policy is obvious in order to fulfill all the expression requirements and to provide 
a uniform approach for an organization instead of 700 models (Barker, 2009). 
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is not an access control model, as many researchers 
describe it (Kuhn et al., 2010). Rather, ABAC is an approach to expressing the security policy based 
on attributes, a generic term that can handle and meet any expression requirements.  
The presentation of the ABAC model is a first step toward a generic solution for access 
control systems (Yang & Jia, 2014; Hur & Noh, 2011; Lang, Foster & Siebenlist, 2009; Li, Gao & 
Wang, 2013). The model’s generality comes from the notion of attribute, which aggregates all 
properties and categories specified in older models. This abstract view makes the expression of 
policies easier, as the most important step become the definition of the attributes that an AC system 
should handle. ABAC represents a set of attributes that characterizes a subject; based on an evaluation 
process, the subject will be authorized or not to access controlled resources. For instance, the roles are 
attributes characterizing subjects and are considered in the evaluation process. Therefore, RBAC is a 
special case of ABAC, where the RBAC model considers all evaluation processes to be based on roles. 
Based on the assessment of attribute information  (i.e., time of the day, persons logged on to 
the network) and information about a user (e.g., role and location), the authorization system can give 
almost instantaneous decisions about whether a subject is appropriately authorized to perform an 
action on an object. The ABAC advantage is the leveraging of attributes about subjects, objects, and 
their environment conditions. In conclusion, ABAC avoids role engineering. However, in case 
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attributes were not defined consistently, the security policy becomes more dynamic than would be 
preferable for audit and attestation. In consequence, ABAC requires specifying a larger number of 
rules, making the refinement more difficult (Colantonio, 2012). Nevertheless, in case the attributes 
were defined consistently and comprehensively, the security policy should be stable enough with 
minimum possible dynamicity and therefore with conflict-free rules. 
I .A .5.i  Attribute Terminology 
The power of attributes is that they do not need to be defined or categorized. However, it helps 
the usage and the linking in the security policy and for this manuscript to be consistent. Therefore, the 
terminologies to be defined are mainly, with no limitation, subjects, resources, actions, environment, 
organization, domain, etc. 
The NIST institute adopted the concise definitions of the multiple terms (attributes) that are 
frequently used throughout the Federal Government and the Identity and Access Management (IAM). 
An object, or a resource, represents the protected entity against unauthorized access. The subject is any 
entity of the system or the network that requests to perform an action, an operation, or a process that 
needs access authorization for the targeted object. Most of the subjects are considered human. 
However, if a computer or another non-human subject performs the operation, it must be performed on 
behalf of an authorized person or organization. 
Attributes are characteristics of a subject such as name, birthday, address, medical record, and 
role in the organization. These attributes individually or combined comprise the subjects’ unique 
identity. The environment attributes are conditions that represent dynamic factors, such as context: 
time, location, threat level, and temperature. 
Policy rules govern the allowed behavior within the environment of an organization. The rules 
are written based on attributes like subjects, objects, actions, and the environment’s conditions. 
Managed objects’ attributes help in describing their identities, also known as resource attributes. 
We2 believe that ABAC is not a model. ABAC is an expression method that approaches to 
facilitate and generalize the expression of security and management policies based on an abstract 
terminology, which is “attribute”.  
I .B .  E x p r e s s i n g  P o lic y  u s in g  S e c u r ity  L a n g u a g e s  
In access control, heterogeneity introduces more heterogeneity. By analyzing the literature 
around AC models diversity, the policy is usually expressed considering three main aspects: access 
control models, security requirements, and the domain of application according to its technical 
environment (e.g., cloud computing, healthcare, smart grids, etc.). In the literature, these three 
elements permit the representation of the expressed policy to be oriented either by authorizations with 
interests prioritizing security objectives – namely CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) 
based on access control models. 
Authorization languages are introduced mainly for security management purposes to tackle 
security issues. These languages prioritize CIA requirements. W3C P3P (Platform for Privacy 
Preferences Project) and W3C APPEL (An Adaptable and Programmable Policy Environment and 
Language) use a P3P Preference Exchange Language. APPEL language is call control language based 
                                                
 
2 The Institute of Research in Informatics at Toulouse (IRIT), the team Service IntEgration and netwoRk 
Administration (SIERA) 
 — 18 —  
on XML grammar for interchanging of structured data in distributed systems through three levels: the 
core, the policy and the domain (Turner, Reiff-marganiec, Blair, Cambpell, & Wang, 2007). APPEL is 
dedicated to sensor networks and homecare applications. Languages represent security and privacy in 
pervasive computing environments; for example, Rei is a policy language based upon the deontic logic 
(Tonti et al., 2003). 
There are policy language representations associated only with specific models. For instance, 
the IBM Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) is a specific policy language for purpose-
based access control, an extension of RBAC. ASL (Authorization Specification Language) represents 
an RBAC model using first-order logic (Jajodia, Samarati, & Subrahmanian, 1997). Another RBAC-
specific policy language is Tower (Hitchens & Varadharajan, 2001). 
Nevertheless, there are three languages among the most common and important ones to study 
when handling issues related to access control. First, the standardized XACML3 by OASIS is an 
attribute-based language. At the second place, PERMIS4 a language, an architecture and special 
infrastructure oriented to manage the privileges and the RBAC model polishes its syntax through the 
usage of Roles. Its strength is coming from the ability to be integrated virtually into any application 
and any authentication scheme (e.g., Shibboleth (Internet2), Kerberos, username/passwords, Grid 
proxy certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)). At the third place, the WS-POLICY is a 
dedicated language for web-services that is also polished by the RBAC model. (Han & Lei, 2012) 
I.B.1. XACML 
The OASISXACML5 standard describes both an XML policy language and an access control 
decision based on an XML request/response language. To meet the general access control 
requirements, the policy language has standard extension points for defining new functions, data types, 
combining logic, etc. Concerning the request/response language, it customizes a query to inquire 
whether a given access request should be allowed or not, and then to interpret the result. However, the 
response is an answer about whether the request should be allowed choosing one of four values: 
Permit, Deny, Indeterminate or Not Applicable. The Indeterminate value occurs because of an error or 
some missing required value, so a decision cannot be made. The Not Applicable is also a special case 
when the request can't be answered by this service. 
The XACML policy language is used to describe general access control requirements in terms 
of constraints on attributes. Specifically, attributes could be any characteristics of any category such as 
the subject, the resource, the action, or the environment in which the access request is made. Attributes 
have an identifier, which is a Uniform Resource Name (URN), and a data type also identified by a 
URN. Considering attributes makes the language very flexible. Moreover, XACML language is 
natively extensible. 
In Figure 2.8, the XACML security policy is composed of several XML tags. The top XML 
tag in the hierarchy is the policy set. XACML security policy could contain several policy sets. 
Policies are grouped in a policy set. However, any policy includes the following: 
 A target element which is a first filter for searching the applicable policy 
 A set of obligation expressions that are instantiated when a matching request is processed. 
PEPs must enforce obligations. 
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 A set of advice expressions that are instantiated when a matching request is processed. An 
advice expression is similar in its form to an obligation. However, PEPs may or may not 
enforce an advice expression. Advice expressions are new features introduced by version 3 of 
XACML. 
 A set of rules, which are expressions to determine if a request is denied or permitted. A rule 
contains a target and may include obligation and advice expressions specific to this rule. 
Obligation and advice inside rules are new to version 3 of XACML. 
Figure 2.8: XACML policy version 3.0, OASIS standard, 2013. 
An example that can demonstrate the expressiveness power and features of XACML is 
through version 3. The example takes the filtering of web page resources by controlling the access to 
them according to several levels of the request. A static web page contains immobile contents (e.g., 
static images and texts). There should be a mechanism to control the appearance of images for only 
authorized users and not all of them. Therefore, there exist a specific permission for each image. As a 
result, the web page that is viewed by a user (i.e., at a specific time) permits dynamically only the 
authorized images. Rules are based on assigned users’ attributes such as their roles. Based on this 
sample scenario extracted from WSO2 samples, we can create the following high-level policy: 
XACML is an attribute-based language that manipulates attributes coming from different 
sources (e.g., the request itself) in order to deliver a response that contains decision(s). The XACML 
representation for the described authorization policy is listed in the Table 2.1. 
Based on this policy, the request will consider the view requests coming from everywhere 
inside an organization and deliver responses to these requests. Assuming Bob as nonuser (or from 
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The main page web index is allowed for access (namely view) by three groups of users: 
“publicUsers“, “internalUsers”, and “adminUsers”. The public users can view two types 
of images (view.gif and help.gif). The internal users are allowed to view in addition to the 
two previous types the copy.gif, move.gif and cancel.gif. The admin can see all previous 
images and the add.gif, edit.gif, and delete.gif. Roman, François, and Abdelmalek are 
users of the mentioned groups respectively. Outside this policy, default decision is deny. 
Web Page Authorization Policy 
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unmentioned group), the response of the policy would be ‘deny’. However, any of Romain, François, 
or Abdelmalek would be allowed to view the web page with the images view.gif and help.gif. 
The XACML authorization language is a flexible, powerful and stable standard language. 
OASIS standardized XACML to express policies based on attributes. This feature bestowed the 
language greater flexibility to express any security objectives, including the CIA requirements. At 
many state-of-the-art studies that we came by, there is regrettably an absence in presenting the 
XACML strengths. The trustworthiness in the sources of attributes that a party provides is an 
important issue to consider as the decision itself is made based on the evaluation of these attributes. 
The issuer of the attributes information is well covered by the XACML syntax and gives the decision 
trust a level in terms of the quality of security.  
The management requirements and objectives do not elect the XACML language for the task 
of configuration management. The XACML was not designed initially as an obligation oriented 
language. However, the flexibility of the language does not stop at the point of expression. The 
extensibility, which the language and its framework offer, permits the supportability of new features 
and requirements to be included. Therefore, many studies ignore this feature and evaluate the language 
according to its current and standard drawn visage.  
Table 2.1: XACML pseudo authorization policy for the access control of static webpage6. 
                                                
 
6 This is not an executable policy; it is an extraction from the original written in a simpler manner as XACML 
example https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wso2/commons/master/balana/modules/balana-samples/web-page-
image-filtering/resources/web-image-filter-policy.xml. 
<Policy> 
 <Target><AnyOf><AllOf> 
<AttributeValue>index.jsp</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>view</AttributeValue> 
</AllOf></AnyOf></Target> 
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule_for_all_groups"> 
<Target><AnyOf><AllOf> 
<AttributeValue>publicUsers</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>internalUsers</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>adminUsers</AttributeValue> 
</AllOf></AnyOf></Target> 
<Condition><Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
<AttributeValue>view.gif</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>help.gif</AttributeValue> 
</Apply></Condition></Rule> 
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule_for_all_internal_user_group"> 
<Target><AnyOf><AllOf> 
<AttributeValue>internalUsers</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>adminUsers</AttributeValue> 
</AllOf></AnyOf></Target> 
<Condition><Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
<AttributeValue>copy.gif</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>move.gif</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>cancel.gif</AttributeValue> 
</Apply></Condition></Rule> 
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule_for_all_admin_user_group"> 
<Target><AnyOf><AllOf> 
<AttributeValue>adminUsers</AttributeValue> 
</AllOf></AnyOf></Target> 
<Condition><Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
<AttributeValue>add.gif</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>edit.gif</AttributeValue> 
<AttributeValue>delete.gif</AttributeValue> 
</Apply></Condition></Rule> 
<Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Rule_deny_all"/> 
</Policy> 
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I.B.2. PERMIS 
One of the soundest authorization solutions that is harmonized with the attribute certificates 
X.509 and standardized by NIST, PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards (PERMIS) 
allows the management of privileges based on roles by providing a complete framework (system and 
infrastructure). PERMIS ensures the implementation of the access control based on the RBAC model.  
The framework provides a privilege management infrastructure (PMI) with a secure 
cryptography approach through public key encryption technologies (PKI). 
PERMIS X.509 PMI RBAC Policy (Chadwick & Otenko, 2002) is comprised of several sub-
policies (see Figure 2.9). The PMI Policy domain unifies all the sub-policies domains. A unique object 
identifier (OID) is assigned to each policy to globally identify it. A policy language needs to specify 
multiple heterogeneous policies combinations and their matching enforcing mechanisms (Zhou & 
Meinel, 2007). However, one drawback of PERMIS is that it does not offer such a possibility. 
Figure 2.9: The X.509 PMI RBAC Policy and its Sub-Policies (Chadwick & Otenko, 
2002, p. 5, figure 1) 
Obviously, PERMIS is a good utility to manage the authorization of organizations using the 
notion of domain. An example of a PERMIS policy can be made to better understand the expression 
using its RBAC language. The Disclosure Policy example, extracted from (Lopez, Canovas, Gomez-
Skarmeta, Otenko, & Chadwick, 2005), is applied “when two or more domains are involved in a trust 
relationship, where users from one domain can request access to resources in the other domains, it is 
necessary to define which user’s attributes could be revealed to those domains. If the domain 
requesting those attributes is a highly trusted domain, due to a previously established very restrictive 
security agreement, the home domain could reveal all the user’s attributes. Otherwise, if the 
relationship established between the domains is not so trusted, the home domain could decide to 
conceal some of them”. 
The Disclosure Policy aims at controlling access (namely the disclosure) to all available 
attributes that exist in the managed domain (called CCS7). Therefore, the policy defines the following 
elements: Subjects, Roles, SOA, Targets, Actions, and Target Access. Subjects are the only allowed 
set of external domains that can request access to the internal domain user’s attributes. Roles 
describing what role each external domain has to play. SOA is the Authorization Authority  (AA) that 
manages the Authorization Certificates issued by the home domain (the PERMIS authorization 
infrastructure through subject-attribute pairs) for each external domain (CCS). Targets describe what 
                                                
 
7 Credential Conversion Service integrates external authorization schemes (non SAML-based) into authorization 
scenarios which make use of SAML as the main language for assertions. (Cánovas et al., 2004)  
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set of users will have their attributes disclosed at the access request moment. There is only one action 
defined here (i.e., disclose) and it gets one parameter (i.e., the attribute to disclose). The Target Access 
describes the link (between a particular set of users and the assigned attributes) that can be disclosed to 
which domains, and under which conditions (see Table 2.2). 
In conclusion, the simple Disclosure Policy expresses that only CCSs (Subjects) with 
LongTerm-CC attribute value, will obtain access to the attribute studentRole type, with the value 
ERASMUS, assigned to the targeted users (Students). Upon the receiving of the attribute query, a 
request is generated in form of a message for each user attribute. The message contains the specified 
target domain (i.e., including subject and role), the requested attribute (i.e., including type and value) 
and the required action. 
PERMIS implies that any organization needs (mostly obligated) to create and design roles 
(possibly need to provide a hierarchy) then assigns them to domains and subjects – it is known as the 
role engineering phase – in order to be able to use the language. 
Table 2.2: Disclosure Policy example (Lopez, Canovas, Gomez-Skarmeta, Otenko, & Chadwick, 2005). 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="2.6.2004.24.1.2005">  
<SubjectPolicy><SubjectDomainSpec ID="SD_International_CCSs">  
<Include LDAPDN=" cn=CCS, o=SAMLDomain,c=C "/>  
</SubjectDomainSpec></SubjectPolicy>  
 <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
 <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.">  
  <SupRole Value="ShortTerm-CCS"></SupRole>  
  <SupRole Value="LongTerm-CCS">  
   <SubRole Value="ShortTerm-CCS"/>  
  </SupRole>  
 </RoleSpec></RoleHierarchyPolicy>  
 <SOAPolicy><SOASpec ID="PERMISDomain_UAM"  
 LDAPDN=" cn=UAM,o=PERMISDomain,c=C "/></SOAPolicy>  
 <RoleAssignmentPolicy><RoleAssignment>  
 <SubjectDomain ID="SD_International_CCSs"/>  
 <RoleList>  
  <Role Type=" permisRole " Value="LongTerm-CCS"/>  
 </RoleList> <Delegate Depth="0"/>  
 <SOA ID="PERMISDomain_UAM"/>  
 <Validity/>  
 </RoleAssignment></RoleAssignmentPolicy>  
 <TargetPolicy><TargetDomainSpec ID="All-Users">  
  <Include LDAPDN="o=PERMISDomain, c=C"/>  
  </TargetDomainSpec><TargetDomainSpec ID="Students">  
  <Include LDAPDN="ou=Students, o=PERMISDomain, c=C"/>  
  </TargetDomainSpec><TargetDomainSpec ID="Professors">  
  <Include LDAPDN="ou=Professors, o=PERMISDomain, c=C"/>  
  </TargetDomainSpec> 
 </TargetPolicy> 
 <ActionPolicy><Action Name="disclose" Args="role value"/></ActionPolicy>  
 <TargetAccessPolicy><TargetAccess> 
  <RoleList><Role Type="permisRole" Value="LongTerm-CCS"/></RoleList>  
 <TargetList><Target Actions="disclose">  
 <TargetDomain ID="Students"/> 
 </Target></TargetList>  
 <IF><AND><Substrings><Arg Name="role" Type="String"/>  
  <Constant Type="String" Value="studentRole"/></Substrings>  
  <Substrings><Arg Name="value" Type="String"/> 
  <Constant Type="String" Value="ERASMUS"/></Substrings>  
 </AND></IF></TargetAccess></TargetAccessPolicy>  
</X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy>  
 
I.B.3. WS-POLICY 
As of September 2007, WS-Policy is a W3C recommendation that represents a set of security 
policy specifications dedicated for web services only. These specifications describe the business (i.e., 
including security) policies capabilities and constraints on agents and end-points (e.g., required 
security tokens, supported encryption algorithms, and privacy rules). The specifications also describe 
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the association of policies with services and end-points. The WS-Policy specifications allow 
representing web services policies using XML (for security, quality of service, etc.) and allow the 
consumers of web services to specify their policy requirements. The WS-Policy framework aims at 
allowing web services to express their constraints and requirements using policy assertions (i.e., an 
assertion is an individual requirement, capability, other property, or a behavior). WS-Policy is featured 
with its flexibility concerning token types, cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms used. The 
intention behind this flexibility is providing enough compatibility and interoperability information 
determined by web service participants (i.e., along with any other necessary information) in order to 
actually allow a participant to enroll in a secure messages exchange. (WS-Policy Specification, 2006) 
The policy assertions for a web service are in forms of requirements or advertisements. The 
operators tags for policy combinations are XML tags mainly. The wsp:ExactlyOne asserts the 
satisfaction of only one child node.  The wsp:All asserts the satisfaction of all child nodes.  
An example on WS-Policy is brought from the WS-Security Policy specification document 
(Della-Libera, 2005). Table 2.3 shows an example on a security "Effective Policy". The policy 
includes following assertions (i.e., requirements or other properties) concerning: bindings, associated 
property, token, and together integrity and confidentiality. By explaining each line: 
Line 1: The main wsp:Policy indicates the beginning of a policy statement for what 
all beneath elements are required to be satisfied. 
Line 2: In this tag, the kind of security binding is defined as symmetric. This means, 
for instance, that the encryption token used from the message initiator to the message 
recipient is also used from the recipient to the initiator. 
Line 3: Contains an example of a nested policy wsp:Policy. Its elements are assertions 
that qualify the behavior of the SymmetricBinding assertion. 
Line 4: Indicates a ProtectionToken assertion. It involves the population of the 
Encryption Token and the Signature Token properties. It is used mainly for the 
message protection using signature and encryption. 
Line 5: Another nested policy element (wsp:Policy) that indicates the type of token to 
be used for the ProtectionToken. 
Line 6: Holds that a Kerberos V5 APREQ token is to be used by both parties in a 
message exchange for protection. 
Line 9: Specify that signatures must be generated over plaintext and before 
encrypting it into cipher text.  
Line 10: The assertion implies the requirement of the encryption of the signature (i.e., 
made over the signed messages parts).  
Line 13-16: These lines indicate what the primary signature must cover of the message 
parts. In this case, the signature is covering the soap:Body element (line 14) and any 
SOAP headers in the WS-Addressing namespace (in line 15).  
Line 17-19: These lines indicate what message parts must be encrypted. In this case, only 
the soap:Body element will be encrypted (line 18). 
Table 2.3: Example on WS-Policy representation for security policy (Della-Libera, 2005). 
<wsp:Policy> 
<sp:SymmetricBinding> 
<wsp:Policy> 
<sp:ProtectionToken> 
<wsp:Policy> 
<sp:KerberosV5APREQToken sp:IncludeToken=".../IncludeToken/Once" /> 
</wsp:Policy> 
</sp:ProtectionToken> 
<sp:SignBeforeEncrypting /> 
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<sp:EncryptSignature /> 
</wsp:Policy> 
</sp:SymmetricBinding> 
<sp:SignedParts> 
<sp:Body/> 
<sp:Header Namespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing"/> 
</sp:SignedParts>  
<sp:EncryptedParts> 
<sp:Body/> 
</sp:EncryptedParts> 
</wsp:Policy> 
One of WS-Policy standard family major drawbacks is letting the policy assertions of the  
WS-* standards to have very big XML structures. This makes these assertions incredibly difficult to 
be expressed by humans (Simon et al., 2011). Another drawback of WS-PolicyConstraints is its 
dependent on the message structure and syntax. Thus, it is difficult to map between different 
vocabularies. Moreover, the matching for two policy assertions requires checking the XPath queries 
content. (Speiser, 2010) 
II .  Configuration Management 
Configuration management aims at applying changes to the managed system (or to its entities) 
in order to make sure it meets the security requirements. For instance, the governance of systems 
implies providing a new configuration for firewalls and routers when new hires arrive concerning their 
allowed devices. Therefore, it is crucial for any security management system to have the ability to 
provision configurations. Configurability is the ability to initialize and dynamically modify all 
managed targets without interruption (i.e. subjects, objects, actions and environment by modifying, for 
example, parameters, start tracking activities, or change database paths) and the values of the attributes 
governing the behavior of an enforcement process (e.g., location of a software component or adding 
auditing mechanisms) (Moui, 2013, p. 59). A configuration of a system consists of collecting specific 
functional or non-functional parameters or attributes (also known as configuration data). The 
parameters’ values govern the expected functionalities and behaviors that the managed system should 
convey. Continually, the reconfiguration process is the act of modifying or adjusting the existing 
configurations (Akue, Lavinal, Desprats, & Sibilla, 2013). 
The configuration, or called also setting, is the simplest, maybe the oldest, adaptation 
methodology for an application. The software application holds a predetermined variety of parameters 
that guides its execution. For example, the router’s routing table, the number of simultaneous 
connections for an Apache web server, or simply the IP address of a machine. The variable can be 
configured or customized at the time of instantiation (Static adaptation) or during the runtime 
(dynamic adaptation). The configuration mechanism is provided either as parameters during the 
application launching, based on a configuration file, or by using an external configuration manager. 
The latter solution is the one that offers the most flexibility, but it is also the most difficult to 
implement (Desertot, 2007). Upon the configuration (or reconfiguration) of software to bestow a 
dynamic adaptation, the management of the behavior in terms of the software and its components life 
cycle becomes more crucial. The decision of applying a configuration requires the consideration of the 
transition between the old and the new one. For example, the routing software module may probably 
need to complete performing the routing of waiting IP datagrams inside a queue, before taking into 
account the new routing table (Cheaito, 2012, p. 51). 
The management world is concerned about the importance of the configuration process to the 
level where studies are interested about the information of the managed systems. Standards from the 
Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) have been proposed to provide mechanisms for the 
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definition and use of management information for systems, networks, applications and services. The 
striving objectives of provided standards are to represent all IT components through management 
models, store management information in data structures and to allow data repositories access and 
updates. Currently, there are several initiatives dedicated to the representation of these standards. 
Previous efforts to meet these management standards were presented through several models, such as 
those used by SNMP (simple network management protocol), DMI (distributed management 
interface), and CMIP (common management information protocol). Such models are actually unified 
using the Common Information Model.  
The Common Information Model is the most common model used for the system and network 
management. However, there are other information models about managed resources like: the SNMP 
architecture using the MIB/SMI (Rose & McCloghrie, 1990; McCloghrie, Case, Rose, Waldbusser, 
1999; Schoenwaelder, Jason, Strauss, Weiss, 2001). The information model MIB/GDMO (ISO 10165-
4) is used for both architectures OSI and TMN, and the policy based management uses the PIB/SPPI 
(RFC 3159). However, these information models do not represent the advanced and concrete 
technologies and do not consider the abstraction offered by CIM. Moreover, the frameworks using 
these architectures (e.g., SNMP, CMSP) are incompatible with each other. Therefore, each framework 
ought to get its own application domain – despite the common interest of these frameworks and their 
managed environments. 
Nevertheless, there exist another recent promising model taking on its own the support of a 
unique network configuration protocol (NETCONF). The data model Yang, until 2013, is not yet 
available as a complete standard approach for NETCONF users. However, the Yang data modeling 
language is available and supports the expression and description of complicated and complex 
configurations. It is more powerful than CIM, SMI/SNMP and SPPI. The Yang language is able to 
describe complex routing tables (supporting list of routes) and critical configuration operations 
(locking of data sources during multiple accesses). Yang does not currently support Software Defined 
Networking (SDN) specifications. However, the architecture proposed by Yang for NetConf supports 
SDN and is standardized by IETF (Shafer, 2011). As a conclusion, one can say that Yang needs a little 
more time to get the light from CIM and to be considered as fully matured, especially that it is not 
totally supported by the technical leaders like CISCO. (Schonwalder, Bjorklund, & Shafer, 2010; 
Knertser & Tsarinenko, 2013) 
I I .A .  E x p r e s s i n g  M a n a g e m e n t P o lic ie s  th r o u g h  
L a n g u a g e s   
In the literature, studies have identified the management policies in a similar way like the 
security policies based on two structures CA and ECA. Obligations are “the actions that must be 
performed by manager objects within the system when specific events occur and a set of conditions are 
met” (Boutaba & Aib, 2007). Management policies are languages eventually oriented by obligations to 
ensure the management task. Obligation policies are based on either ECA structured languages and 
therefore obligations are invoked upon specific event(s) occurring. As another choice, policy 
languages are structured as CA rules to represent a special form of the obligation policies. In such 
cases, obligations are stored as configurations to be used, fired or installed when necessary (e.g., in 
form of parameters). Both ECA and CA policies seek meeting the management requirements through 
providing the provisioning feature in order to adapt the behavior (i.e., provision management 
configurations).  
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Studies on management policies identify languages’ abilities to represent the expressed policy 
with an obligations orientation. That is, policies are interested in prioritizing management objectives – 
namely configuration ones based on management information models. The following sections are 
examples on the most common management policy languages. 
II.A.1. CIM/PCIM-SPL DMTF management solution 
CIM is an object-oriented, vendor- and system-independent information model defined by the 
DMTF used to describe various components of managed systems, including software and hardware 
elements and their relationships. Based on an object-oriented modeling approach, CIM describes the 
elements of IT systems using object classification, and specifies relationships among objects using 
object-oriented concepts, such as inheritance and dependencies. The goal of CIM is to model all 
aspects of the managed environment, including systems, devices, networks, operating systems, 
applications, and even users. 
 CIM is not simply a model, but contains a metamodel as well (DSP0004, V 3.0). It allows the 
integration of other different information models, especially MIB/SMI and MIB/GDMO (Nataf, 
Festor, & Doyen, 2003). Based on the CIM metamodel (see Figure 2.10) (Vergara, Villagrá, and 
Berrocal, 2005), the CIM language expresses all management information using these UML basic 
elements.  
Figure 2.10: CIM metamodel schema 
The CIM language aims at describing all managed systems and networks usually used 
components. The metamodel helps the definition of the CIM language through three levels of 
abstractions:  
(a) The basic model that defines the classes and the generic associations 
toward all management domains;  
(b) The common model that describes the classes and associations 
specific to each domain of management (e.g., applications, services, 
users, networks), but however independent from the implementation;  
(c) Finally, the extensions that are specified for each implementation.  
Nevertheless, the world of management consider the configuration policies in terms of 
representations as an externalized logic that determines the behavior of managed systems, networks, 
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applications, and services (Agrawal, Lee, & Lobo, 2005). Following this reasoning, each policy 
language depends on two information models, one for the resources being managed, and another for 
the policies themselves (Agrawal, Calo, Lee, & Lobo, 2007).  
Therefore, the IETF Policy working group, a leader in management standards and solutions, 
mostly carries out the ongoing studies on policy specification and expression concerning the 
configuration management. IETF does not specify policies using a language, but through an object-
oriented information model (Ellesson, Strassner, Moore, & Westerinen, 2001). The DMTF developed 
the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) model as an extension of the Common Information Model 
(CIM) to express management policies – strictly expressions without real implementations. In Figure 
2.11, a policy rule aggregates policy conditions and policy actions. Regarding this representation, the 
policy expression follows the statement of the CA structure: if (set of conditions) then execute a set of 
actions. (Lymberopoulos, 2004) 
Figure 2.11: Detailed subset of the CIM policy schema v2.38.0 
For a better understanding of CIM schema, let’s take a simple example on the management 
information representation for a network printer. Supposing that a printer is connected to an intranet, it 
contains several parameters such as an IP address, description, ink percentage, serial number, etc. In 
order to configure the printer (or reconfigure it), one needs to consult the existing information and the 
possibility of modifying the settings.  
With CIM, all classes inherit from the class CIM_ManagedElement in order to specify and 
express the management information of the managed resources. However, the most generic, 
appropriate and simple class to represent the management information of network resources like the 
printer is CIM_ComputerSystem – the switch, router, firewall, etc. can be seen as computer systems as 
well. 
Therefore, the previous explanations show only the modeling on where to find the 
management information of the printer in order to configure its parameters. However, the CIM 
solution needs to work on top of a framework in order to apply the standards. Therefore, DMTF 
presented the WBEM framework. WBEM proposes a DMTF standard framework and architecture for 
CIM and implement tools like Open Pegasus to provision configurations. 
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Nevertheless, the configuration management handles models in such a similar way as in access 
control which aims at describing and providing guidelines for network and security managers to write 
their policies. Even though the comparison is stated, it is not very balanced. The configuration 
management addresses and models much more complicated management information than the 
common access control models do concerning the information about the protected resources – in terms 
of variety of information and management metrics. However, the truth about both models is that they 
need languages, namely policy languages, in order to use the information and apply, specify and 
implement the management and control decisions and actions. Therefore, the configurations need to be 
refined to low-level languages in order to be technically implemented. In other words, using CIM 
alone through WBEM will only ensure the supervision task of management. The governance task 
needs to be ensured using the notion of policy (i.e., including policy languages, architectures, 
frameworks, etc.). 
Figure 2.12: Extract from the CIM system schema v2.42.0 
II .A .1 . i  CIM-SPL 
In the configuration management section, the presented study on CIM illustrated its 
remarkable importance for the modeling of the management information. However, we presented also 
the lack of DMTF CIM model for having a policy language to render and complement its policy 
model – proposed by the DMTF Policy Working Group. Therefore, CIM-SPL (Simplified Policy 
Language for CIM) has been introduced to comprise CA structured rules (Agrawal, Calo, Lee, & 
Lobo, 2007). This version of CIM-SPL did not support the reaction to events and therefore the DMTF 
community proposed the use of an external Event Model (DMTF DSP107, 2003). In this case, an 
externalized party provides the event processing and handling for the CIM-SPL language. The event 
model defines event-related abstractions and describes the CIM indications hierarchy. The modeling 
aims at designing the information about all the events that can be detected by the supported 
technologies in CIM. Upon the receiving of a CIM InstIndication instance (i.e., a subclass of CIM 
Indication), this implies the occurrence of an event and the need to make actions. Therefore, the 
corresponding policy is called entirely for evaluation. This evaluation is known as an unsolicited 
policy evaluation. The other supported type is the solicited evaluation. This type is proper to the policy 
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enforcement point to call all policies for the evaluation that are relevant to a specific resource. There 
are only two strategies to apply the evaluation: evaluate all applicable policies or evaluate the first 
applicable policy (DMTF DSP0231, 2009). 
Table 2.4: An example on CIM-SPL policy (Boutaba & Aib, 2007). 
Import CIM_X_XX_XXXX::CIM_LocalFileSystem; 
Strategy Execute_All_Applicable; 
 
Policy { 
Declaration { 
computer_system = collect(Self, CIM_HostedFileSystem, PartComponent, 
GroupComponent, null, true)[0]; 
storage_config_service = collect(computer_system, CIM_HostedService, Antecedent, 
Dependent, CIM_StorageConfigurationService, true)[0]; 
logical_disk = collect(Self, CIM_ResidesOnExtent, Dependent, Antecedent, null, true)[0]; 
storage_pool = collect(logical_disk, CIM_AllocatedFromStoragePool, Dependent, 
Antecedent, null, true)[0]; 
fs_goal = collect(Self, CIM_ElementSettingData, ManagedElement, SettingData, 
CIM_FileSystemSetting true)[0]; } 
Condition { (AvailableSpace / FileSystemSize) < 0.25 } 
Decision { 
storage_conf_service.CreateOrModifyElementFromStoragePool("LogicalDisk", 
/* ElementType Volume */ 
  8, job, fs_goal,1.25 * FileSystemSize, storage_pool, logical_disk) | 
DoSomethingOnFailure() } 
 }:1 /* policy priority*/; 
These evaluation processes at each event (or combination of events) were considered as an 
exhaustive process each time to evaluate all the rules in the corresponding policy (or even all the 
policies). Therefore, the proposition for an extension to CIM-SPL was made (Pan, Lobo, & Calo, 
2009). Based on the WBEM management framework, the implementation of new providers to detect 
and react on events (i.e., software modules that are responsible of specific tasks not supported initially 
by WBEM). However, the processing of events was still not supported. The CIM-SPL extension 
served on supporting the management requirements, and additionally supports the requirements of 
access control through the representation of the RBAC model. The only implementation of this 
language was proposed through a policy engine during the Open Group’s Open- Pegasus project (Han 
& Lei, 2012). 
IETF PIB, PDL, and DMTF CIM-SPL languages have been introduced mainly for the 
objective of managing networks and systems. However, PIB expressed the need for a policy model 
and an externalized party to process events. PDL drawback is the conflict resolution and the 
complexity of its event model. Finally, CIM-SPL needs an externalized party to manage and process 
its desired events.  
II.A.2. IETF PIB 
In distributed heterogeneous systems, access control polices that follow RBAC (i.e., proposed 
by the NIST) are distributed based on the provisioning strategy defined by IETF. The strategy is about 
considering the management information to be distributed to the targeted enforcement elements using 
the COPS-PR protocol. PIB (Policy Information Base) is an information representation for the policies 
modeled by RBAC.  
The PIB using the provisioning approach follows three main points (Westerinen et al., 2001). 
The first point is about representing the policy information using a model (e.g., PCIM or PCIMe). The 
second point is to represent the policies using PIB for each independent specific device (i.e., including 
translating the policy to be understood into the device capabilities in order for the device to be able to 
enforce this policy). The third point is related to the communication phase of policies. COPS-PR 
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(Chan et al., 2001) is a protocol designed for negotiating capabilities, transporting and installing the 
PIB structured policies to be configured into the targeted device. 
The IETF provisioning approach or strategy is a generic solution for the management domains 
and not dedicated to solutions through PIB only. In addition to PIB, the distribution of configurations 
has been proposed for DiffServ and IPsec recently. As presented previously, the PCIM and its 
extensions (PCIMe) (Moore, Elleson, Strasser, Weterinen, 2001) represent policies information for 
any management domain using a generic set of classes and associations. Therefore, IETF PCIM 
represents a good, yet generic, candidate for modeling the information for a policy expressed and 
specified following the PIB approach.  
To conclude the study on PIB, the PIB solution is not enough standalone to fulfill the 
management needs in terms of representing the policy and its information without the usage of a 
modeling solution (e.g., PCIM) nor  for sure a communication protocol (i.e., COPS-PR). 
II.A.3. PDL 
Another example of the management policies language provided by IETF is the Policy 
Description Language (PDL) from Bell Labs. PDL is the first language introduced for network 
administration with rules structured on ECA (Lobo, Bhatia, & Naqvi, 1999). PDL aims at managing 
the network based on a declarative language in order to define policies. Policies rules take the form of 
“event(s) cause(s) action(s) if condition(s)”. PDL introduces another language to declare and manage 
the events separately using Policy Defined Event (PDE) language. PDE follows the form “event(s) 
trigger(s) policy-defined-event if condition(s)”. This language processes events in several forms and 
accepts the expression of complex operations on them based on the concept of time window (e.g., 
combination and coordination) (Strassner, 2003, “How to Express Information in a Common Way”, p. 
126-127). Examples on PDL proved the expressiveness of the language (Kohli & Lobo, 1999). 
However, the language lacks the ability to handle aggregate or composite policies and requires an 
additional programming language support. The PDL language causes the requirement for excessively 
complex PDE hierarchies (i.e., because one PDE keeps triggering one (or more) PDEs, until an action 
or sequence of actions is performed). Importantly, PDL has a limited support for conflict resolution, 
and with complex PDE hierarchies it becomes more limited. 
Table 2.5: Sample PDL policies (Chomicki, Lobo, & Naqvi, 2000). 
// policy for product order processing  
defectiveProduct causes stop  
orderReceived causes mailProduct  
orderReceived causes chargeCreditCard  
 
/* policy for Soft switch overload control in the presence of an excessive number of signalling network 
time outs */  
(normalmode, group(callmade|timeout)) triggers overloadmode if 
(Count(timeout)/Count(callmade)>ThOvld) 
 
One of the CA structured languages to represent the network administration rules is PFDL 
(Policy Framework Definition Language) (Nicklisch, 1999). PFDL is a definition language necessary 
for the expression of the PCIM model. However, the work on PFDL did not continue by the IETF 
policy group. Therefore, the language stayed as a general-purpose language proposed for the PCIM 
model to be used to specify rules through a management console (PAP) to provide a view for the 
administrator to express QoS, access control, and customized web applications management policies.  
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II.A.4. The Ponder Policy Specification Language 
Appeared in 2000, Ponder is a language, framework, and architecture, which are mainly 
oriented for network management. The language supports authorization, obligation, and configuration. 
Ponder is an event-oriented language that keeps an eye on the QoS through performing monitoring 
(surveillance) on network behaviors and activities based on predefined metrics (accuracy, 
performance, etc.) (Damianou, Dulay, Lupu, & Sloman, 2001). However, the security side is assured 
by a special representation of the authorization policy that adapts to Ponder and RBAC requirements 
only. Ponder gets a higher score when it comes to management through the support for obligation than 
its score for security management. The lack of support limits its capabilities to compete with other 
access control implementations. Four groups represent the different types of Ponder policies: positive 
and negative authorization (i.e., including policies for information filtering), obligations, restrictions 
(i.e., using the refrain syntax) and delegation.  
Ponder is defined as a declarative language, object-oriented, flexible, expressive and 
extensible, allowing security and management policies creation for distributed systems. As a key 
concept, roles provide Ponder with the semantic of grouping policies based on subjects (e.g., DiffServ 
edge router). Ponder is an RBAC-Based framework. However, the only contradiction between Ponder 
and the RBAC model is the support missing for the inheritance of privileges within a Role Instance 
Hierarchy. For the composition of policies, Ponder uses the concept of domains by constructing sub 
trees identified by abstract paths. The domains represented in the policies work as a repository to 
group and prioritize all Ponder elements (i.e., subjects, targets, policies). To formalize the concept, 
Ponder defines Meta policies to define permitted policy types and authorized concurrent action 
sequencing (Polyrakis & Boutaba, 2002; Sloman, 1994). 
Ponder major drawback is its expressiveness. Moreover, it leaks the temporal structure that 
provides, in particular, history-based SOD (Separation of Duty, that is, having more than one subject 
required to complete an action (e.g., a task)). Ponder policies do not support workflow management. 
They are a matter of containing conflicting rules, especially positive authorization and negative 
authorization rules (Jin, Krishnan, & Sandhu, 2012). 
Based on the ECA scheme, Ponder obligation policies aim at describing the actions that must 
be performed when a particular event occurs. Ponder obligation policies can help the expression of 
three kinds of policies: 
1. Security policies: by allowing a security officer to specify the actions to be taken 
when a security policy is violated (exceptions); 
2. QoS management policies: by allowing the QoS manager to manage the quality of 
service offered to users (e.g., scheduling systems backups or performing software 
configurations), 
3. Auditing policies: by allowing the specification of what information is to be logged, 
where and by whom. 
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II .A .4.i  Examples 
The first example on Ponder policy is for managing the QoS of the network by monitoring the 
connections made by network users. Once a connection failure event occurs (i.e., is detected through 
the ConnectionFailure obligation), the Ponder framework starts counting the failures. Upon the third 
time event occurrence on a particular identified user (i.e., the line “3 * FailedConnection(userId)”), the 
user identification will be disabled in the managed organization. This deactivation action is logged 
“t.deactivate () -> s.connection (userId)”. 
Table 2.6: Example 1, connection failure policy 
inst oblig ConnectionFailure{ 
on 3 * FailedConnection (userId); 
subject s=/region/admin; 
target <User> t=/region/users^{userId};  
do t.deactivate () -> s.connection(idutilisateur); 
} 
 
Another trivial example to present Ponder for a QoS management policy is when the 
performance within a managed environment goes down – the performance is measured regarding the 
bandwidth. In this example, the obligation policy type perfIncreaseT specifies what to do as reactions 
on events. A performance degradation event perfDegradation(bw, source) triggers the obligation 
policy. The perfDegradation event parameters (bw, source) are reused for the specification of the 
actions. Sequentially, the policy subject invokes the action bwReserve(bw) and log(bw, source) on the 
target object. The subjects interface is responsible for the implementation of the log action. 
Respectively, the name assignments s and t for the subject and target in policy perfIncrease used in the 
actions specification. The target type is restricted only to those whose their IDL is Router – see the 
angle brackets next to the target attribute specification of the perfIncreaseT policy type. 
Table 2.7: Example 2, bandwidth performance management (Damianou, Dulay, Lupu, & Sloman, 2000). 
type oblig perfIncreaseT (subjects,target<Router>t) { 
on perfDegradation(bw, source); 
do t.bwReserve(bw) -> s.log(bw, source); 
} // perfIncreaseT 
 
inst  
oblig pl = perfIncreaseT(brEngineer, coreRouter/+edgeRouter/); 
oblig perfIncrease { 
subject s = brEngineer; 
target t = coreRouter/ + edgeRouter/; 
on perfDegradation(bw, source); 
do t.bwReserve(bw) -> s.log(bw, source); 
} // perfIncrease 
 
In conclusion to the study on Ponder, the solution presents a pure management solution 
oriented by obligations using rules structured as events, conditions, actions. Therefore, research 
studies presented that the most complete solution to manage, represent and express management 
policies orientated by obligations and configuration is the Ponder solution. Ponder is able to process 
and manage the events it needs to enforce its policy ECA rules. In addition, the obligation policy 
languages claimed to support security policies, namely authorizations, and also QoS policies. 
Obligations are ensuring configuration provisioning in the form of restrictions, delegations, or direct 
actions (e.g., logging, downgrading the bandwidth to recover the performance). 
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II.A.5. NETCONF configuration language 
We highlighted that there are many languages in the management world that do not provide an 
access control support, but manage and administrate the configuration of networks and systems 
devices (objects) (i.e., configurations include the distribution of management policies). Configuration 
languages express rules in both structures CA and ECA in order to perform management functions on 
the behavior of systems and networks. The management functions could be limited to perform 
configuration actions like (set, update, etc.) or it could be more complicated configuration task like in 
the new NetConf (i.e., responding to detected events and perform the right relevant actions). 
With the intention of visiting some configuration languages, NETCONF is mainly used for 
configuration management. It uses operations to configure network devices based on RPC layers 
(Wang, Zhang, Li, Li, & Gao, 2010). In 2000, IETF SNMPconf working group started a provisioning 
solution designed for configuring network elements (Chadha & Kant, 2008). Its motivation refers to 
the absence of a standard protocol suitable for network elements configuration. Therefore, the SNMP 
community launched SNMPconf well suited for configuration and monitoring of network elements. 
The workgroup developed the MIB to represent the desired network-wide DiffServ-based QoS 
behavior (McFaden, Partain, Saperia, & Tackabury, 2003, IETF RFC 3512). SNMPconf through MIBs 
specifies the configuration data of the managed elements. SNMPconf is a standard configuration 
policy language using the SNMP communication protocol and Net-SNMP tools to configure and 
provision network policies. For instance, the command snmpset: “snmpset -options hostnam-address 
community MIB-objectID a new-ip-address” allows the MIB object IP address to be set (Mauro & 
Schmidt, 2001, Appendix C, p. 367).  
Moreover, there are languages for the management of quality of service (QoS) for the two 
approaches: the RSVP signaling (IntServ/RSVP) (Braden, Zhang, Berson, Herzog, & Jamin, 1997) 
and the differentiated services (DiffServ) (Blake et. al., 1998). Per-Hop Behaviour (PHB) uses EF 
Configuration Policy (Ferrari & Chimento, 2000; Jacobson, Nichols, & Poduri, 1999). The 
configuration management of network policy information (CA structured) is managed and represented 
by a PCIM (policy core information model), defined by RFC 3060. Policies are storable in a repository 
and are downloadable by management information base (MIB) scripts directly to the managed nodes. 
There is a special version of PCIM for the QoS (QPIM) (Snir et al., 2003). IETF PCIM with 
DMTF/QPIM provides a configuration management solution – namely traffic flow management 
network device configurations – that defines policy actions for Differentiated Services (DiffServ) and 
Integrated Services (IntServ) networks. A QPIM policy rule example for establishing an EF Per Hop 
behavior (EF-PHB) on a DiffServ node is “If (traffic belongs to EF aggregate) then do EF-actions” 
(Lymberopoulos, 2004).  
Nevertheless, NETCONF seems to be the best nomination to give an example on 
configuration languages. NETCONF is one of the most powerful solutions, because of recently 
proposed with revolutionary features that are specified to meet what management expects inside a 
management policy. However, there is not yet a  complete implementation to all features proposed in 
NETCONF. Moreover, security is not a priority for this solution (Seitz & Rissanen, 2008; Wang, 
Zhang, Li, Li , & Gao, 2010)! 
NETCONF respects the ECA rules structure and represents a sort of reaction rules (On events 
if condition(s) then action(s)). However, the policy language expression in which the structured rules 
are written is still shy from getting out to lights. The YANG representation language aims at 
“modeling data used to model configuration and state data manipulated by the Network Configuration 
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Protocol (NETCONF), NETCONF remote procedure calls (RPC), and NETCONF notifications”. 
(Shafer, 2011, RFC 6020) 
Therefore, performing configuration management using for this IETF solution based on 
policies needs both NETCONF and YANG together. NETCONF offers a conceptual model of high-
level layers to use while managing configuration (see Figure 2.13).  
Figure 2.13: NETCONF architecture (Chadha & 
Kant, 2008, p. 168) 
Many NETCONF configuration operations help the administration and management of 
networks and systems. The language introduced the concept of “data sore”, a network device uses to 
store information about the configuration of the device (Chadha & Kant, 2008, p. 171). The get-config 
gets all or part of the configuration from the data store and the get operation gets the same plus the 
state data as well. The edit-config edits the configuration in the data store by allowing functions like 
merge, replace, create, or delete on the configuration elements. There are other operations as well like 
copy-config or delete-config (to copy or remove the totality of an existing configuration). Useful 
operations like validate (takes the candidate configuration and verifies its syntax and structure in order 
to report the existing errors), commit (commit a configuration candidate (e.g., modified) toward the 
target running element based on rules like all or nothing), and restore (recover back the candidate 
configuration in the data store from the current configuration that is running). 
The lock / unlock operations are the most interesting operations that allow the admin to place / 
remove the lock of the data store where the configuration is stored. Like in database management 
systems, the idea is to prevent other clients from updating the configurations while it holds the lock. 
The main parameters that this operation takes are the target that defines the name of the configuration 
data store to lock / unlock and the response of the policy decision of allowing or not allowing the 
locking / unlocking and communicate it through the usage of IETF RPC (Remote Procedure Call). 
(Enns, Bjorklund, Schönwälder, & Bierman, 2011, RFC 6241) 
Table 2.8: Example of using the lock operation in NETCONF. 
<rpc message-id="101"! xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">! 
<lock> <target> <running/> </target> </lock> 
</rpc> 
<rpc-reply message-id="101"! xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> 
<rpc-error> <!-- lock failed --> 
<error-type>protocol</error-type> 
<error-tag>lock-denied</error-tag> 
<error-severity>error</error-severity> 
<error-message> Lock failed, lock is already held </error-message> 
<error-info> <session-id>454</session-id> </error-info> 
</rpc-error> 
</rpc-reply> 
 
Content
Operations
RPC
Transport 
Protocol
Configuration Data
<get-config>, 
<edit-config>,
<rpc>,
<rpc-reply>,
BEEP, SSH, SSH, 
console
Layer Example
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Based on the configuration requirements defined originally during an IAB workshop that 
paved the way for NETCONF and YANG (Schoenwaelder8, 2003, RFC3535), the following table 
shows the difference between SNMP and NETCONF in terms of configuration management. 
Table 2.9: Comparison between SNMP and NETCONF (Schönwälder, 2012). 
 
 
                                                
 
8 The name in references is written in both ways “Schoenwaelder” and “Schönwälder”. 
No Description SNMP NETCONF 
R1 Configuration vs. Operation state - + 
R2 Concurrency support O + 
R3 Configuration transactions - [+] 
R4 Multiple Configurations - [+] 
R5 Distribution vs. activation - [+] 
R6 Persistence of configuration state O + 
R7 Configuration change notifications - + 
R8 Configuration dump and restore - + 
R9 Support of standard tools - + 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter’s Conclusion 
The Chapter 2 presented the expression of policies in both worlds the 
management and security. The security community first concentrates on 
models to provide expression templates.. Security solutions either apply 
templates to policy languages (e.g., PDL and Ponder applying RBAC 
model), or are totally specific solutions without any attachment to 
access control models (e.g., APPEL). The management community 
represents policies directly through languages. Two names can be found 
in the literature to describe the languages for management policies: 
configuration languages (e.g., NETCONF) and obligation languages 
(e.g., CIM-SPL). 
   
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: 
Security & Management  
Architectures 
The Chapter focuses on the State-of-the-art architectures to 
implement the policy, within the security and the management 
communities. Hence, we divided the chapter into three sections to 
illustrate different studies on architectures. The first section qualifies in 
defining a general architecture for any security management system. The 
second section presents the different existing management architectures 
and the third one presents the different existing security architectures. 
 
 
 
Summary 
I. General Security Management Architecture 
Ø Architectures with management objectives 
Ø SNMP-Based Architecture 
Ø Policy-Based Management 
Ø PBM Communication Paradigms 
Ø DMTF WBEM Architecture 
Ø Ponder Architecture 
Ø Concluding management architectures 
 
II. Architectures with security objectives 
Ø AAA Architecture 
Ø OASIS XACML Architecture 
Ø Concluding security architectures 
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C h a p t e r  3 :  S e c u r i t y  &  M a n a g e m e n t  
A r c h i t e c t u r e s  
“I tell you, sir, the only safeguard of order and discipline in the modern world is a standardized 
worker with interchangeable parts. That would solve the entire problem of management.” 
Jean Giraudoux 
Columbia World of Quotations 
 Retrieved October 31, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
Introduction: 
Due to the rate at which new technologies are introduced for systems and networks, security 
management of targeted environments faces significant challenges. The business requirements for 
ubiquity and mobility have created more heterogeneity in these environments, making the 
management task even harder. Therefore, there are always efforts toward and calls for the unification 
of approaches and architectures. As standards try to create and provide the most suitable solutions, 
standardization leaders aim to improve the management of security in systems and networks. For 
example, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards (OASIS) specialize in standardizing access control architecture. In 
terms of system and network management, the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) with 
IETF, the International Telegraph Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) and the 
Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) are leaders in providing standardized 
architectures. 
One should point out that the security policy expression and architecture are strongly 
connected. Any expressed security policy using a language needs to be applied and used by an 
architecture in order to be effective. Therefore, the problem presented in this chapter is strongly 
related to the expression issues discussed in Chapter 2. 
In security management, one can recall that the security policy has two tasks to fulfill. The 
first is security, which is usually undertaken using authorization. The second task is management, 
which is expressed as obligations. Therefore, after the expression of the security policy, the 
architecture that enforces this policy should accomplish these two tasks. The access control 
architecture ensures that the implementation and the application of the security policy at the 
environment level meet the system and network requirements (that is, the decision-making and the 
enforcement process). The application of the security policy is required for management decisions. 
The implementation of the security policy is required to deploy all necessary mechanisms (i.e., 
hardware or software) in order to enforce the management decisions.  
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I .  General  Security  Management Architecture 
Studies on the architecture of security management are influenced by the heterogeneity 
previously presented in the security policy expression. As networks and systems management and 
access control are studied separately (Clemm, 2006, pp. 157−159), it is natural too that heterogeneous 
architectures will be found among the existing security management solutions. For instance, network 
management proposes different management solutions in terms of frameworks, architectures, and 
languages⎯for example, the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) framework and model (ISO9 10040, 
1998), the ITU-T TMN framework (ITU-T Recommendation M.3010), and the IETF SNMP-based 
architecture (Harrington, Wijnen, & Presuhn, 2002). Some architectures are expression-related 
solutions like SNMP, and others are domain-specific language (DSL) expressions. In access control, 
most studies focused on models have been conducted since the 1990s. Therefore, security policy 
models that are “applied when needed” (e.g., RBAC, OrBAC, UCON, etc.) apply specific 
architectures that follow the models’ expressions and requirements with respect to the environments’ 
capabilities. 
Despite the existing architectures’ heterogeneity, the mentioned expression requirements can 
help in proposing a general view on what security management should respect in terms of architecture 
(see Figure 3.14). The systems that ensure the management of the security, should respect the 
requirements of the managed systems and networks (that is, expressed in the security policy) in terms 
of the CIA requirements.  
Figure 3.14: General architecture of the security management. 
Any security management system (SMS) architecture should understand the expressed 
security policy by being able to (a) implement it by making decisions based on it, (b) communicate 
these decisions, and (c) enforce the decisions inside the environment. Therefore, the architecture needs 
to be flexible in order to include new technologies at technical perceptions and new requirements at 
                                                
 
9 International Organization for Standardization 
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organizational perceptions. Moreover, the SMS architecture needs to be adaptive enough to consider 
the changes in the environment’s behavior. 
Unfortunately, the general view is far from being completely respected because of the 
divergent solutions that provide the SMS architecture and the distance between management and 
security. Heterogeneity in system and network management exists through different administration 
solutions toward ensuring the supervision and the governance. Heterogeneity in access control exists 
through the different authorization solutions to ensure CIA constraints. The distance between security 
and management refers to the understanding of requirements. Those concerned with systems and 
networks management consider security as a partial service that should be assured to meet a required 
level of quality. However, those responsible for access control consider security to be a priority and 
ignore many management requirements.  
By analyzing the different architectures in both domains, it was possible to identify two logics 
or visions in systems and networks management in terms of security. In systems and networks 
management, the architectures for management of security can be classified as passive and active. The 
passive architectures accept or allow what happens in the environment’s behavior, without active 
response or resistance. However, the strength of passive architectures is their posterior reasoning about 
what situations happened, which occurs prior to giving them a response (i.e., usually expressed in 
literature as reactions). For instance, networks management architectures supervise the networks to 
watch the behavior, usually using the polling strategy. Once the number of notifications has increased, 
the reasoning of the governance side decides to get over the overload situation. Hence, the governance 
system adapts the network bandwidth by reducing the notifications number by configuring the polling 
settings. In access control, there are different architectures but still subscribed to the passive class. For 
example, in smart buildings equipped with alarm systems like intrusion-detection systems, access 
control systems based on passive architectures would deny the access of an unauthorized subject after 
detecting an intrusion alert (that is, a situation when an intruder enters a prohibited zone). 
Figure 3.15: State diagram for passive architectures. 
The active architectures are farther from the behavior than the passive architectures are. Active 
architectures aim at blocking the changes to be made to the environment’s behavior unless it is 
authorized instead of adjusting the behavior to become authorized or acceptable. In other words, active 
architectures are more interested in allowing (or denying) subjects the access to resources (objects) for 
usage reasons, which will certainly affect the environment’s behavior. A suitable example for this 
architecture would be one involving a Firewall. A firewall is responsible for protecting resources from 
State 1 State 3State 2
Behavior Changes
Behavior 
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Reactions
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getting into the hacked10 state, where unauthorized subjects should gain access to make changes in the 
environment’s behavior. However, access requests could be a part of the behavior changes as well; 
that is when this part needs a permission to continue making behavior changes inside the environment 
(e.g., segments in the dataflow asking to allocate memory space somewhere in the data store). From a 
management viewpoint, active architectures are being used to impose obligations in the environment 
behavior. For instance, in a smart grid, the system may encounter a huge number of access requests 
where subjects need to use energy sources at the same time⎯a gigantic access situation. In this 
situation, the access control system (e.g., based on RBAC) would deny all roles equal to users and 
allow only administrators. With this decision, the access control system may use the bandwidth cap as 
an obligation in order to limit the connection and data usage for requesters during specific periods. By 
this, the obligation of the access control systems itself imposes changes in the environment’s behavior. 
Figure 3.16: State diagram for active architectures. 
The two active and passive architectures in literature are totally disconnected, which means 
that the implementation or deployment is independent and exclusive to the limit of our knowledge. 
One can apply the active architecture and not the passive and vice versa. This heterogeneity in 
available solutions for security management defines a problem, and it is what invites research for 
finding a unified approach (that is, security policy expression and architecture).  
I .A .  A  lo o k  a t  e x is tin g  a r c h ite c tu r e s  
The ultimate goal of any systems and networks management platform and services stays the 
facilitation of the administrator and security officer daily tasks, especially facing evolving approaches 
over time solving the new posed problems. The following three sections try to provide a look on the 
existing possible architectures that one should consider whenever choosing the systems architecture to 
deliver a security management solution. 
The first section presents one of the famous approaches to provide systems and networks 
management; policy-based management is a complete research trend that aims at proposing several 
solutions to adapt the heterogeneous requirements inside the systems and networks environments. 
Each solution proposes a specific architecture, however, the IETF was able to define a standard initial 
architecture to propose new ones based on this initiation. Therefore, the literature contains now 
heterogeneous architectures that may or may not respect the standard architecture.  
Nevertheless, and based on the essential objective of each architecture, one can divide the 
systems and networks management architectures that studies consider for security management 
solutions into two architectures: management architectures and security architectures. 
                                                
 
10 Gain unauthorized access to data in a system or computer, Oxford Dictionary. 
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The management premises address the heterogeneity problem into networks and systems 
following the approach of OSI, IETF and ITU-T. They set the foundations for these disciplines: 
modeling management architectures, representation of the environment or the integration of 
management in networks and systems (Bennani et al. 2001). Propagating specific management 
solutions to adapt specific areas is what introduces the problem of heterogeneity. Therefore, studies 
are ongoing on the unification of these management architectures for global control of networks and 
systems. The leader on capturing this problem is the DMTF WBEM research initiative.  
The security premises address the heterogeneity problem into networks and systems following 
the approach from OASIS, AAA and IETF. Other architecture solutions are associated with the chosen 
security model (e.g., PCIM or context-aware RBAC). Despite the efforts, heterogeneity exist in the 
security architecture solutions due to either the specificity of the architecture because of its coupling 
with models or to the architecture’s abstraction that need to be adapted before it can be applied to 
technical constrains of the managed environments. Nevertheless, all the security architectures are 
poorly supportive to the management objectives (and the opposite is true as well). For instance, 
OASIS presented the XACML standard with an associated architecture but it does not conform to all 
the management’s world objectives.  
The difference between both worlds (management and security) does not stop at the design 
level of architectures, but also the implementation of these architectures. There are several ways of 
implementation that assure the communication between the different architecture’s components. 
Therefore, a fourth section is interested in presenting several heterogeneous communication 
paradigms.  
It is important to point out that the objective of the following study is to show that there is no 
proposition for a unified solution that can reply to all the security management solution in conformity 
to both objectives: management and security. Therefore, the chapter is structured to present first the 
renowned management architectures. Afterwards, the following section presents the standardized 
security architectures. Next, a section introduces the eminent architecture of Policy-Based 
management. This approach first presented by the management community and then widely adopted in 
many security, management and even telecommunication researches (Yavatkar, Pendarakis, & Guerin, 
2000). Finally, all architectures use communication protocols to exchange information in order to 
perform management or security. The last section goes through the logic behind each followed 
communication paradigm. 
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II .  Architectures with management objectives  
Today’s user of networks and systems is able to access anytime and anywhere services (email, 
data, etc.). Networks management must be able to react immediately to any event (for example, failure 
of equipment or mobility requested by users) to ensure the availability and reliability of services.  
The existing approaches in distributed management, for instance, are considered in five 
models defined by the OSI in [ISO 10040]: the organizational model that concerns the identification 
and definition of entities participating in the activity of management, the architectural model that 
structures the defined entities in the organizational model, the informational model for the 
specification and representation of the management information, the functional model that represents 
the set of management operations to be implemented, and the communication model that defines 
protocols allowing the information exchange between the defined entities in the organizational model.  
The management of networks and systems faces the heterogeneity problem in two different 
areas: computer networks and telecommunication networks. The environments of networks are 
becoming more sophisticated. Incorporating facilities includes integrating different technologies from 
different vendors. Therefore, management of networks and systems has become critical with different 
standards hatched to facilitate this task.   
In the context of the OSI model [ISO 7498-4], the ISO standard proposes to treat conceptually 
many problems in all areas of management. However, with the complexity of its implementation, 
especially within enterprise networks, the management community preferred the IETF proposition 
with less powerful – but extremely simple – solution based on TCP/ IP-based networks.  
In parallel, integrated management of network and systems has emerged in the world of 
telecommunications. The ITU-T organization has developed a model called TMN [ITU-T M3010] that 
is strongly linked to ISO. It responds to some problems related to business telecommunications 
operators, for example, by integrating the different entities involved in the business of 
telecommunications (customers, service providers and network providers).  
From the available management architectures, we found that SNMP-based and DMTF WBEM 
are most frequently used in the literature. Therefore, the study will be limited to these common 
management architectures. 
I I .A .  S N M P - B a s e d  A r c h ite c tu r e  
The architecture describes the relationship between managed objects (agents) and management 
machines (managers)⎯that is, in the management of networks and systems using the simple network 
management protocol (SNMP) and a management-information base (MIB). On the one hand, an 
agent-to-manager SNMP-based architecture is based on reporting events coming from the agents about 
the managed objects (see Figure 3.17). On the other hand, the manager-to-agent architecture aims at 
governing the agents by provisioning network configurations. Finally, the manager-to-manager is 
partially an administration purpose architecture; it intends to forward management decisions from one 
manager to another.  
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The SNMP-based architecture aims at overcoming the heterogeneity and emphasizing the role 
of the systems and networks administration. Moreover, its additional advantage is the support of 
access control requirements. 
Figure 3.17: SNMPv2 agent-manager relationship. 
The technical management architecture using SNMP is presented in the Figure 3.18. The 
interoperation between agents is made based on notifications that salute the need for configurations to 
be sent in order to adapt the managed objects to the specified requirements. The SNMP technical 
architecture is based on the UDP communication protocol. Its main objective is to encapsulate the 
heterogeneous network devices (e.g., Cisco routers) with software agents. The agents are clients to a 
Traps server (i.e., responsible of capturing notifications from different agents). Traps servers 
communicate through a UDP connection the traps to the administrators’ interfaces. The latters will 
propose the suitable configurations through the Net-SNMP configuration language to be applied by 
the agents. The communication between the administration interface (manager) and the agents is also 
through a UDP connection (i.e., asynchronized connections).  
Figure 3.18: SNMP technical architecture 
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I I .B .  P o lic y - B a s e d  M a n a g e m e n t  
Policy-based management (PBM), one of the management approaches, is proposed to 
overcome the technical heterogeneity of systems and networks. PBM is an administrative approach 
that is used to simplify the security management of a given endeavor by establishing security policies 
to drive situations that are likely to occur. Its main objective separates the rules governing the behavior 
of a system from its functionality. It promises to reduce maintenance costs of information and 
communication systems while improving flexibility and runtime adaptability. PBM is today present at 
the heart of a multitude of management architectures and paradigms including SLA-driven, business-
driven, autonomous, adaptive, and self-* management (Boutaba & Aib, 2007).  
PBM has been defined from different aspects and perspectives. Multiple definitions of this 
management approach introduce its adaptability to all domains related to system and network 
management. Despite the variety in definitions, PBM has a core objective of achieving business 
requirements while ensuring the management of networks and systems. 
In the late 1990s, the Quality of Service (QoS) concern has influenced the PBM. Afterward, 
the notion of policy-based network management (PBNM) was introduced. PBNM promises 
organizations the ability of controlling the QoS through watching and governing networked 
applications and users. Moreover, PBNM promises the organizations’ administration the ability to 
control policies through instructions translated into specific management configurations, to bypass the 
traditional network operations (Jude, 2001). 
Nowadays, the PBM approach arrives at a very generous level of extensions. There is not only 
PBNM, but the policy-based approach is applied to many domains, such as policy-based energy 
management (PBEM), policy-based security management (PBSM), policy-based QoS management, 
etc. However, the core feature that all policy-based solutions have kept is the policy-based architecture 
that proposes two main points: the decision-making and the enforcement of this decision. Moreover, to 
adapt to the heterogeneity of the environments, especially the distributed one, PBM proposes 
communications between one-to-one points and many-to-many points. 
PBM Architecture:  
Most security or management approaches use a particular framework (model, language, and 
architecture) perfectly adapted to them and generally inspired by the PBM architecture. The Network 
Working Group of the IETF proposed this widespread, standard and well-known architecture 
(Yavatkar, 2000). PBM architecture consists of several elements: a policy repository (PR) that stores 
policies, a policy decision point (PDP) that allows evaluation of the relevant policies (set of rules) and 
shares a decision based on their evaluation, and a policy enforcement point (PEP) responsible for 
enforcing the decisions taken by the PDP (Figure 3.19). The architecture assumes a one-to-one 
relationship where there is a unique point for subjects to ask for access requests and a unique point to 
make decisions based on a unique security policy. However, this simple, centralized architecture does 
not fit the complexity of the new advances at the environment level (e.g., in large-scale systems where 
distribution is a priority: virtualization, mobility, etc.).   
Figure 3.19: Policy-based management architecture (RFC 2753). 
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The one-to-one architecture starts by the policy officer writing the security policy based on 
requirements. The security policy will be stored in the PR in order to be restored whenever the PDP 
wants to use it. The PDP makes management decisions. The PDP agent is entirely independent from 
the environment it manages. The PEP enforces the PDP’s decisions. The main role of this agent is to 
be the interface between the managed objects (resources) and the PDP. The PEP could be seen as a 
safeguard for resources, as it protects them by enforcing only authorized subjects or ensures their 
availability by enforcing suitable configurations. The communication between the PDP and the PEP is 
defined based on the usage of the PBM architecture. If the purpose of using the architecture is oriented 
for authorizations in management or access control, then the communication takes the handshake form 
in a synchronized request/response manner, known as the outsourcing communication. If the purpose 
of using the architecture is oriented for obligations in management or access control, then the 
communication usually takes the provisioning form in an asynchronized manner, where the PDP 
pushes configurations in one direction to PEPs, known as the provisioning communication. 
In distributed networks and systems, PBM has emerged as a centralized management solution 
(Mohaban et al., 2004). PBM aims at providing systems and networks with a centralized architecture 
that facilitates the administration task. The policy within the PBM architecture is either translated into 
decisions (i.e., in the case of access control) or pushed as configurations (i.e., in the case of 
management, such as other policies, rules, commands, etc.), but not both. These communication ways 
are implemented and enforced separately across the networks or the systems management.  
In literature, by following one, and only one, communication way per usage for either the 
management or the access control purpose, the PBM needs to define more an architecture that adapts 
to distributed-environments. Therefore, in terms of security management, there are three ways to 
establish the relationship between the PEP and the PDP based on the written security policy and the 
chosen communication way (i.e., outsourcing or provisioning): one-to-many (PDP-PEPs), many-to-
one (PDPs-PEP), and many-to-many (PDPs-PEPs). 
Nevertheless, it is important before going ahead with the architectures to explain the 
deployment of PDPs and PEPs. PDPs and PEPs can be separated as shown in Figure 3.20, where each 
point is completely independent with no overlapping functionalities. They can also be partially 
separated to share some of each other’s features, where the PDP may contain a local PEP (LPEP) in 
order to communicate with other PDPs, or the PEP could contain a local PDP (LPDP) in order to 
obtain decisions and configurations (e.g., it could be a policy information base (PIB) when using the 
SNMP protocol). Finally, they could be co-located on the same machine and totally integrated in terms 
of functionalities and communications (Follows & Straeten, 1999).  
Figure 3.20: Relationships of PEP-PDP/LPEP, PDP-PEP/LPDP and PDP/PEP. 
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One-to-Many: 
The one-to-many architecture allows the usage of a unique and centralized PDP to make 
management decisions for many distributed PEPs. This kind of paradigm is useful whenever the 
administration that provides the management decisions is centralized, but the environment is 
heterogeneous and distributed.  
Figure 3.21: One-to-many relationship using the PBM architecture. 
In the outsourcing communication mode, the PDP agent is responsible for responding to the 
access requests, parallel and synchronized, coming from the different PEPs. The PEPs then enforce the 
decisions and the related obligations, if any. In the provisioning mode, the PDP responds to the 
incoming observed events and sends configurations to the PEPs based on the written security policy. 
This architecture has a widespread usage in terms of distributed network management using a 
centralized approach, such as in a hospital or clinic, but not in widely distributed systems like smart 
grids and healthcare organizations. 
I I .C .  P B M  C o m m u n ic a tio n  P a r a d ig m s  
Communications between components of the different presented security and management 
architectures are ensured based on the chosen paradigm: outsourcing or provisioning. The 
implementation of these communications with respect to the paradigm is ensured through 
communication protocols (e.g., COPS, RADIUS, SAML, AAA Diameter, XACML, SNMP, CIM-
XML, SSH, etc.). In security management, the communications are what inform the policy about what 
is happening inside the managed environments. 
Eventually, PBM supports behavior changes through providing adaptability. The adaptability 
is ensured by changing the security policy without redeveloping or interrupting the system (Sloman & 
Lupu, 2002). To achieve this aim, PBM offers the above architecture that adapts behavior changes to 
meet the requirements. Originally, the PBM seeks adaptability to resolve the heterogeneity of the 
networks and systems environments. However, the PBM solutions and choices are becoming more 
diverse, and with the heterogeneity in expression, the architectures are even more heterogeneous.  
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PBM communication solutions, in providing adaptability for the environment changes, are 
categorized as outsourcing and provisioning (see Figure 3.22). These two communication paradigms 
give the choice to administrate (supervise and govern) the environments by either the management of 
configuration or by the controlling the access and usage. This is another sort of heterogeneity in PBM 
by providing two different solutions, and this provides different architectures for each relationship 
explained. Moreover, this creates more distance between the management and the security of systems 
and networks. 
Figure 3.22: The PBM communication paradigms of outsourcing and provisioning. 
Both outsourcing and provisioning paradigms were defined and standardized by the Network 
Working Group through the Common Open Policy Service (COPS) (Durham et al., 2000). The 
COPS stack is designed to meet all of the PBM architecture requirements. The COPS protocol cannot 
be directly used to distribute policies. Therefore, it represents the foundation for extending protocols 
that are specializations in performing a specific task (e.g., COPS-PR uses provisioning for equipment 
configuration, COPS-RSVP uses outsourcing for access control requests/responses, etc.). (Barrère, 
Benzekri, Grasset, Laborde, & Raynaud, 2001; Nataf, Festor, & Doyen, 2003) 
Other adoption of the IETF outsourcing paradigm is proposed through the protocols RADIUS 
(RFC 2865), TACACS+ (RFC 1492) and Diameter (RFC 3588). RADIUS uses UDP (port 1842) since 
it is a simple “Request-Reply” protocol (Accept/Request). TACACS+ was pro posed by Cisco as a 
terminal access controller for access control systems. Finally, Diameter is a successor to RADIUS that 
should fix some of its the shortcomings. Diameter uses reliable transport connections (i.e., TCP or 
SCTP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol)). Both RADIUS and TACACS+ are access control 
protocols, but evidentially do not define the policy. These protocols merely provide a means to 
communicate such information between a client and an authentication server. The policy is 
implemented externally using an authorization server (e.g., AAA11 servers in the upcoming section). 
The outsourcing addresses the kind of events at the PEP that requires an instantaneous policy 
decision.  In the outsourcing scenario, the PEP delegates the responsibility to an external policy server 
(PDP) to make decisions on its behalf.  For example, in COPS Usage for RSVP (RFC 2749, 2000) 
when an RSVP reservation message arrives, the PEP must decide whether to admit or reject the 
request. It can outsource this decision by sending a specific query to its PDP, waiting for its decision 
before admitting the outstanding reservation (RFC 3084, 2001). 
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As explained within the relationships, access control uses both paradigms. In the outsourcing, 
the PDP receives access requests from subjects through the PEP passing by standardized protocols 
such as COPS-RSVP, SAML, Radius, Diameter, or XACML (Rensing, Karsten, & Stiller, 2001). The 
access requests are analyzed according to the written security policy. The PDP returns its decision 
using standard protocols as well. The decision holds the possibility of three types of values: “allow, 
permit, etc.”, “deny, prohibit, etc.”, or “indeterminate, unknown, etc.” To complete the PDP’s 
decision, an obligation section could be sent with the decision to be enforced by the PEP (e.g., sending 
an email to the administrator after having enforced the authorization decision).  
On the other hand, the IETF Architecture at the PDP level supports the “provisioning” 
paradigm (i.e., using the COPS protocol for support of policy provisioning (COPS-PR)). An extraction 
from the COPS Usage for Policy Provisioning document could best describe the adaption of IETF 
architecture to the Provisioning mode:  
“The COPS Configuration model (herein described as the Provisioning model) makes no 
assumptions of such a direct one-to-one correlation between PEP events and PDP decisions.  The PDP 
may proactively provision the PEP reacting to external events (such as user inputs), PEP events, and 
any combination thereof (N-to-M correlation).  Provisioning may be performed in bulk (e.g., entire 
router QoS configuration) or in portions (e.g., updating a DiffServ marking filter).” (RFC 3084, 2001) 
When using the provisioning paradigm, the PDP receives events and starts reacting to them 
based on the written security policy. The reaction represents decisions provisioned to the PEP in order 
to be enforced (i.e., passing by standard protocols such as COPS-PR, SNMP, NetConf, CIM-XML, 
SSH, etc.). The decision could be a direct order to apply a configuration on resources (managed 
objects) or it could be itself a configuration for the PEP, a set of rules (policy). The PEP either applies 
the configurations to the environment or stores the policy to be used later on by the LPDP. The LPDP 
also receives events about the environment and thanks to the provisioned policy, the PEP may not 
need to ask the PDP for decisions, as the decisions could be already handled and therefore be locally 
provisioned by the LPDP to the PEP. 
From the literature, security management obviously needs both paradigms to really meet the 
CIA criteria. Moreover, the management of security is a two-tasks mission: the management and the 
security. Therefore, unifying both paradigms provides a robust, flexible, and powerful solution that 
could adapt the system and network entities to the environment changes and subsequently meet the 
management and the security requirements. 
Technical architectures of Outsourcing & Provisioning 
In Figure 3.23, the technical specifications of the COPS-RSVP (i.e., outsourcing) and the 
COPS-PR (Provisioning) are with decision-making conceptualization. Upon the attempt of using the 
network from the user, the outsourcing paradigm is a synchronized decision making. The PEP 
maintains a TCP connection (i.e., open and close) and works as a client for the PDP. The PDP receives 
the requests from the senders and respond with direct synchronized decisions. The objective of the 
outsourcing is controlling access to resources. Upon network notifications (i.e., including the attempt 
of using resources), the provisioning paradigm is not necessarily synchronized. However, the PEP 
maintains a TCP connection and works as a TCP client for the server installed inside the PDP. In this 
case, the TCP connection objective is to receive policy configuration from the PDP in order to be 
stored into the PIB (policy information base).  
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Figure 3.23: Outsourcing and provisioning technical architectures 
As a technical comparison, both paradigms use TCP session not like the SNMP using UDP 
sessions. The difference between outsourcing and provisioning is the logic. The outsourcing is based 
on externalizing the decision-making to the PDP. The provisioning is based on the provision of what is 
needed for the PEP to apply the decisions. Technically, the outsourcing considers the PEP is the 
sender (i.e., informs the PDP about the access requests), but the provisioning considers the PEP as the 
receiver (i.e., takes policy configurations from the PDP). (RFC 2753; RFC 2749) 
I I .D .  D M T F  W B E M  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Communication systems including networks, middleware, services and complex systems 
represent a major terrain for the supervision in terms of configuration and protection. Integrated 
management aims at providing all activities that help optimizing the interoperability between 
heterogeneous management environements, namely using configuration and reconfiguraiton 
management. As the leader contributor to this domain offering standards and solutions, DMTF 
initiated the WBEM (Web-Based Enterprise Management) to unify the management of IT 
environments (see Figure 3.24). The aim of WBEM is to integrate existing management solutions 
through a uniform modeling of management information (CIM) to help performing advanced 
management (event correlation, proactive management, etc.). However, the standalone WBEM is not 
enough to provide governance and supervision. Therefore, the WBEM architecture in Figure 3.24 (the 
right side) supports multitude technologies for that complementing its environment. Integrating SNMP 
(Simple Network Management Protocol) standardized by IETF helps the supervision task. 
WBEM architecture is mainly composed of two sides the WBEM server(s) and the WBEM 
client(s). At the server side, the architecture consists of two main components the CIMOM and the 
CIMOP. The CIMOM is the CIM object manager that controls the interactions between the CIM 
repository (i.e., where the management information are stored) and the client side or the provider side. 
The CIMOP is the CIM object provider that represents the interface between the CIMOM and the 
available providers that it can use. The CIM providers are software modules that are written using a 
high-level language (e.g., Java, C++, Python and C#).  These modules are DSLs12 written for specific 
objective that is to represent or encapsulate a specific technology (e.g., SNMP).  The WBEM client(s) 
side is where the administrators supervise and govern the managed environment. There are three types 
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of transactions that can be exchanged. The first two are setting and getting management information. 
The third is subscribing to notifications (i.e., CIM indications) that are triggered upon satisfying 
triggering conditions. 
Figure 3.24: WBEM architecture 
At the left side of the Figure 3.25, the integration of SNMP (or any other protocol) with 
WBEM is supported through software interfaces known as providers. The configuration management 
of communication systems is then possible to ensure using an SNMP provider. The SNMP provider 
listens to the environment notifications through so known SNMP traps. Then the mapping with the 
WBEM is through using a CIM class named indentions in order to update the new monitored value of 
the environment (e.g., the connection number of machines to a networked switch). Moreover, the 
SNMP can get notifications (indications) to change values of parameters (i.e., provision 
configurations) into the environment (e.g., change the default configuration of a networked printer to 
print tasks on two sides). 
Figure 3.25: Integrated management using WBEM and SNMP for configurations provisioning 
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I I .E .  P o n d e r  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Ponder (Damianou, Dulay, Lupu, & Sloman, 2001) is a security and management solution for 
distributed systems. Imperial College London implemented the Ponder architecture in a centralized 
manner. Its architecture is based on designing a policy repository (LDAP directory) that stores all 
management and security policies. Via a management console, the administrators create, store and 
modify their policies (in the form of Java RMI policy implementation). Ponder management strategy 
is to distribute multiple Ponder Management Components (PMCs) throughout the managed networks 
and systems. In the literature, these PMCs entities are no difference from PDPs/PEPs according to the 
IETF definition (i.e., PMCs are qualified to receive policies and to enforce them) (see Figure 3.26). 
Figure 3.26: Ponder architecture 
I I .F .  C o n c lu d in g  m a n a g e m e n t a r c h ite c tu r e s  
The reason of mentioning the SNMP/WBEM integrated management in this work refers to the 
focus of this research domain on improving the configuration and reconfiguration management aiming 
at improving the adaptation strategies. Therefore, the objective of this thesis to contribute with a 
security management solution is rather valorized when it respects the provisioning paradigm applied in 
this domain. As a result, it is important to define an architecture that combines the provisioning 
paradigm (for configuration management architectures), but stays correct in terms of offering the 
authorization service with respect to the security requirements (CIA). 
In Figure 3.27, the provided illustration is a general view of all management architectures 
describing the common components and the different communication paradigms. Every management 
architecture has a manager or an administrator side that sends the management orders (i.e., in form of 
configurations). However, the supervision task, which involves knowing the reality inside the 
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environments in real-time, needs two operations13, to help monitoring the environment and to watch its 
behavior changes: set and get. Both operations participate in performing common management 
strategies. The get operation either called manually, timed with a programed interval system (e.g., 
polling), or automatically in form of triggers (e.g., SNMP traps, CIM indication, low-bandwidth 
notifications). The other side is responsible of governing the managed environment through applying 
the control orders requested by the administrators. The application is either by responding to the 
administrator subscription to notifications (e.g., by sending a notification of low bandwidth from the 
router agent) or by setting the configuration sent by the administrator (e.g., changing the assigned 
route for some IP addresses inside the routing-table at a specific router). 
Figure 3.27: General management architecture 
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III .  Architectures with security  objectives  
The literature defines the security architectures based on the security objectives that an 
organization needs to obtain. For instance, organizations that are interested in implementing an 
encryption solution and maintain the confidentiality of their assets go for PKIs solutions (i.e., 
including its architectures). However, the security community worked on defining an access control 
architecture that can generally represent the triple security: Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA). This concept of AAA aims at providing services through an AAA server that 
separate the functionalities of authentication and authorization services at one side and ensure the 
management of applications at another.  
The literature holds several adoptions in terms of the technical implementation to the AAA 
architecture. In 1991, the Livingston Enterprises presented RADIUS as the Remote Authentication 
Dial In User Service networking protocol. It aims at centralizing the management of Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) for the users who connect and use a network service. It has 
been standardized later on by the IETF (Vollbrecht, 2006). RADIUS provides several implementations 
for the AAA architecture (Jacquenet, Bourdon, Boucadair, 2008, Chapter 11) and several trust 
relationships between services providers and consumers (Hassell, 2002, Chapter 1, Section 2). A 
second implementation for the AAA architecture is Privileges Management Infrastructure (PMIs). 
Considering their privileges, PMIs offer several ways to manage users’ access to available resources 
(i.e., privileges are attributes or properties assigned by a credential or trusted authority). The privileges 
are retrieved whenever the needs are identified into the access control policy.  
Finally, OASIS standardizes the XACML architecture with its complete solution (i.e., 
language, architecture and communication protocol). The XACML architecture meets the PBM 
architecture, respects the AAA standard architecture and can accept both implementations of a PMI 
and RADIUS as well. Moreover, the support of an issuer in XACML permits the integration of PKIs 
approach in its architecture to manage trustworthiness. XACML today is considered as one of the 
soundest security solution14. 
I I I .A .  A A A  A r c h ite c tu r e  
AAA proposes a standard generic architecture for management systems of services security. 
According to RFC 2904 of the IETF, the basic entities involved in authorization are (see Figure 3.28): 
a user requesting a service, the main organization that establishes contract with users (i.e., this 
involves the necessity of checking in an active or a passive form the user’s authorization to trigger the 
execution of the service), the service provider’s AAA server that allows access to the service based on 
the signed contract with the main organization of the user, and the service equipment dedicated to the 
services provisioning in response to service requests. 
The AAA authorization approach imposes the necessity of undertaking two actions: 1) an 
authorization decision after evaluating the access control policy and 2) the provided decision should be 
enforced. Respectively, two separated entities perform these two functions the PDP (Policy Decision 
Point) and the PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). On the first hand, the PDP is a logical entity that takes 
authorization decisions by considering the following information (RFC 2906): the requested resource, 
the required action (view, modify, use, etc.), the subject requesting the resource, and the policy that 
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manages access to the resource. On a second hand, the PEP is a logical entity that applies the 
authorization decision made by the PDP (i.e., this operation known as enforcement). This PEP is the 
guardian of the resource(s). 
Figure 3.28: AAA generic architecture (RFC 2903) 
The interactions between a PDP and a PEP can follow one of three models: Agent, Push or 
Pull. The agent model allows the user (requesting access) to submit her query to a third party (i.e., the 
AAA authorization server that is composed of the PBM elements: PDP / PEP). This AAA agent acts 
between the user and the equipment providing the service by applying the policy on the request. Upon 
the policy evaluation, the server allows or not the user to access the resource (i.e., the user receives 
notification of the denial as a message). In case of permission, the resource returns the query result to 
the PEP, which transfers it back to user (see Figure (A), 3.29).  
In the push model, the user addresses her desire of using the service provided and managed 
directly by the service provider (i.e., the resource/PDP). The latter’s role as an authorization server 
manages access to the resource by defining the authorization information (i.e., the right to use the 
service and start accessing the resource or not). In case of acceptation, the user receives a ticket to 
present it with each access request to the resource. The PEP by her turn is located at the resource level 
and gives the right of access to the user if the ticket is valid (see Figure (B) 3.29).  
Finally, the pull model assigns the responsibility for managing the authorization information 
exclusively to the PDP. Upon the access request, the resource/PEP inquires the PDP for the 
authorization information in a solicited (active) way. The PDP grants (or not) the right of access to the 
user, based on the policy (see Figure (C) 3.29). 
Figure 3.29: Three AAA PDP/PEP interaction models: (A) Agent, (B) Push, (C) Pull (RFC 2904). 
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I I I .B .  O A S I S  X A C M L  A r c h ite c tu r e  
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is a security management solution 
composed of a standard language, architecture, and implementation. The XACML security 
management solution was created by OASIS in 2003 (Godik, 2003). XACML aims at standardizing 
the access control management through using the PBM architecture, XML representation and 
enhancing the interoperability between heterogeneous systems, as it presents a standard solution.  
On the architectural side, XACML is based on the standard association between the PEP, the 
PDP, and the PR. In Figure 3.30, the drawn boxes are the main components that identify the XACML 
architecture: 
v The Context Handler is responsible for ensuring the communication (and translation if 
necessary) between the PEP and other boxes or entities to retrieve or complete the required 
data for the evaluation process of the policy. 
v The Policy Administration Point (PAP) creates and stores the security policies in the PR. 
Mostly, it is a user-friendly interface, or editor, which provides the policy writer (manager or 
administrator) with possible facilities to write his or her security policy. The policy is 
expressed in a semi-natural language close to the human English language. 
v The Policy Information Point (PIP) is responsible for storing or retrieving complementary 
information about attributes’ values. This information will be needed for the evaluation of the 
policy by the PDP, 
v The Policy Decision Point (PDP) makes the management decisions. This management agent 
is independent from the application it manages. It receives requests using a standardized 
protocol such as COPS, SAML, or XACML. These requests are analyzed according to a 
policy; the PDP may ask for more information to make its decision. Finally, the PDP returns 
its decision, which can be “accept,” “refuse,” or “indeterminate.” An obligation section can 
complete this decision (such as “send an email to the administrator after having enforced the 
authorization decision”). 
v The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforces the PDP’s decisions. The main role of this 
agent is to be the interface between the management application and the PDP. Hence, it 
translates the requests that are expressed in the application-specific language into the 
standardized protocol language understood by the PDP. The PEP can also get additional 
information that will help the PDP to make its decision. Finally, it translates the PDP’s 
decisions into the application-specific language. 
The workflow of the XACML architecture contains the following steps: 
1. PAPs write policies and policy sets and make them available to the PDP. These policies or 
policy sets represent the complete policy for a specified target. 
2. The access requester sends a request for access to the PEP.  
3. The PEP sends the request for access to the context handler in its native request format, 
optionally including attributes of the subjects, resource, action, and environment. 
4. The context handler constructs a standard XACML request context and sends it to the PDP. 
5. The PDP can request additional subject, resource, action, and environment attributes from the 
context handler, if needed. 
6. The context handler requests the attributes from a PIP. 
7. The PIP obtains the requested attributes. 
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8. The PIP returns the requested attributes to the context handler. 
9. The context handler sends the requested attributes. The PDP evaluates the policy. 
10. The PDP returns the standard XACML response context (including the authorization decision) 
to the context handler. 
11. The context handler translates the response context to the native response format of the PEP. 
The context handler returns the response to the PEP that enforces the authorization decision. 
12. If the decision includes obligations, the PEP fulfills them.  
13. Finally, the PEP enforces the authorization decision. 
Figure 3.30: XACML PBM architecture. 
The defined steps are the standard flow of actions that describe the XACML architecture. 
XACML is suitable for distributed environments where PEPs and PDPs are distributed in 
heterogeneous infrastructures. By separating the access policy of the protected applications and by 
providing standard authorizations expressions, XACML allows heterogeneous systems to share 
security policies. Thus, system administrators are no longer needed to write their policies using 
different languages. In addition, several research works presented that try to modularize the 
implementations of PDP and PEP in order to improve the reusability and the adding of new features 
on the fly (i.e., at the runtime) (Laborde, Cheaito, Barrèrre, & Benzekri, 2009; Cheaito, Laborde, 
Barrèrre, & Benzekri, 2011, Laborde, Kamel, Barrère, & Benzekri, 2008). 
Moreover, one of the XACML strengths, in terms of both language and architecture, is the 
acceptability of extensions. The language is open to extensions and the architecture can accept new 
components, and while it supports the standards, XACML can accept many standard protocols. This 
makes the number one choice for the solution we seek the XACML architecture and language, as it 
supports ABAC. However, this choice is not sufficient alone because the standard XACML does not 
unify the approaches and architectures presented previously, and therefore it misses the unification of 
them and the adaptability, whenever the environment changes the behavior. 
With comparison with the COPS management paradigms, the XACML is considerably similar 
to the outsourcing communication manner. However, the XACML does not obligate the PEP to 
maintain the TCP connection and therefore can manipulate several PEPs and PDPs. However, the 
XACML architecture does not support a similar technology to the COPS-PR. The provisioning 
paradigm helps the configuration of networks and this what is missing in XACML solutions. 
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I I I .C .  C o n c lu d i n g  s e c u r ity  a r c h i te c tu r e s 
The section mentioned the AAA and XACML solutions that focus on improving the access 
control management, namely authorization, by proposing abstract or implemented architectures that 
helps managing securely networks and systems. With the thesis objective of introducing a security 
management solution, it is remarkable that security architectures do not valorize the management 
objectives. As a result, it is important to stay correct in terms of offering authorization service with 
respect to the security requirements (CIA), but a security management architecture should combine the 
management features (for configuration management essentially) beside the security features. 
In Figure 3.31, the provided illustration is a general view of all security architectures 
describing the common components and the different communication paradigms. For the security 
architectures, every one has an administrator (i.e., security officer) who responds to the security 
queries (i.e., in form of access requests). However, the authorization task, which involves managing 
who can access what, when and under what circumstances, needs two operations to help controlling 
the access in the managed environment: authorization decision making, and enforcing authorizations 
and obligations. Both operations participate in performing common access controls approaches. 
Figure 3.31: Literature general view of access control architectures 
The authorization decision-making operation (i.e., the responsibility of PDPs) is about 
evaluating the security policy in order to check if the users who request access have the right to use the 
requested resource(s). Once the decision is made, the authorization is applied through the enforcement 
operation that should ensure the users getting or not the access to resources. The used paradigm for the 
exchange between the access requestor and the access provider is usually outsourcing. However, the 
authorization system logic of controlling the access is common, but the composition and the 
representation of the system are different from an architecture to another (e.g., Ponder calls PMCs 
instead of PDPs and PEPs). 
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Chapter’s Conclusion 
To wrap-up this Chapter, its main objective is to highlight the deep-
seated differences between the current management architectures logic 
and the current security architectures logic. Essentially, the introduction 
of the PBM architecture opened thoughts to reach a common 
architecture that can fit both worlds’ requirements. However, its 
abstraction and missing of implementation is not actually enough. 
Notably, the today’s PBM architecture treats the communication 
paradigms separately, even though it supports both representations. The 
eager need for a unified architecture that could meet management and 
security requirements and participate in providing a security 
management solution is overwhelming. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
 
The third part presents our contribution within the PREDYKOT 
project. Our vision is detailed in depth through three chapters dedicated 
to expression, architecture and concrete scenarios as a proof of concept.  
 
X 
   
I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  P A R T  I I I  
We identified two crucial phases where studies have been heterogeneous: the expression and 
the architecture. Policy expression and applying it to architecture is the enforcement of this policy. 
Obviously, the policy seems to have a sort of life cycle. The management of the policy’s life cycle was 
clearly stated through the European project called PREDYKOT. 
On October 2011, the fifth call from the ITEA program kicked off PRDYKOT. ITEA is the 
EUREKA15 cluster program supporting innovative, industry-driven, pre-competitive R&D projects in 
the area of software-intensive systems and services (SiSS). The R&D PREDYKOT project aimed at 
ensuring software modules that deliver policy refined dynamically and kept on the track. PREDYKOT 
addressed the ecosystems to shift their focus on the basic operational improvements of security policy 
management to the critical intelligence for business process improvement. The intelligence considered 
by this project is related to necessary mechanisms that ensure that the effectiveness of the security 
policy remains at any time. Moreover, the project proposes to undertake the contextual information, 
during the decision-making, to dynamically refine the security policy, (that is, by applying changes or 
modifications on the policy). The requirements that concerned this project were mainly the 
governance, the risk management, and the compliance. 
The PREDYKOT project developed a new method to present the PBM architecture. The 
project analyzed the market and the standards (from Gartner Reports: 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012), and 
compared them with current industrial and research requirements. The outcome of this study was an 
architecture that creates a security loop by connecting the environment behavior changes automatically 
with the policy refinement process (that is, expressing the security policy and continually improving it 
to stay on track with the business requirements). This created a sort of feedback based on which the 
refinement process evaluates the current security policies. The feedback is an output of a reasoning 
phase that consists of a specific language and intelligence engine. The implementation of the 
PREDYKOT architecture and expression was through a methodology known as policy management or 
policy life-cycle management. This approach is based on dynamically refining, modifying, or 
completely changing the security policy (policies) whenever the requirements are not met. Therefore, 
this approach keeps verifying, or polling, the security policy to check its validity. 
Today’s policy lifecycle management forms a cascade workflow of sequential management 
tasks. However, current policy lifecycle management misses the link between the monitoring side and 
the security governance side (cf. Figure III.32, A). Without this link, there is no guarantee that changes 
                                                
 
15 The intergovernmental organization for pan-European research and development funding and coordination 
THE NOTION OF ECOSYSTEMS ORIGINATES FROM ECOLOGY TO DESCRIBE A UNITY OF 
ACTORS LIVING INSIDE. THE ECOSYSTEM IS A SET OF SOLUTIONS THAT ENABLE, SUPPORT, 
AND AUTOMATE THE ACTIVITIES AND TRANSACTIONS BY AND BETWEEN THE ACTORS OF THE 
ORGANIZATIONS (BOSCH, 2009). SOFTWARE ECOSYSTEM IS “A SET OF ACTORS 
FUNCTIONING AS A UNIT AND INTERACTING WITH A SHARED MARKET FOR SOFTWARE AND 
SERVICES, TOGETHER WITH THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THEM. THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE 
FREQUENTLY UNDERPINNED BY A COMMON TECHNOLOGICAL PLATFORM OR MARKET AND 
OPERATE THROUGH THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, RESOURCES AND ARTIFACTS” (BERK, 
JANSEN, & LUINENBURG, 2010). 
 What is an Eco-System? 
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at the environment are always meeting the defined security requirements. PREDYKOT proposes to 
automatically verify that whatever dynamicity produced at the environment, the policy stays effective 
and on the track (i.e., still meets the requirements). The automation link of guarantying policy 
effectiveness is possible at two points: the policy expression and the enforcement architecture.  The 
reasoning box ensures the automation of the link. It keeps the expressed policy updated with managed 
elements behavioral changes. 
Figure III.32: Comparing PREDYKOT with the current policy life-cycle management 
According to PREDYKOT results, there are four principle elements to consider in order for an 
effective management of the policy lifecycle: the specified requirements, the security management 
policy, the reasoning feedback and the managed elements (cf. Figure III.33). Through the project, the 
consideration of the reasoning feedback inside the specified policy has created two implementation 
visions. This division into two views is a result of the question “what is the impact of the reasoning 
feedback on the policy lifecycle?” 
The first view goes with associating the feedback with the policy rules. Therefore, whenever 
the feedback changes, the rules of the policy must be updated. In addition to managing the policy, 
modifying the policy (e.g., operations like adding, removing, replacing, altering) imposes the 
management of its rules. Rule-based management in highly dynamic environments could create a 
complex dilemma in term of the engine performance and the policy integrity. However, the use of a 
heavy engine (e.g., usage of Drools) that could manage reactive rules upon intelligent calculation of 
feedbacks was one of the PREDYKOT implementations presented by two partners: situation calculus 
using a reasoning engine (Samarji, Cuppens, Cuppens-Boulahia, Kanoun, & Dubus, 2013) and 
reasoning language (Hu, Patkos, Chibani, & Amirat, 2012). Such engines may reduce the performance 
weight on a heavy process like the management of rules.  
Sure, we believe in implementing a security management solution that keeps the policy 
effective and on track whenever the feedback changes, but without changing the policy. This means, 
that the policy should apply authorizations and configurations suitable for every feedback. Dynamic 
authorization is giving permissions and prohibitions to managed elements based on the provided 
feedback (e.g., only analyzers are allowed to modify the documents during analysis task). Dynamic 
(A) PREDYKOT policy lifecycle management   (B) The current policy life-cycle management 
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configuration is provisioning the suitable obligations to the provided feedback (e.g., keep track of 
modifications when errors are produced).  Our contribution is an approach to express authorizations 
flexibly so that it can provide dynamic permissions and prohibitions. Moreover, our contribution is an 
adaptive architecture to apply dynamic and changeable configurations according to the feedback so 
that there is no need to stop the security management system. 
Our implementation vision preferred to keep the policy stable during the automatic loop, 
which means limiting policy modifications upon change requests on requirements. The next thesis 
chapters are following this PREDYKOT implementation vision.  
Figure III.33 gives a link to point our upcoming contribution within the PREDYKOT project. 
With the next two chapters, we are addressing our vision of an effective dynamic decision without 
modifying the policy. The first chapter addresses three points:  
1. How to define the feedback in order to express dynamic security management policies? 
2. How this feedback is defined, identified, and made available for consumption by the policy? 
3. How to represent the dynamic security management policies using this feedback? 
The second chapter is concerned with the adaptive enforcement of the decisions both 
authorizations and configurations. It presents the adaptive architecture through three points:  
Ø How the feedback will impact dynamically the policy decisions? 
Ø How the dynamic decisions will be implemented and enforced adaptably, without 
interrupting the security management system? 
Ø What impact the enforced decisions would have back on the feedback? 
At the end of this part, to proof our generic contribution, characteristics, we apply our 
PREDYKOT implementation to three different scenarios through expressing and implementing each 
of the scenarios policy. 
Figure III.33: Linking PREDYKOT architecture with next two chapters 
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Chapter IV 
Expression of A Dynamic 
Security Management Policy  
Chapter 4 aims at clarifying studies around expressing the dynamic behavior 
changes (the feedback) in term of two notions contexts and situations. Next, we 
present our choice of expressing the feedback based on the notion of situations. We 
engineer the policy to consider the situations feedback by proposing a methodology of 
expression, and going in depth on how to define and manage them. We present our 
choice of a flexible language that respects the attribute-based approach and expresses 
the dynamicity of the behavior. We present our choice of a flexible language that 
respects the attribute-based approach and expresses the dynamicity of the behavior. 
As a security management language, we need to orient XACML in order to be able to 
give adaptive decisions and configurations. Therefore, the last section presents the 
orientation mechanism and structure of XACML using situations. 
In order to support such a methodology, we provide a tool for the situations 
calculus. A set of software modules implements the situations manager that can be 
considered in any deployment infrastructure. 
Summary 
I. Expressing the Policy with Feedback 
Ø Terminologies: Situation, Context, Decision 
Ø Methodology: SCD Policy Engineering 
Ø Evaluating the Policy Expression using SCD 
II. Feedback Implementation 
Ø Situation Management 
Ø Complex Event Processing 
Ø Adaptable Situation Manager 
1) Situation Design & Identification 
2) Dynamic Situation Configuration 
3) Situation Preservation 
III. Representing the SCD Policy-Expression 
Ø Dynamic XACML Policy oriented by Situations 
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C h a p t e r  4 :  E x p r e s s i o n  o f  A  D y n a m i c  
S e c u r i t y  M a n a g e m e n t  P o l i c y   
“It is very unfair to judge any body’s conduct, without an intimate knowledge of their 
situation. Nobody, who has not been in the interior of a family, can say what difficulties 
of any individual of that family may be.” 
Jane Austen 
Columbia World of Quotations 
 Retrieved November 10, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
Introduction: 
Dynamic security management involves expressing the policy with understanding the dynamic 
behavior of managed elements and with accordance to the initially specified requirements. For 
instance, insecure states like systems under attacks become inevitable nowadays. Under attacks, the 
managed elements, and consequently the managed system itself, wont behave normally. Hence, each 
change at the environment causes a behavior change (Δ) of this environment’s elements. In 
consequence, this change may impose an equivalent change on the security policy as well, concerning 
both authorizations and configurations. A behavioral change at the authorization (AuthZ) point 
imposes changing the current permission (P) with a new permission (P’). Likewise, a behavioral 
change at the configuration point imposes changing the current configuration (Config) with a new 
configuration (Config’). We could conceptualize this by the following: 
To introduce this chapter, we demonstrate one simple example to use all along the underlying 
sections. Therefore, we specify its requirements. Then, we explain how to express these requirements 
with current policy expression approaches and what are their drawbacks. Finally, we conclude by 
presenting our motivation towards a contribution at the policy expression level. 
Let’s consider that at IRIT (Institute de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse), we deployed 
a security alarm system. We want our dynamic security policy to manage Bashar’s permissions and 
alarm systems’ configurations with consideration to the closing/opening periods. Thus, we specify the 
following four simple security requirements: 
  
Behavioral 
Change 
Δ 
P ⇒ P’ 
and/or 
AuthZ
 
Config Config ⇒ Config’ 
Bashar has the right to enter 1R1 building
Bashar does not have the right to enter 1R1 building
The alarming system is deactivated
The alarming system is activated
Opening
Period
Closing
Period
Opening
Period
Closing
Period
P
P'


P P'  
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To express the specified requirements in a security policy, current common approaches are 
either the CA (i.e., the common pseudo-code notation is “If condition Then action” (Strassner, P. 164, 
2004)) or the ECA (i.e., the common pseudo-code notations are “Upon/On event If condition 
Then/Then Do/Do action”) (Hu1, Yeh, & Laun, 2009; Bonatti, 2010). As there are several ECA 
notations, throughout this thesis we will depict rules using the following pseudo-code notation: “On 
event if condition then action”. 
On the first hand, the CA policies are dedicated for authorizations and are evaluated whenever 
an access request is received. On the other hand, the ECA policies are dedicated to ensuring 
configurations and are evaluated whenever a relevant event holds. However, authorizations have been 
managed using ECA by considering the event (E) as a constant type (i.e., E is always an access 
request). 
We start by expressing the authorizations then we express the configurations. However, we 
need to define first what are the “opening period” and the “closing period”. At IRIT, 1R1 building is 
open to employees at the morning from 7:00 and until the 20:59 in the evening. Predictably, the 
building is closed outside this period (i.e., from 21:00 until 6:59).  
We suppose that the access control event (E) is always: a person wants to enter. Hence, we 
express the authorization policies as follows: 
? Authorization Rule 1: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) >= 7:00 ⋀  
Now (Time) <= 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 
Then allow the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule  2 :  
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) < 7:00 ⋁  
Now (Time) > 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
Now, the expression of the configuration policies could be as follows: 
? Configuration Rule  3 :  
On evt1 = Time is 7:00  
Then deactivate the alarm system 
? Configuration Rule  4 :  
On evt2 = Time is 21:00  
Then activate the alarm system 
Nevertheless, we intentionally forget to consider the weekends as part of the closing period 
(i.e., 21:00-06:59, Saturdays, and Sundays) in order to present new changes on the mentioned rules. 
Now, the four above rules are replaced by the following: 
? Authorization Rule  1 :  
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) >= 7:00 ⋀  
Now (Time) < 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) 
Then allow the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule  2 :  
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ 
(Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁ (Now (Time) < 7:00 ⋀ Now (Time) >= 21:00)) 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
? Configuration Rule  3 :  
On evt1 = Time is 7:00 
If Today ≠ (Sun/Sat)  
Then deactivate the alarm system 
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Furthermore, what if we want to consider public holidays (i.e., “Les Jours Fériés”) in the 
definition of the closing period. For instance, the 14th of July is a national day in France. So, another 
modification is to add new conditions to the existing rules, but in order to do what? What if we needed 
to include all national days, or others? 
By considering the 14th of July, we have to following ECA policy expression: 
? Authorization Rule 1: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) >= 7:00 ⋀ Now (Time) 
< 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) ⋀ Today ≠ 14th July 
Then allow the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule 2: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) < 7:00 ⋀ Now (Time) 
>= 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ (Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁ Today = 14th July) 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
? Configuration Rule 3: 
On evt1 = Time is 7:00 
If Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) ⋁ Today ≠ 14th July 
Then deactivate the alarm system 
? Configuration Rule 4: 
On evt2 = Time is 21:01  
If Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁	Today = 14th July 
Then activate the alarm system 
In fact, what we are trying to demonstrate is that ECA/CA expressing process gain weight 
each time considering new conditions, especially if we what to add the summer holidays as well. Any 
new consideration of conditions is just to clarify more the introduction of new suggested 
circumstances. Within the possible behavior changes (Δ) (i.e., opening and closing periods), for 
example we want to consider: 
Circumstances: 
Bashar wants to enter building 1R1, time is 14:00 now and today is Friday. 
New circumstances: 
Bashar wants to enter building 1R1, time is s 14:00 now and today is Friday 8th of August. 
To consider the new circumstances, we need to update the rules by adding new conditions as 
well. Upon these new circumstances, evaluating the expressed conditions should decide what actions 
to do (i.e., permissions are given or not (P/P’), and configurations are changed (Config/Config’)).  
By observing what we demonstrated, we did not change the expression of permissions (P/P’) 
neither the expression of configurations (Config/Config’). What we are changing each time to meet 
the new circumstances by adding the new conditions is to understand the changes (Δ). So, what is 
missing to optimize the policy expression? 
The ECA/CA policy rule misses the semantics that express what a behavior change is about. 
Therefore in order to express the closing period, we needed to add additional conditions to help the 
rule itself understand and consider what “closing period” really meant. 
As a result, we add more conditions to the policy rules in order to explain that the “closing 
period” meaning involves non-working hours (i.e., 21:00-06:59), weekends, vacations, national-days, 
etc. From this observation, this is one problem that the current ECA/CA approaches encounter. 
Now, we want to introduce new exceptional circumstances that introduce new rules. Let us 
imagine that reconstruction works will take place during the month of November at building 1R1. 
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Eventually, this exception implies allowing workers to enter building 1R1 during their working hours 
(i.e., from 7:00 to 18:00). Hence, the alarm system is deactivated at the reconstruction period. 
However, Bashar is not allowed to enter the building for safety reasons. As a result, we will need to 
improve the previous policy by 1) inserting new five rules and 2) updating the other old rules (i.e., 
with the new underlined conditions in order to ensure the policy consistency and avoid any rules 
conflicts). So, the following nine rules express the new ECA policy: 
? Authorization Rule 1: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) >= 7:00 ⋀  
Now (Time) <= 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) ⋀  
Today ≠ 14th July ⋀ Month ≠ November 
Then allow the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule 2: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) < 7:00 ⋁  
Now (Time) > 21:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ (Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁  
Today = 14th July ⋁ Month ≠ November) 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule 3: 
If Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ 
Month = November 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule 4: 
If Role (Person) = Worker ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) >= 7:00 ⋀  
Now (Time) <= 18:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) ⋀  
Today ≠ 14th July ⋀ Month = November 
Then allow the person to enter 
? Authorization Rule 5: 
If Role (Person) = Worker ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Now (Time) < 7:00 ⋁  
Now (Time) > 18:00 ⋀ Name (Resource) = Building 1R1 ⋀ (Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁  
Today = 14th July ⋁ Month = November) 
Then prohibit the person to enter 
? Configuration Rule 6: 
On evt1 = Time is 7:00 
If (Today ≠ (Sun/Sat) ⋁ Today ≠ 14th July) ⋁	Month = November 
Then deactivate the alarm system 
? Configuration Rule 7: 
On evt2 = Time is 21:00  
If Today = (Sun/Sat) ⋁ Today = 14th July ⋁ Month ≠ November 
Then activate the alarm system 
? Configuration Rule 8: 
On evt3 ≠ Month is no more November 
Then activate the alarm system 
 
Giving the above rules, we note that we updated the rules (1, 2, 6, & 7) in order to avoid 
conflicts and handling the exceptional reconstruction work of November in the new rules (i.e., 3, 4, 5, 
& 8). On the one hand, the authorization rule (3) aims at preventing Bashar from entering during 
November to the 1R1 building. On the other hand, the authorization rules (4 & 5) aim at controlling 
the entering of workers to be only from 7:00 to 18:00 and preventing their entrance outside this range.  
Nevertheless, do these rules correspond and conform to the specified security requirements? 
Surely, no one can answer this question easily without diving inside the rules and the conditions, and 
potentially be lost. It is obvious that the nine rules are complicated for such simple requirements.   
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Concerning the alarm system, the exceptional reconstruction work in November requires to 
deactivate the alarm system during the worker’s working hours and to activate it outside these hours 
and during weekends.  
By observing the new ECA policy, what we were doing is just trying to refine the rules to be 
dynamic. The refinement is by going finer and finer with the details in expressing the rules in order to 
consider the new exception. In other words, we see that using events introduce more fine-grained 
rules, which extend the policy size and increase potential conflicts between them. Therefore, a second 
problem we raise by using ECA is the lack of abstraction in expressing the policy rules.  
Accordingly, expressing dynamic security management using complex policies is a result of 
the missing abstraction and semantics in ECA/CA policies. When semantics are missing, the 
complexity is remarkable by the size of the rule. In consequence, rules get more complex by adding 
new conditions in order to provide the required semantics. When abstraction is missing, the 
complexity is remarkable by the number of the rules. Hence, the policy gets larger by adding new 
rules to meet the new circumstances (i.e., exceptional reconstruction work).  
As the dynamic management of security is a complex problem, one needs a simple 
methodology to express the policy. Therefore, we imperatively need first a term that bestows both 
semantics (i.e., meaning to the rules so that they become simpler) and abstraction (i.e., aggregating 
conditions and circumstances as much as possible to reduce the rules number). 
To summarize, we used the previous example to demonstrate our motivation behind 1) Why 
we need a feedback with abstraction to express a dynamic policy, and 2) why we need a feedback 
with semantics to express a dynamic policy. Finally, we introduce the need for an answer to the 
question: 3) how to express a dynamic security policy that ensures a feedback with both? 
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I .  Expressing the Policy with Feedback 
The innovation brought by PREDYKOT was essentially around the reasoning box, which 
provides a feedback on the behavior changes (Δ) to the policy (PREDYKOT Posters Co-summit, 
2015). It reasons on the collected data (e.g., time now is 7:00 or Bashar is asking to enter) coming 
from the technical managed environment (e.g., the 1R1 building) to provide this feedback (e.g., 
closing or opening periods).  
We claim that the expression of this feedback must have two features: the meaningfulness 
(i.e., to reflect semantics) and the abstractness (i.e., to conceptualize the policy and to aggregate rules). 
For instance, the meaningful feature comes from the feedback “closing period” because it indicates 
that, “when it is the closing period, the building is closed.”  
Therefore, in what concerns the meaningfulness, one can feel how the following expression: 
“when it is the opening period, then allow Bashar to enter the 1R1 building” is natural in term of the 
human languages (i.e., here it is English) and high-level in term of being very close to the defined 
requirements. By analyzing this expression, we can identify the sentence “when a meaningful feedback 
caused by certain circumstances and within certain conditions, then do some actions”. Consequently, 
we can better structure this expression as follows:  
When meaningful feedback (about new circumstances happening) 
And certain conditions (on these new circumstances) 
Then do some actions (to adapt to these circumstances) 
Now, the first question we need to answer in this section is: what terms could help 
representing the proposed expression structure? 
Moreover, the same feedback (i.e., “closing period”) is abstract as well because it does not 
define any values for the period to which the building will be closed. For instance, the feedback 
“closing period” does not define imperatively that 14th of July is included (i.e., it is not a national day 
for other countries than France). Moreover, the feedback is abstract because it does not specify in what 
intention the usage of such meaning will be in term of security management (e.g., to allow or to deny 
persons). For instance, the “closing period” does not imply the prohibition of employees to enter the 
building at the summer vacation (e.g., letting PhD students continue their researches during August). 
Therefore, the closed meaning for the policy is abstract and does not associate or specify any decision. 
Finally, the feedback abstraction provides a sort of independency in management. For instance, the 
policy is interested only in managing the security state of the 1R1 building during the “closing 
period”. As a result, the edition phase of policies should specify for each feedback, the corresponding 
rules. 
Therefore, in what concerns the abstractness, we need to conceptualize this feedback and 
study what conditions and circumstances could specify and identify its happening, duration, meaning, 
and usage. At the same time, we need to understand the possible security states caused by receiving a 
meaningful feedback, and then aggregate the policy rules under each of these states. 
Now, the second question we need to answer in the next section is: what conceptual model 
could help us understand the feedback and its consequences, and how to manage and identify the 
meaningful feedback? 
To summarize, we have the two following questions in order to express the policies in the 
structure: When semantics, circumstances and conditions are met, then do some actions. To answer 
the first one, we have to find suitable terminologies to represent the different semantics, circumstances 
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and conditions. To answer the second one, we have to propose an engineering methodology of 
analyzing the requirements in order to consider the meaningful feedback (i.e., semantics, 
circumstances and conditions). This methodology should contain also a modeling approach to 
conceptualize the relationship between the semantics and the policy permissions and configurations. 
Answering both questions would fulfill expressing the policy rules with the above-proposed structure. 
I .A .  T e r m in o lo g y  
Observing failures and other behaviors, whether desired or undesired, in large-scale software 
or systems of specific domains (telecommunication systems, information systems, online web 
applications, etc.) is difficult. Very often, it is only possible by monitoring and examining the runtime 
behavior of these systems through operational logs or traces. However, these systems can generate 
data on the order of gigabytes every day, which creates a challenge in predicting upcoming critical 
problems or identifying relevant behavior feedbacks. One can say that there is a gap between the 
amounts of information a system has and the amount of information a system needs to make a decision 
(Fülöp et al., 2010). 
Nowadays, advancing tools for managing and processing technical events are introduced to 
the market (e.g., Security Information Event Management (SIEM), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), 
etc.). Hence, the feedback on events represents now an essential phase in order to produce the 
semantics. However and in order to express feedback on events more efficiently, we need to 
investigate results from more specialized research fields. 
Complex adaptive systems are a research field with intensive studies on the behavior of their 
actors. The aim is at recognizing highly dynamic behavior changes in order to observe and learn about 
the unpredictable actors’ activities. For instance, studies on Pervasive Computing systems have 
focused on two research trends to handle the dynamic feedback: context and situation awareness. 
Therefore, it is crucial to define what a context is and what a situation is. Should security management 
use situations, contexts or both? What is best to use for expressing the meaningful feedback? 
To overcome these doubts, we choose to express the feedback using the term situation. 
However, we argument that the context represents an undeniable term to use in order to complete our 
proposed policy rules structure instead of ECA/CE. Thus, using both terms situation and context we 
propose the following SCD structure:  
When Situation  = meaningful feedback (about new circumstances happening) 
And Context  = certain conditions (on these new circumstances) 
Then Decisions  = do some actions (to adapt to these circumstances) 
The most common definition of the context information was provided as “any information 
that can be used to characterize the situation of entities (i.e., whether a person, place or object) that 
are considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including the user and 
the application themselves” (Dey et al., 1999, Page 3). 
Concisely, we refine what does the situation term mean, and what is used for in the literature. 
Then, we contribute on adding our proper definition and explain how to make the use of it in this 
thesis. Moreover, we justify our choice of using the situation for expressing the semantics. Likewise, 
we define what does the context term mean, and what it is used for in the literature. Then, we 
contribute on adding our proper definition and explain how to make the use of them in this thesis. 
Moreover, we justify our choice of using the context for expressing the conditions (i.e., associated 
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with certain circumstances). Finally we define what does the decision term mean and what is our 
contribution to this part of the structure.  
I.A.1. Situation 
Different faces of situation could be relevant to use for representing the meaningful feedback. 
The Centre of National Resource Textual and Lexical of France (CNRTL) continues the initial 
definition of a situation as “a set of conditions and circumstances in which one finds oneself16:” 
§ At a given time, the situations semantics could be described as awful, advantageous, 
critical, cruel, terrible, exceptional, favorable, bad, painful, emergent, fake in which 
they can examined, flipped, reversed back into a given or an initial situation. 
§ At a given point of view, the situation can be administrative,  financial, legal, 
physical, military, a property status, a family status, irregular, a marital status etc. “A 
person inquired straight away on our business situation, and though he was very 
young, and limited in his means, he paid everything! The look that marked the greatest 
affection on my sister and me” [Restif La Bret., Nicolas, 1796, p. 113]. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Italian theologian has described situations as: “Every step, every 
situation reflects your state of mind and, similarly, carries a spiritual meaning” (CNRTL). From this 
saying, one can match between human and systems’ elements, mind and requirements, spirituality and 
behavior. As a result, a new definition may appear “every situation reflects a system’s (element) state 
against its requirements and, by the same token, carries a meaning about its behavior.” 
Situations are expressive and meaningful words that can describe the crucial conditions and 
circumstances that invite the managed elements’ behavior to change. It is generic enough to express 
several scales and therefore to be included during the requirements specification, policy specification 
and expression, configuration, and assessment of technical environments’ behaviors. 
 Situations are not limited to defining the state of a person or a task, but they express the state 
of a system, subsystem, and any member of the system. However, the effort in the definition is to pick 
up the right word that expresses the interesting situation. One-way is to extract situations and express 
them using abstract keywords. By analyzing the requirements documents, any keyword that has a 
significant appearance or importance in the documents can be recognized as a situation, but only if it is 
possible to define the conditions and the circumstances for a specific subject (i.e., a member of the 
system).  
By definition, the situation is a time-related concept, and it is subject to have a start and an 
end, which creates a period of time representing the situation lifetime or duration. For instance, in our 
example, the working environment of the 1R1 building has two situations where the building opens 
and closes. We define the first situation, as it is expressed in the above requirements, “opening 
period”. This situation starts every day at 7:00 and ends at 21:00 (i.e., outside the weekends, national 
days, etc.). 
  
                                                
 
16 Collins, Oxford & Larousse Dictionaries 
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Figure 4.34: Situation as a core concept. 
In pervasive systems, studies advancement on the situation-awareness domain has proposed a 
more detailed definition: “A set of contexts in the application over a period of time that affects the 
future system’s behavior” (Yau et al., 2006). Here, a context refers to any instantaneous, detectable, 
and relevant property of the environment, system, or user, such as location, available bandwidth, and 
user’s schedule. Pervasive systems collect data to predict or anticipate a situation (Tsai, Liu, Chen, & 
Paul, 2005). A more technical definition for situation is “a relevant time frame calculated based on 
events generated by available sensors” (Thollot, 2012; Thollot, 2013). Our work is more concerned 
with defining situations to identify them, once they appear without predictions. However, we hope to 
derive benefits from predicting future situations. Therefore, we refine the mentioned definition for the 
purposes of this work as “a set of contexts detected because of predefined conditions and 
circumstances within the application over a timeline that affects the current and future system 
behavior.” 
Ongoing works to distinguish context and situation have been presented by other studies 
(Boytsov & Zaslavsky, 2013; Janiesch, 2010; Yau, Huang, Gong, & Seth, 2004; Yau, Wang, & 
Huang, 2003). One definition of the situation for an application software system is “an expression on 
previous device-action record over a period of time and/or the variation of a set of contexts relevant to 
the application software on the device over a period of time. Situation is used to trigger further device 
actions” (Yau, Wang, Karim, 2002). A formal definition is proposed as well by considering the 
situation as problems: “A situation is a problematic and developing state of a computational element 
characterized by its context. ‘Problematic’ means that there is a problem of which a system should 
take care in a given situation and ‘developing’ means that a situation is changeable to another 
situation or state by system operations for solving the problem” (Kim & Kim, 2009, Definition 3.1, p. 
557). The provided formal definition is S = <C, H, P, A>, where C is the context information, H is the 
history of actions, P is the problem, and A is the plan (set of actions). A “situation is a concept of 
developing a state as well as an understanding context. Situation is more like a process, while the 
context is more like data. That makes it easy and efficient to design and implement dynamic systems 
based on the concept of situation” (Kim & Kim, 2009, p. 556). 
Requirement
Situation EventPolicy
Behavior
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From the previous definitions of a situation, one can recognize that a situation is mainly 
defined by its conditions and circumstances. However, this recognition tells only the beginning of the 
situation. Situations have a duration bounded by the time. Every situation must end at a specific time. 
Likewise, a situation ends after recognizing certain conditions and circumstances. Moreover, the 
situation is defined as entity-related, which means that each situation is associated with and owned by 
a specific entity. For instance, in our example, the working environment of the 1R1 building has two 
situations that represent the building’s state open and close. We define the first situation, as it is 
expressed in the above requirements, “opening period”. This situation starts every day at 7:00 and 
ends at 21:00 (i.e., working days – outside the weekends, national days, etc.). We define the second 
situation as the “closing period” that starts after the end of the first situation (at 21:00) and ends before 
the starting of the next situation (at 7:00). It also includes weekends. Thus, the “closing period” during 
Saturdays and Sundays starts each Friday’s night (at 21:00) and continues until next Monday’s 
morning (7:00). Likewise at the national days (i.e., 14th of July), the “closing period” is from the night 
of July’s 13th (at 21:00) and until the morning of July’s 15th (at 7:00).  
Nevertheless, we recognized a situation with the start and the end of certain conditions and 
circumstances, but what does a recognized situation represent by itself during its lifetime? The 
situation represents meanings, semantics. For example, the situation “opening period” represents the 
following semantics: the 1R1 building is open for employees during the period 7:00-21:00 on working 
days. These semantics are embedded in this situation. Therefore, using situations will simplify the 
security management, but it is a complex process that we need to manage externally by defining and 
identifying (or recognizing) the situation. Why externally? Because as we argued before, integrating 
an event inside the policy expression (i.e., ECA) introduces complexity to the policy! 
To conclude, situations represent the best candidate to express the behavior of the system. 
However, it is undeniable that the policy expression needs to consider events and contexts. Once the 
dynamicity is expressed, the security policy expression can be easier because the knowledge about the 
environmental behavior it manages and governs, helps defining more consistent and coherent rules 
with both the requirements and the environment. Studies have frequently promoted the situation notion 
as the best formalism in expressing and representing the dynamic behavior, because it is closer to the 
requirements than events and contexts (Loke, 2006). 
  
 — 75 — 
I.A.2. Context 
Linguistically, The Oxford dictionary defines the context as the “set of facts that surrounds a 
particular event, situation, etc.” 
Previously, we have provided the most common definition that associates the context 
information definition with the situation definition as “any information that can be used to 
characterize the situation of entities (i.e., whether a person, place or object) that are considered 
relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including the user and the application 
themselves.” (Dey et al., 1999, Page 3). 
A Context is a fact. Hence, examples of the information about contexts could be the role, 
location, identity, state of people (groups or, computational and physical objects), actions, etc. For 
instance, Emma’s role is a doctor, the doctor’s name is Emma, Emma is running to reach the door, 
Emma is angry and Emma is at the emergency room. 
Any event, situation, or fact that is not surrounded with a clear context is raw (e.g., a raw 
event could be “a person heard a noise”) (Akyildiz et al., 2002; Dorn et al., 2008; Melgani et al., 
2001). Any event that is not specified to have a sense, and as a result, is not classified or categorized, 
would be considered as raw. That is why the example “a person heard a noise” is a raw event with no 
sense, as we don’t know what person, what noise, and where, etc. 
Therefore, the way we view things in our daily lives is affected by their context in order to be 
specified. The context could be related to several elements that could represent the circumstances and 
the conditions. However, various refinements of the context definitions in term of awareness do exist, 
Dey’s definition is widely accepted and adopted to provide a consistent understanding of the subject 
studied by researchers [INCOME, 2012, Chapter 4, Deliverable 2.1]. 
In this thesis work, the context is the group of facts (i.e., contexts and conditions) that 
specifies and refines a situation and a policy rule. For the situations, the context groups the conditions 
and circumstances that represent their start and end. For instance, the “opening period” situation gives 
the semantics that the 1R1 building is opened within the following context: time is between 7:00-
21:00, the days are working days outside the reconstruction works period i.e. other than weekends, 
national days, vacations, etc., and the months are other than November. The context is recognized 
using the help of detected events (we will explain the technical relationship at the next section). For 
the policy rules, the context is the group of facts that are used in the conditions to specify the rules. For 
instance, the name of the person requesting the access is Bashar, the action requested is to enter, and 
the building name is 1R1. 
We did precise what the context for the situation is, but what is the situation for the context in 
the policy rule? The situation gives semantics to the given and defined context. For instance, the 
context detected as someone is running to exit the mall. The situation gives semantics to this context. 
This means, that if the situation of the mall is on fire, then the person is running away from the fire 
(i.e., the given semantics). If the situation of the mall is being robbed, then the person is suspected as 
he/she is running away from the crime scene (i.e., the given semantics). 
To summarize the context, the SCD structure has the following expression: When Situation 
And Context Then Decision. In our contribution, this context is of two types: a situation context and a 
policy context. It is an expressive and a rich source of information extracted from the requirements. By 
referring to our previous example, for us the context represents all the following examples: 
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§ Bashar wants to enter the 1R1 building, time is 14:00 now and today is Friday. 
§ Bashar wants to enter the 1R1 building, time is 14:00 now and today is Friday 8th of 
August. 
§ The name of the person requesting the access is Bashar  
§ The name of the requested action is Enter 
§ The time now is 7:00, 21:00, 18:00, or 5:00, etc. 
§ The name of the resource, where the access request is controlled, is Building 1R1  
§ Today is Sunday, Saturday, Monday, etc.  
§ Today is a national holiday 14th July, Thanksgiving, etc. 
§ Today is a vacation day Christmas, etc. 
§ There are some reconstruction works this month of November. 
§ The role of the person is reconstruction worker  
§ The alarm system state is active, inactive, etc. 
§ Etc. 
Therefore, the context participates in the policy expression at both situation and policy levels. 
The first level is whenever defining the start and the end of a situation (i.e., helping the recognition of 
a situation). The second level is whenever defining the conditions of the policy rules. 
I.A.3. Decision 
A decision is a rule part that is applied upon the evaluation of relevant situation(s) and relevant 
context(s). There are two types of the security management decisions: authorizations and 
configurations. The permissions are the authorization decisions to allow or deny a subject from 
accessing a requested resource. Defining permissions is associated at least with three types of 
elements: subjects, objects/resources, and actions. However, other elements types may participate in 
defining permissions such as the environment in where the permission is being given. For instance, 
an example on the permissions is allowing Bashar entering the 1R1 building during the opening 
period. This example gives the permission of allowing the subject ‘Bashar’ to effecting the action 
‘entering’ on the controlled resource ‘Building 1R1’ within the “opening period” environmental 
situation. 
Configurations are the management decisions to provision new settings, parameters, etc. The 
security management involves obligating managed elements to perform certain actions (e.g., activating 
the alarm systems). Therefore, such security obligations are inclusively part of the security 
management decisions. Security obligations are high-level expressions, where configurations are 
technical representations. For instance, alarm systems should be deactivated during the “opening 
period” situation and activated during the “closing period” situation. Technically, configurations are 
the actions of setting the alarm on/off called whenever needed. 
Finally, our SCD policy permits providing a default decision in a special SCD rule. The rule 
structure is then: 
When there is no specific situation, 
And there is no specific context,  
Then give a default decision  
As a conclusion on contexts and situations, contexts are used to calculate and identify 
situations, where situations provide semantics to contexts. 
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I .B .  M e th o d o lo g y :  th e  S C D  P o lic y  E n g i n e e r i n g 
We contribute with a methodology to engineer security management policies 17 . Our 
engineering methodology aims at guiding the expression of the dynamic security management policy 
using the SCD structure, in order to be easily represented later with a technical language. The policy 
expression methodology we propose aims at analyzing the security requirements to extract the triples: 
situations, contexts, and decisions. Afterwards, we model the situations relationships and associate 
each situation with relevant triples. Finally, we express the policy rules using the SCD structure. 
I.B.1. SCD Policy Specification 
To specify a dynamic security policy, we extract the SCD triples by analyzing the provided 
requirements. Given the example that we mentioned, we have initially two requirements. For them, we 
specified three situations: “opening period”, “closing period”, and “reconstruction period”.  
As we mentioned, every situation is defined with start and ending contexts. Each context is a 
group of circumstances and conditions. The “opening period” situation is defined with several starting 
and ending contexts18: 
1. Starting Context:  
o Time now is 7:00  
o Today is a working day (i.e. not a weekend, not a national holiday etc.)  
o Etc. 
2. Ending Context: 
o Time now is 21:00  
o Today is a weekend  
o Today is a national holiday 
o Today is a vacation day 
o Etc. 
The situation “reconstruction period” is defined with several starting and ending contexts:  
3. Starting Context:  
o The Beginning of November, there is reconstruction work 
o Other dates … 
4. Ending Context: 
o The end of November, reconstruction work should be finished 
o Otherwise, extensions … 
                                                
 
17 We refer with the name Policy Engineering to the study presented in LANOMS (Zhang et al., 2005): “Security 
management of information systems is a complex and daunting task in most organizations. Management policies 
are then introduced to guide and control the management of information systems, but the management of 
management policies is also a complex task. Therefore, we propose a new concept—policy engineering, which 
uses the philosophy and paradigms of established engineering disciplines to address these problems. The 
introduction of policy engineering will provide a systematic methodology that can be used to guide and control 
the management of information systems.” 
18 Nevertheless, the following starting and ending contexts are related to time (period of time), which makes 
three situations time-related situations. We can also define starting and ending contexts by other identifiers such 
as the location (space). For instance, we have the situation "stolen". We can identify the location of a shop's 
items with location patches, using Google coordination (X, Y). The stolen situation's starting context is when the 
item is no longer inside the shop and it has not been sold. 
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Logically, the 1R1 building is initially closed and then it is opened for employees to work, 
then it is closed again, and so on. At November, the building is closed at the night (from 21:00 to 7:00) 
before the beginning of the reconstruction works. Therefore, the next situation of the “closing period” 
is also the “reconstruction period”. Once November is finished, the building gets back to the “closing 
period” situation. Afterwards, the building continues the successive repetition between closing and 
opening periods. 
The “closing period” situation as a core situation starts whenever the “opening period” 
situation ends, and ends whenever the “opening period” situation starts. Likewise, the same “closing 
period” situation ends whenever the “reconstruction period” situation starts, and starts whenever the 
“reconstruction period” ends. Hence, the context that triggers a situation always ends another one. 
However, as we will see later on the next technical section, the starting and ending contexts are 
dynamic points. This means, the situation in term of semantics stays the same (e.g., “opening period”), 
but the context may change (e.g., “open day event”). Therefore, the situation will start with different 
conditions and circumstances but will give the same semantics (i.e. the 1R1 building is open). 
Now, the specification of the policy rules context is our methodology’s next step. From the 
requirements, we identify that there are the following contexts to include in the policy: 
§ The name of the person requesting the access is Bashar  
§ The name of the requested action is Enter 
§ The name of the resource, where the access request is controlled, is Building 1R1 
§ The role of the person is reconstruction worker 
§ Etc. 
Finally, the specification of the desired decisions is our methodology’s next step. Our policy 
decisions are of two types: permissions and configurations. From the example’s requirements, we 
identify the following decisions (we do not explicit): 
§ Allow Bashar to enter building 1R1 
§ Deny Bashar to enter building 1R1 
§ Allow workers to enter building 1R1 
§ Deny workers to enter building 1R1 
§ Activate the alarm system 
§ Deactivate the alarm system 
I.B.2. SCD Policy Modeling 
During the thesis work, we have noticed about the situation notion its expressiveness feature. 
We found that a situation links the associated entity to the requirements. It reflects the entity’s 
behavior by showing its current state, it gives a semantic to the context in the policy rules, it also 
aggregates situations contexts and SCD rules, etc. 
Therefore, we decided to model the situation of each entity in which we manage its security. 
For instance, we are managing the security of the 1R1 building. Hence, we model the situations of the 
building and we associate to each situation the relevant contexts and decisions. 
As changing the situation of the building means changing its states as well, we found that the 
software engineering model ‘state diagram’ is the closest model to our needs. Thus, we consider each 
state to be a situation and each transition is a starting context of a situation and an ending context to 
another one. However, adjusting the diagram was not sufficient to include the policy decisions and 
contexts. Hence, we propose a rectangular box associated to each situation. As a result, we represent 
the SCD triples and the relationships between them (see Figure 4.35). 
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Figure 4.35: Modeling situations using state diagrams 
Given the defined SCD triples for our previous example, we can use our model to 
conceptualize the SCD policy. Figure 4.36, shows three states representing the three defined 
situations: opening, closing periods, and reconstruction period. Firstly, the previously defined starting 
context ends the situation “closing period” and as a result orients the policy towards the contexts and 
the decisions associated with the new state (i.e., “opening period”). Secondly, the ending context ends 
the situation “opening period” and as a result orients the policy towards the contexts and the decisions 
associated with another state (i.e., “closing period”). Thirdly, the starting context for the situation 
“reconstruction period” starts it and ends the previous situation “closing period”. Finally, the ending 
context for the situation “reconstruction period” ends it and starts the situation “closing period” again. 
As an observation, the situation “closing period” occurs after the “opening period” and after the 
“reconstruction period” as well. 
As a result of this step, we obtained a conceptual view on the policy that we are willing to 
express. This facilitates even more the task of expressing the rules in the SCD structure.  
Figure 4.36: Modeling the situations of 1R1 building. 
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I.B.3. SCD Policy Expression 
Now that we defined the situation, the context and the decision terms, we want to use the SCD 
structure to express any dynamic security management policies. With the help of the previous state 
diagram, let us express the example we mentioned earlier: 
? SCD Rule 1: 
When Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” 
And Name (Person) = Bashar ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then allow the person to enter 
? SCD Rule 2: 
When Situation (Building 1R1) = “Reconstruction Period” 
And Role (Person) = Worker ⋀ Name (Action) = Enter ⋀ Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then allow the person to enter 
? SCD Rule 3: 
When Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” 
And Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Beginning” 
Then deactivate the alarm system 
? SCD Rule 4: 
When Situation (Building 1R1) = “Closing Period” 
And Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Beginning” 
Then activate the alarm system 
? SCD Rule 5: 
When Situation (Building 1R1) = “Reconstruction Period” 
And Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Beginning” 
Then deactivate the alarm system 
? SCD Rule 6:  
When Any other situations are identified 
And Within any contexts 
Then Decision is to deny access 
We used five rules to express the predefined security requirements. The first rule is chosen 
whenever the situation “opening period” is recognized. It is applied if the context matches: Bashar 
wants to enter building 1R1. Upon choosing this rule, the applied decision is to allow him to enter. 
The second rule is chosen whenever the situation “reconstruction period” is recognized. It is applied if 
the context matches: a person with the Worker role wants to enter the 1R1building. Upon choosing 
this rule, the applied decision is to allow him/her to enter. The third rule is chosen whenever the 
situation “opening period” is recognized. It is applied only at the context where the situation “opening 
period” has just begun. Upon choosing this rule, the applied decision is to do an action (i.e., deactivate 
the alarm system). At the opposite way, the fourth rule is chosen whenever the situation “closing 
period” is recognized. It is applied only at the context where the situation “closing period” has just 
begun. Upon choosing this rule, the applied decision is to activate the alarm system. Exceptionally, the 
fifth rule is chosen whenever the situation “reconstruction period” is recognized. It is applied only at 
the context where the situation “reconstruction period” has just begun. Upon choosing this rule, the 
applied decision is to deactivate the alarm system. Whenever there are situations and contexts that do 
not match the previous five rules, the sixth rule is chosen and the decision by default is to deny all 
access requests. 
In summary, we proposed an analytical approach to engineer the policy expression based on 
expressing the feedback using SCD triples: situations, contexts, and decisions (actions). We added a 
modeling approach using the state diagram that helps understanding what are the security 
requirements in terms of these SCD triples. Both approaches aim at facilitating the policy expression, 
and consequently will improve its evaluation and enforcement. 
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As the methodology conclusion, we want to stress the value of our contribution. First, we want 
to recall the specified security requirements (SR). Table 4.10 demonstrates two columns: the specified 
security requirements number, and the specified security requirements description.  
Table 4.10: Specified security requirements 
SR Description 
SR 1 Bashar has the right to enter building 1R1 during the opening period 
SR 2 The alarm system is deactivated during the opening period  
SR 3 The alarm system is activated during the closing period  
SR 4 Workers have the right to enter building 1R1 during the reconstruction period  
SR 5 The alarm system is deactivated during the reconstruction works  
SR 6 
Deny-all: 
- Workers does not have the right to enter building 1R1 outside the reconstruction period 
- Bashar does not have the right to enter the 1R1building during the closing period 
By empirically comparing the policy expressed using ECA/CA (i.e., eight rules, page 68) and 
our SCD policy (i.e., six rules), one can easily remark the difference in the rules number. More 
importantly, with less number we expressed simpler rules in term of the conditions complexity. Our 
rules conditions are simpler and closer to the SR descriptions than the ones expressed with ECA/CA 
policies.  
Our methodology for the policy expression is simple, yet powerful. We externalize the 
complexity of the events expression to be outside the policy, how? We added the abstract and the 
meaningful term: situation. With the term situation, we bestow the detected context and the specified 
policy semantics and abstraction. Therefore, we reduce the complexity of expression by using the 
semantics. Moreover, we reduce the complexity of the policy size by using the abstraction to 
aggregate the rules. 
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II .  The Feedback Implementation 
We specified our expression of the feedback on the behavior changes to be based on 
situations. We presented that starting and ending points surround each situation. Moreover, we 
explained that these points are defined using contexts. Between the starting and the ending points there 
is a lifetime duration that we defined as lifespan. Hence, we need a management paradigm for 
situations to identify starting and ending contexts and to maintain their life during the totality of the 
lifespan. 
Accordingly, it is important to point out that the definition of situations implies eventually the 
definition of contexts. Therefore, the identification process is essential after the definition of situations 
to assign a concrete managed element in order to distinguish its occurrence. Briefly, the definition of 
situations creates a powerful abstraction that needs to be assigned a context (i.e., starting and ending 
points, and managed elements). The assignment process is known as the identification of situations. 
Situation identification is the outcome of managing situations. 
I I .A .  S itu a tio n  M a n a g e m e n t 
Situation management (SIMA) identifies effective methods for situation recognition, 
prediction, reasoning and control19. The SIMA term has been widely used in different domains, 
especially in critical ones like cyber security, physical infrastructure, pervasive computing, air traffic 
control, battlefield operations management, disaster and crisis management, homeland security, etc. Its 
importance comes with domains interested in the detection and processing of situations⎯normal and, 
more particularly, abnormal⎯identified based on events or alarms (e.g., intrusions) (Cochran, 1996), 
and interested in managing complex dynamic operations, networks, and systems. Modern U.S. defense 
policy highlights the importance of situations by expecting that wars in the future will be characterized 
by heightened mobility, increased operational tempo, and more complex and dynamic situations. 
Therefore, policy decisions and actions will require an effective methodology for monitoring, 
awareness, recognition, prediction, reasoning and control of situations, partially or wholly, which 
collectively are recognized in literature as SIMA.  
The management of situations aims essentially at managing and controlling distributed 
heterogeneous information sources, processing real-time (or nearby real-time) event streams, and 
representing and integrating low-level technical events and higher-level requirements (business goals). 
Moreover, SIMA includes the task of fusion and presentation of multi-source information that 
amplifies the human understanding, reasoning about what is happening and what is important in the 
environments’ behavior (Jakobson, Lewis, Matheus, Kokar, & Buford, 2005).  
Technologies are generous in providing technical solutions for the SIMA task. The main 
trends that overlap with this task’s objectives are information fusion, intelligent sensing, sensing grids, 
situation-awareness, context-awareness, and complex event-processing architectures (IEEE CogSIMA 
2011-2014). 
In our contribution, we consider SIMA as a paradigm that aims at defining, identifying and 
maintaining situations lifespan. Therefore, we define SIMA mainly with three phases in order to 
implement our feedback.  
                                                
 
19 Information rephrased from the following website at 21 July 2015: 
http://cms.comsoc.org/eprise/main/SiteGen/TC_SM/Content/Home/Situation_Management.html  
 — 83 — 
i) The first phase is to technically design situations definitions. These definitions we already 
specified during the SCD Policy Specification step (i.e., analyzing requirements to 
recognize keywords that could describe relevant situations such as: opening period, 
closing period, intrusion, attack, emergency, etc.).  
ii) The second phase, which happens once the situation is defined and designed, is the 
technical identification of situations through starting and ending contexts.  
iii) Finally, the third phase is to maintain the situations alive all along their lifetime duration 
(i.e., lifespan). As far as a situation of a managed element is maintained alive, the SCD 
policy knows that this situation is still valid. 
Therefore, SIMA is a crucial step in our contribution because of its relationship with both the 
environment and the policy (Jakobson, Buford, & Lewis, 2007). Its outcome is situations that 
represent the core of our contribution. SIMA is a very flexible and abstract paradigm that we specified 
in this thesis work to respond to security management requirements. Therefore, we need to technically 
implement this paradigm.  
Amit20 – The Situation Manager is just a conceptual solution, provided by IBM Research 
Laboratory in Haifa, which proposes a generic architecture to implement the SIMA phases. The Amit 
solution guidelines what functionalities the software module (i.e., the situation manager) should 
provide to the interested applications. Moreover, the solution describes the relationship between the 
situation manager and the events information sources (see Figure 4.37). 
Figure 4.37: General view on the architecture of the Amit Situation Manager. 
Nevertheless, IBM Amit is a high-level conceptual contribution with no implementation. 
Therefore, we inspire from their solution and contribute with an implementation with respect to their 
proposition. Our implementation is limited to meet the dynamic security management requirements 
that we presented during the state of the art. 
The conceptual architecture has the objective of monitoring the runtime behavior and receives 
information about the events’ occurrence. Then, it detects the desired situations by means of 
applications that require reactions. Finally, it reports the detected situations to the subscribers’ 
applications. The Amit – Situation Manager hands over the situation-detection’s responsibility from 
the application level to a higher-level tool. Moreover, it bridges the situations that require reactions 
and the application. It provides a general solution (i.e., a solution that is practical in many domains) 
that can express the fundamentals of a situation definition. 
Extracted from the article “Amit – The Situation Manager” (Adi & Etzion, 2004), we quote the 
following definition: 
A tool that includes both a language and an efficient runtime execution mechanism 
aimed at reducing the complexity of active applications. This tool follows the 
observation that in many cases there is a gap between current tools that enable one to 
react to a single event (following the ECA: event-condition-action paradigm) and the 
reality in which a single event may not require any reaction; however, the reaction 
should be given to patterns over the event history. 
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Nevertheless, we need to implement our own situation manager enlighten by the Amit generic 
architecture and definition. We believe that implementing the situation including the starting and 
ending contexts is undoable without using events. However, the need to detect and process more 
complicated events (e.g., attacks) introduces new technologies. In this thesis, we have chosen to 
follow the complex event processing technology to implement our situation manager. We develop next 
our motivation to justify our choice. 
I I .B .  C o m p le x  E v e n t  P r o c e s s in g  
Events are the core elements for understanding a system’s behavior and adjusting it to 
requirements. Events are relatively important phenomena that add fresh news to reality and may 
eventually participate as a group of events in creating other phenomena within defined contexts or 
semantics. The following study is extracted based on information from the National Centre of Textual 
and Lexical Resources (CNRTL) of France. It defines an event as “A fact that leads to a situation.” 
Events may happen across various layers of an organization, as sales leads, orders, or 
customer service calls. Nevertheless, they may be new items, text messages, social media posts, stock 
market feeds, traffic reports, weather reports, or other kinds of data. An event may also be defined as a 
“change of state,” when a measurement exceeds a predefined threshold of time, temperature, or other 
value. 
In fact, in reality we can only observe indications, warnings, or signs. For example, a man 
notices that his family has started to drink more juice, so he needs to add an additional carton of juice 
to the grocery list. Therefore, the man observed the consumption of his family after the first time the 
family was out of juice. After the third time that this phenomenon occurred, he reached his conclusion. 
The example shows that there are two types of events: low-level events or indications and others that 
are an outcome of observing these events. 
Studies were able to achieve the detection of sophisticated events such as hacks and threats 
using data analytics tools known as the deep packet inspections (DPI) (Porter, 2005; Y. Cao et al., 
2013). Moreover, the detection of intrusions into networks and systems was ensured using tools under 
the IDS category (intrusion detection systems) (WT Work - NIST, 2003). Finally, the security 
incidents and malwares are discoverable with tools called SIEM (Security Information and Event 
Management) (Gabriel et al., 2009). All IDS, DPI and SIEM are tools with the objective of detecting 
complicated processed events.  
Nevertheless, we require in this thesis work to identify semantics and not only technical events 
(otherwise, we would use ECA). For instance, we give the following example: “a person is running to 
exit the store”. Simultaneously, the store manager is pressing the emergency button. Consequently, a 
call to the nearest police station was automatically performed. Panics were recognized from observing 
the other clients inside the store. The reader would intuitively conclude that this is a robbery scene. 
We come with an understanding out of composing all these events together (i.e., a semantic: there is 
an ongoing robbery in the store).  
We dress the semantic with what we called a situation. Event processing tools (e.g., IDS, DPI, 
SIEM, etc.) are not designed to provide such semantics. Therefore, we choose the complex event 
processing technology because, in addition to processing events, it aggregates, composes, coordinates 
and correlates events to provide complex events. Moreover, it redoes all these operations on these 
complex events to produce more complex events, and so on until constructing the beginning of an 
understanding, which is the beginning of a situation.  
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Therefore, among all possible technical solutions to ensure SIMA and implement the situation 
manager, we justify our choice of using the complex event processing technology. It is an event-driven 
solution that processes events and reprocesses events to produce more complex events. It aims at 
helping the applications to express the detailed behavior changes through resulting in an aggregated 
feedback. A complex event is not a sophisticated signification of the occurrence of events groups. 
Complex refers to the difficult effort we put on processing several events in order to help producing a 
meaningful feedback.  
The first introduction of the concept of “complex event processing” was in August 18, 1998, 
at Distributed Systems at Stanford University: 
Complex event processing is a new technology for extracting information from 
distributed message-based systems. This technology allows users of a system to specify 
the information that is of interest to them. It can be low level network processing data 
or high level enterprise management intelligence, depending upon the role and 
viewpoint of individual users. It can be changed from moment to moment while the 
target system is in operation. (Luckham & Frasca, 1998) 
Complex event processing (CEP) applies to a wide range of studies on business processes, 
artificial intelligence, network administration, security of information systems, etc. Therefore, 
commercial, academic, and free tools are available for different aims and with powerful and advanced 
features. 
On April 23, 2007, Tim Bass from TIBCO Software Inc. introduced TIBACO as an example 
of CEP tools. TIBCO defined CEP as: 
An emerging network technology that creates actionable, situational knowledge from 
distributed message-based systems, databases and applications in real time or near real 
time. CEP can provide an organization with the capability to define, manage and 
predict events, situations, exceptional conditions, opportunities and threats in complex, 
heterogeneous networks. Many have said that advancements in CEP will help advance 
the state-of-the-art in end-to-end visibility for operational situational awareness in 
many business scenarios. These scenarios range from network management to business 
optimization, resulting in enhanced situational knowledge, increased business agility, 
and the ability to more accurately (and rapidly) sense, detect and respond to business 
events and situations. (Vermesan & Friess, 2013, p. 91) 
CEP is an event processing loop that starts by combining information (data) from multiple 
heterogeneous sources to infer composition of events or events patterns, known as complex events 
(CEs). The CEP objective is to identify CEs and to associate them, if possible, with meanings or 
semantics. A CEP-based system should be capable of monitoring, processing (i.e., filtering, 
coordinating, composing, and aggregating events into CEs), reasoning, and analyzing (Adi & Etzion, 
2003). CEP systems are rule-based systems with representation languages (i.e., event processing 
languages [EPL]) to express CEP rules that supervise, and may control, other systems.  
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Figure 4.38: General view of the CEP architecture. 
Using CEP requires a functional architecture to help organizations understand and organize 
the system requirements based on analyzing the behavior. Figure 4.38 presents the common 
architecture that each CEP-based agent usually respects. 
CEP relies on a number of techniques to process CEs, including event-pattern detection, 
detecting relationships between events (such as causality, membership, or timing), and event 
correlation (a technique for making sense of a large number of events and pinpointing the few events 
that are really important in that mass of information).  
Processing the complex events aims to monitor and analyze the information collected (data) 
about events, and their meaning, in order to derive conclusions that help to understand the behavior. 
The data might be observed from structured and organized sources (e.g., datacenters), converged 
sources (e.g., event streams), or event vast sources (e.g., clouds).  
The event processing systems are embedded in monitoring and reasoning engines, decision 
support systems, and reporting systems (e.g., activity logs, historization, and audit). Inside sources, 
event-processing systems locate events in two forms: time-based and storage-based. Storage-based 
events are partially ordered or disordered inside the cloud. Events could be sequenced based on 
timelines inside event streams. A special technology used in event stream processing (ESP) is time 
windows. Normally, these windows are movable and dynamic with time, and therefore they are known 
as “sliding windows.” 
Nevertheless, what is a cloud event, and what is a stream event? When event cloud processing 
is relevant, and why event stream processing is more interesting for our contribution? 
Events stream is a time ordered sequence of events in time, while events cloud is unordered. 
For example, an events stream contains the following sets: {{t0, “a person is running toward the exit 
of the store”}, {t0+1, “the store manager pressed the emergency button”}, {t0+2, “panic is detected 
inside the store between clients”}, {t0+6, “the nearest policy station is informed”}, etc.}. On the other 
hand, events cloud with the same content will have the following unordered sets: {{t0+6, “the nearest 
policy station is informed”}, {t0+1, “the store manager pressed the emergency button”}, {t0, “a person 
is running toward the exit of the store”}, {t0+2, “panic is detected inside the store between clients”}, 
etc.}. We find that events cloud is storage-based and similar to the unstructured data in databases. One 
needs to use unordered data for the ease of data insertion, but with no concern for the data retrieval 
efficiency. For instance, we can use events cloud for the archiving process and historization. Cloud 
events are also relevant to store a huge amount of data, which is the famous big data (Costa et al., 
2013). Moreover, analyzing cloud events is interesting whenever there are unknown patterns to 
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discover through machine learning and expert systems (e.g., in medical and biological data) (Fülöp et 
al., 2010).  
Events stream is time-based and reputed with its strength and its efficiency in term of 
retrieving events rapidly (Cugola & Margara, 2012).  Moreover, event stream processing helps the 
momently identification of events. This helps create time-related reasoning on the occurrence of 
events. Therefore, ESP meets our requirements in creating the starting and ending points, and 
inclusively establishing the situation lifespan. 
In Figure 4.9, the relationship between SIMA and CEP (i.e., based on ESP) takes a 
bidirectional dependency form. Situation management is about defining situations through specifying 
the conditions and the circumstances of the behavior that start and end them. Afterwards, SIMA 
identifies situations through the CEP. The CEP tools provide the ability to keep an eye on the 
environment’s behavior through predefined rules. As one of these tools, the event stream processing 
(ESP) contains adapters (mainly two, an input and an output ones) that observe and detect interesting 
behaviors according to the defined rules and aggregate them in a stream of events. In the stream, the 
role of SIMA is to configure the ESP with rules that aggregate, collect, coordinate, and compose 
events into CEs. The latter will then be used to identify situations. 
Figure 4.39: Situations and complex-events relationship in event stream 
processing (ESP). 
We found an open source solution that helps us implementing our situation manager using the 
ESP technology. Esper proposes a technology and technical framework to manage the processing of 
events. This is an extraction from the company definition of the technology:  
Esper is an Event Stream Processing (ESP) and event correlation engine (CEP, 
Complex Event Processing). Targeted to real-time Event Driven Architectures (EDA), 
Esper is capable of triggering custom actions written as Plain Old Java Objects 
(POJO) when event conditions occur among event streams. It is designed for high-
volume event correlation where millions of events coming in would make it impossible 
to store them all to later query them using classical database architecture. 
 
A tailored Event Processing Language (EPL) allows expressing rich event conditions, 
correlation, possibly spanning time windows, thus minimizing the development effort 
required to set up a system that can react to complex situations. 
 
Esper is a lightweight kernel written in Java, which is fully embeddable into any Java, 
process, JEE application server or Java-based Enterprise Service Bus. It enables rapid 
development of applications that process large volumes of incoming messages or 
events. 
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In Esper, each events stream is related to a type of events. For instance, fire incidents are sent 
to a specific stream. Warnings about potential attacks are sent to another events stream.  
Esper EPL is what we use to express all complex events. The language syntax is very close to 
the SQL language. Thus, it contains all the common operations: group by, having, from, select, 
mathematical operations (e.g., count, max, etc.), where, etc. We present the two following EPL 
structures to introduce the syntax: 
Select eventStreamName.AttributeName as alias, 
MathOperations(eventStreamName.AttributeName) as alias, etc. 
From eventStreamName.win:time(value of minutes, seconds, etc.) as alias, 
Where eventStreamName.AttributeName1 = eventStreamName.AttributeName2 
In Esper CEP, we use EPLs to retrieve events from events streams (i.e., instead of tables in 
databases). Each event contains attributes with values that are similar to the columns of the tables. We 
can apply mathematical operations on the retrieved values (e.g., min, max, count, etc.). EPL also 
allows the retrieval of events within a sliding window (i.e., win:time). The sliding window allows the 
retrieval of events within a window of time defined for example by minutes or seconds. The term 
sliding means that the events retrieved within the 10 second wont be the same as the next coming 10 
seconds. It is at the moment of firing the query that we count 10 second before and so on. Finally, we 
can add the usual logical conditions to perform the join between streams or attribute values.  
Using Esper EPL, we can also define the patterns. Patterns allow the concept of subscription 
to a type of events for a period or time or forever. At the following structure, we define a pattern to 
retrieve events from an event stream every time the conditions are met: 
Every eventStreamName (AttributeName =value, AttributeName > value, etc.)  
However, we can limit the events retrieval by defining a timer to stop for example after one 
hour (i.e., 60 minutes. Therefore, we add the following line to the pattern: 
Where timer:within(60 minutes) 
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I I .C .  A d a p ta b le  S itu a tio n  M a n a g e r  
Our situation manager (SM) aims at ensuring the implementation of all our SIMA defined 
phases. Therefore, it has three functionalities to accomplish each of the SIMA phases. We claim our 
SM to be adaptable as we configure and reconfigure situations without stopping its functionalities. 
Hence, situations can be defined and redefined whenever it is necessary.  
Our SM respects the Amit guidelines in term of language and architecture. However, Amit is a 
conceptual architecture and an abstract language. The latter expresses situations with the relevant 
events and defines the concept of the lifespan (i.e., what we use to draw the duration of a situation) 
that is bounded by an initiator (i.e., our starting point) and a terminator (i.e., our ending point) (Adi & 
Etzion, 2002). 
What we retain from the Amit guidelines on the architecture is the fact that the situation 
manager (Adi, Botzer, & Etzion, 2002) aims at observing the behavior changes to provide a semantic 
feedback to subscribed applications (i.e., which is exactly our main objective using SIMA). However, 
as SIMA phases vary from an application domain to another, the Amit Situation Manager does not 
impose any implementation. Hence, as we did specify our required SIMA phases, we need then to 
implement our own SM functionalities to ensure these phases.  
Likewise, the abstract language in Amit aims only at describing situations. However, there is 
no specific representation language that is proposed to technically express our situations. Thus, we 
need as well to use our own language to express situations. 
Our technical implementation of the SM architecture is a CEP-based solution, namely built on 
the Esper technology. Our technical expression and identification of situations using the SM 
architecture is ensured using Esper EPL language (presented earlier), which respects the Amit 
language definition (Adi & Etzion, 2004). 
The SM architecture schematized in Figure 4.40 consists of three main components. The first 
one is the Context Manager, which is a CEP-based agent responsible for defining all the interesting 
CEs for the Situation Manager (SM). The second component is the SM itself, which is responsible for 
retrieving the starting point (SP) and ending point (EP) of each predefined or configured situation (i.e., 
requested by the administrator). Basically, the SM is also an intelligent CEP-based agent that provides 
semantics. Finally, the third component is the situation database, which is the store of current 
situations to be consumed by the relevant applications  (i.e., in our contribution, it is the PDP agent) 
during the evaluation of the dynamic security policy when a decision is required. All these 
components cooperate to detect, identify, and deliver situations, which are a meaningful feedback 
about behavior changes, to the authorization system (precisely the PDP). 
Based on the technical architecture in Figure 4.40, our SM components are responsible of 
delivering three functionalities to ensure the SIMA (Situation Management) phases as the following:  
(1) We contribute with the conceptual and technical edition of situations and contexts as 
the first functionality. The conceptual edition is through designing situations and the 
relevant contexts to define situations’ SPs and EPs. In term of the technical edition, 
our SM architecture is adaptable in the sense of accepting dynamic changes on 
configurations (i.e., reconfigurations) during the runtime. This functionality is valid 
for both agents (context and situation managers) for the definition of relevant complex 
events (i.e., including detecting all raw events) and relevant situations (i.e., 
recognizing the SP and the EP).  
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(2) Based on the provided situation design and configuration, our SM architecture can 
easily identify situations. The identification process contains two steps: identifying 
events to create complex events, and identify SPs and EPs to create situations.  
(3) Finally, our SM maintains the situation of a managed element during its lifespan by 
storing it in a database (i.e., keeping the PDP aware about the current situation of a 
managed element as far as this situation is valid).  
Figure 4.40: Our SM architecture. 
II.C.1. Situation Design & Dynamic Configuration 
Some studies concerning the situation decision in the literature (Costa, Mielke, Pereira, & 
Almeida, 2012; Heckmann, 2006; Barford, 2010; Yau & Liu, 2006), aim at helping the situation 
identification (technical detection or recognition) through conceptually drawing the situation.  
Within the same objective, we have our own definition of the relevant situations for the SCD 
policy. Therefore, we contribute on a specific technical design for our situation definition.  
Each situation belongs to an entity and it appears and disappears in the constraint of time. The 
SP is defined when one of many conditions and circumstances (i.e., stating contexts) at a specific time 
allows the appearance of this situation. The EP is defined when one of many conditions and 
circumstances (i.e., ending contexts) at a specific time allows this situation to disappear. Thus, each 
situation has a lifetime characterized by its duration (i.e., between the situation’s birth and death). This 
duration is known in research as the “lifespan” (Adi, Botzer, & Etzion, 2002).  
Situations at the higher level are abstract because they reflect descriptive information (e.g., 
“opening period”). Their strength is at the lower level when attached to entities (i.e., “opening period 
of the building 1R1”). Therefore, we stress that each situation is concerned by a unique entity (e.g., 
any managed element is a possible entity: Bashar, workers, alarm system, and in our example it is the 
1R1 building). It is a many-to-many relationship, where a situation may belong to many entities, and 
an entity may have several situations. Briefly, each situation is characterized by the following 
elements (see Figure 4.41): 
Figure 4.41: general design for a situation. 
1. Situation Name: for example, opening period and ending period. 
2. Appearance: the moment of detecting one of the starting contexts for a situation. 
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3. Disappearance: the moment of detecting one of the ending contexts for a situation. 
4. Lifespan: the duration between the appearance and disappearance in which the 
situation will be preserved for consumptions. 
5. An entity: the relevant managed element that we intend to secure. 
Figure 4.42 shows a view on the sequential and instantaneous happening of several situations. 
It is possible for two situations or more to occur at the same time if they belong to different entities. In 
term of the entities-situations relationship, there is no entity without a situation. Moreover, there 
should be an initial situation for each entity. Thus, the default situation for all entities is “nominal,” 
which means that the entity is within its normal behavior and activities. To the limit of the thesis work, 
the managed situations we experienced are conflict-free, with the condition of respecting our policy 
engineering recommendation in term of SCD policy specification. 
In this thesis work, we consider only one situation for one entity at a given time. However, 
situations-overlapping is possible when these situations belong to different entities. Therefore, we 
necessarily need more research effort on considering more situations for one entity. Situations then 
should not cause any contradictions in term of authorization or configuration decisions.  
In Figure 4.42, let’s imagine entity 1 is the alarm system and entity 2 is building 1R1. We 
suppose that the alarm system has three situations: (1) Activated (2) Dysfunctional, or (3) Deactivated. 
We keep the same situations of building 1R1: (1) Open or (2) Close. Therefore, we can imagine the 
alarm system to be dysfunctional during both the opening and closing periods of building 1R1. 
However, as we mentioned before, this overlapping does not affect the security management 
decisions. There will be always one decision for each SCD policy evaluation because there is one 
matching for each rule. Hence, there is no overlapping between the situations of the same entity.  
Figure 4.42: Interrelationship between situations and entities 
Now, we designed the desired and relevant situations including defining their SPs and EPs in 
form of complex events. The question is how to represent technically this design in a way that the 
CEP-based agents (context and situation managers) can understand? Moreover, how to permit the 
administrator to dynamically update the technical representation of these situations and complex 
events without interrupting our dynamic security management system (i.e., in order to keep respecting 
PBM recommendations)? For instance, the French government was considering the city of Toulouse 
as part of the Zone A during the academic year 2014/2015 (i.e., the winter vacations start from the 7th 
of February). However, from this academic year 2015/2016 the city of Toulouse will be considered as 
part of the Zone C (i.e., the winter vacations starts 20th of February). Hence, the technical definition 
for the situations’ SPs and EPs has to be changed for both the opening and closing periods, in order to 
consider these new contexts. 
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Therefore, we need to dynamically (re) configure both the context and the situation managers. 
This means, redefine the CEs that express the contexts for the SPs and the EPs. Using dynamic 
configurations, we feature the Situation Manager and the Context Manager agents with adaptable 
upgrading of situation definitions, or totally adding new situations.  
We manage the (re) configuration of both agents externally and without interrupting their 
functionality. We recognize and read the situation’s configuration files in real time whenever a change 
is acquired. We applied this configuration strategy to the Context Manager as well to capture the 
events participating in identifying the SPs and EPs. 
To represent this dynamic configuration, we propose a new configuration language to express 
the necessary Esper EPLs for both context and situation managers. Hence, to configure a situation in 
the Situation Manager (SM) we define two parameters: situation type and situation listener to 
instances. Likewise, we configure the Context Manager with two parameters: complex event types and 
complex events listeners. Thus, We propose a uniform representation for the configuration file for any 
CEP-based agent to be structured as the following and expressed using Esper EPL language: 
IF 
 StatementeName = EPL Statement 
Then 
 StatementeName;WhatListener;WhichAction=WithWhatParameters 
Any of our Update Listeners by default recognize three actions: 
A Send: we implement this action inside the listener of each CEP-based agent (i.e., 
situation or context managers) to send simple events internally. Therefore, all the 
agent’s software objects communicate internally using Esper simple events. For 
instance, when the SM receives the beginning of the situation “Opening Period” 
(SP), the relevant update listener sends this event to the SM again as a request to 
create the situation (i.e., we call this event: situation event). As an example for the 
use of this action in the Context Manager, we use the send action to aggregate 
events. For instance, we detect raw events from many sensors at different locations. 
After processing these raw events we create a complex event. We send this complex 
event to be listened by the relevant software object. Briefly, we use the send action 
to exchange events internally between the update listeners, because each listener is 
interested with specific types of complex events. We give the following example: 
Select (e1, e2, e5, …)win:time(6 sec) From eventStream1 //Listener1 sends CE1 
Select (CE1, CE3, C6)win:time(1 min) From CEStream3 //CEListener2 recieves CE1 
A Forward: This action is similar to the Send one, but it aims at generating stream 
events to be sent externally (i.e., outside the relevant CEP-based agent). For 
instance, the communication between the Context Manager and the Situation 
Manager is managed using this action. Upon the listening of SPs or EPs, the Context 
Manager forwards a complex event to the Situation Manager. 
A Show: This action aims at exposing and logging the relevant events to the user GUI 
(i.e., the administrator). This also keeps track of situations or complex events.  
Our CEP-based agents listen to complex events and react with these three updates using Esper 
Update Listener. However, we want to allow future upgrades to these agents. Therefore, the 
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configuration file may contain any name of action. Though, if the declared action is not implemented 
inside the relevant Update Listener, the action unsurprisingly will not be executed.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to integrate a new type of listeners other than the Update Listener 
in Esper21. Moreover, actions can be implemented inside the listener directly or called from an external 
implementation (i.e., using plugins technologies like: OSGi bundles or POJO).  
At the Context Manager side (Figure 4.43), we demonstrate the following example for the 
complex event statement that represents the SP of the situation “opening period”. The statement 
contains the conditions and circumstances that permit the SP to be valid. Then, it associates a listener 
to this complex event statement. It configures this associated listener to update the SM using the 
forward action. Hence, upon the matching of this statement by a specific complex event, the 
associated listener will forward all the information of this detected CE. The destination of this 
forwarding is the SM and the type name of the complex event to send is SP event. Inside the Context 
Manager configuration file, the concerned part is:  
#IF  
ComplexEventStatement.OpeningPeriod= EPL Statement; 
#Then 
ComplexEventStatement.OpeningPeriod=" 
select * as OpeningPeriodSP from TimeDate_Events.std:lastevent(),  
where (timeTaken.roundFloor('hour') == '7' and timeTaken.roundFloor('min') == '00') 
andtimeTaken.getDayOfWeek() not in ('5', '6')  
and (timeTaken.getDayOfMonth() != '13' and timeTaken.getMonthOfYear() != '6') 
and timeTaken.getMonthOfYear() != '10'";22 
ListenerName=DynamicComplexEventsListener; 
Forward="ThisCEto::SituationManager::SendAs::SituationEvent;" 
Figure 4.43: Context Manager configuration file 
At the SM side (Figure 4.44), we demonstrate the following example for a situation statement 
inside the SM configuration file. The configuration simply aims at detecting all events from the type 
“Situation Events” forwarded by the Context Manager. Having an event from this type means the 
beginning of a new situation (i.e., inclusively means the ending of another). Therefore, we define the 
action process situation to check if the SP is related to the “opening period”, then the reaction will be 
to create the situation. Otherwise, if the SP is related to the “closing period”, then the reaction will be 
to end the situation. 
#IF 
SituationStatement.OpeneingPeriod= EPL Statement; 
#Then 
SituationStatement.OpeneingPeriod= "select * from SituationEvent.std:lastevent() 
as se where se.message like '%SP%' "; 
ListenerName=DynamicSituationsListener; 
ProcessSituation=OpeneingPeriod 
                                                
 
21 Esper provides the ability to integrate new listeners at runtime. We did not need this functionality in our 
implementation. More information is available inside the Esper guide’s StatementAwareUpdateListener. 
22 We may clarify more these four earlier condition statements. In fact, the first conditions statement verifies the 
current time is exactly equal to 7:00 am. Otherwise, the next condition statement verifies today is not a weekend 
(Saturday = 5, and Sunday = 6). If not, the next condition statement verifies today is not the 14th of July. Finally, 
the last condition statement verifies that the current month is not November (i.e., = ‘10’).  
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CEP Rules to 
collect and 
process 
events, then 
provide CEs
Expression	of	A	Dynamic	Security	Management	Policy	 Ch.	4	
 
— 94 — 
The action “process situations” exists only in the Situation Manager agent. It is applied upon 
the detection of events from the type “situation event”. Hence, the configuration file Context Manager 
does not contain this action. This action is not one of the default three actions: send, forward, and 
show. Therefore, the Situation Manager should contain the implementation of this action in order to be 
executed.  
Figure 4.44: SM Configuration File 
To summarize this functionality, for one situation “opening period” we needed to express the 
configurations at two locations: Situation Manager and Context Manager.  At the Context Manager 
level, we configure the contexts that help identifying the SPs and EPs. At the SM level, we configure 
the link between the situations and their relevant SPs and EPs (i.e., identified and forwarded by the 
Context Manager). We stress the interest of this identification is the aggregation of the policy rules, 
thus reducing its complexity. By observing the ECA/CA rules expressed earlier, this situation and its 
context group the conditions expressed in the rules 1 & 6. Hence, we were able to use the situation 
name only “opening period” in our expressed rules 1 & 3. We externalized the complexity of the 
dynamic behavior (i.e., expressed by the conditions) to be managed outside the policy, but we keep its 
dynamic effects on the policy decisions (i.e., using situations and contexts as we will see at the 
underlying section “orienting mechanism”). 
II.C.2. Situation Identification 
Technically speaking, this SM functionality aims at identifying the previously designed and 
configured situations. From this point, we aim at linking the provided technical design with the 
technical implementation of situations using the CEP techniques.  
As abstract terms stating the businesses interesting to applications or systems (Costa, 
Guizzardi, Almeida, Pires, & Sinderen, 2006), situations can be identified straight from continuous 
data sources (e.g., motion detection of “walking” or “running” for knowing the room’s situation, or a 
temperature measure for forecasting a weather situation or determining a fever situation). Situations 
are dynamic, with varied durations; sequential; and interleaved to express the application, system, or 
network behaviors. Therefore, all transitions between the entities situations need to be controlled and 
identified (Ye, Dobson, & McKeever, 2012). 
Figure 4.45 illustrates our approach of using Esper ESP to aggregate events in order to create 
CEs using patterns and sliding windows. Patterns are special structures of CEP rules that define the 
operation to process events (aggregation, coordination, etc.) within windows of time (i.e., for each 
pattern). To explain better through an example, some airports can track checked bags in case they get 
lost. Bags pass by four checkpoints equipped with wireless sensors and antennas.  
An ESP collects all events coming from these points and keeps interesting events in the event 
stream. Based on CEP rules, the ESP processes the stream. Supposedly, one CE is identified when a 
bag is not on the conveyor belt anymore. The technique to detect that is through the ESP analyzing the 
event stream and coordinating four signals from the antennas. In case the last signal is not received or 
there were no events informing that the bag had passed by, then the CE is triggered. This CE is a 
candidate, alone or with other CEs, that defines the start of a situation (i.e., baggage lost). 
Situation
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CEP Rules 
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Using CEP tools, the identification of situations is done by using CEP rules in SQL-like 
queries. Based on these rules, a CE identifies predefined conditions and circumstances expressing the 
behavior.  
Figure 4.45: Stream processing using CEP rules. 
In Figure 4.46, we link the situation design (i.e. proposed earlier in Figure 4.41) with the 
technical identification approach using ESP (see Figure 4.45). We already defined that there are two 
points bounding each entity’s situation: a starting point (SP) (i.e., expressing its appearance) and an 
ending point (EP) (i.e., expressing its disappearance). Both points represent conditions and 
circumstances inside the environment, and they are identified by one or more CEs. For one entity, the 
previous situation’s EP may or may not match the SP’s CEs. Likewise, the next situation for the same 
entity may or may not match its SP with the EP of the current situation. However, the situations 
happening for one entity are certainly successive. The lifespan is defined by the duration between the 
EP and the SP. Moreover, during the lifespan of a situation, the events and the CEs do not stop 
expressing the behavior. Therefore, patterns are used also to ensure that there is no suspension or 
maybe a different EP or SP. For instance, the situation of gigantic access to a smart grid usually ends 
by suspending access requests to reduce the number of connections. However, the fact of losing the 
connection entirely ends the situation as well (i.e., this is a pattern defined in parallel to the main 
situation’s identity).  
Figure 4.46: Situation identification technique. 
The following query represents a pattern written using Esper EPL. The result of this query is a 
complex event that defines the SP of the situation gigantic access.23 The situation SP starts whenever 
the number of different accesses detected becomes more than 15 within 5 minutes. Another possibility, 
SP may start whenever there is ten denied tries for the same access. We express these CEs using the 
following Esper EPL patterns: 
 
                                                
 
23 In networks, it is defined as the frequent number of attempts to access (a) resource during a short interval of 
time. 
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³ CE Rule 1:  
SELECT * as GiganticAccessSP 
FROM pattern –– monitors the different access requests placed within a 5 min window 
[every access=AccessEvent ->  
(every(timer:interval(5 min) and not AccessType(id!=access.id))] 
HAVING (Count(*) > 15) –– if there are no 15 different requests, then no gigantic access 
³ CE Rule 2:  
SELECT * as GiganticAccessSP 
FROM pattern ––monitors same access requests placed within a 5 min window 
[every access=AccessEvent -> ((every(timer:interval(5 min)) and  
(PolicyDecision(request.id==access.id) == deny))] 
HAVING (Count(*) > 10) –– if there are no 10 retries, there is no gigantic access 
The EP could be a manual intervention from the network administrator. To keep our automatic 
solution, CE3 would be then to observe the administrators activities and end the situation upon doing a 
specific action (e.g., clicking on a button called “back to normal access”). Another way around is by 
using a policy obligation to remove the configuration “block-access” (i.e., provisioned automatically 
when this situation starts). CE4 is to observe the policy obligations and end the situation whenever 
there is a configuration to remove the “block-access”. Hence, this EP terminates the situation gigantic 
access by the happening of CE1, CE2, or both. 
³ CE Rule 3:  
SELECT * as NominalAccessSP –– Conceptually it is the GiganticAccessEP as well 
FROM AdminActivities.std:lastevent() as AA –– getting last activities made only 
Where AA.Action == ClickOnButton(“back to normal access”) 
³ CE Rule 4:  
SELECT * as NominalAccessSP –– Conceptually it is the GignaticAccessEP as well 
FROM  PolicyObligations.win:time(10 sec) as PO –– creating a sliding window to get last 
obligations within the 10 seconds from calling the query 
Where PO.Config == “remove ‘block-access’ setting from edge-router XYZ” 
We can imagine the following SCD policy rules that participate in this situation: 
³ SCD Rule 1:  
When Situation (Network XYZ) = “Gigantic Access” 
And Beginning of the situation (Network XYZ) = “Gigantic Access” 
Then “block access” of the edge router XYZ 
³ SCD Rule 2:  
When Situation (Network XYZ) = “Nominal Access” 
And Ending of the situation (Network XYZ) = “Gigantic Access” 
Then don’t “block access” of the edge router XYZ 
Moreover, we can identify situations with even simpler EPLs than patterns in some scenarios. 
For instance, we can identify our earlier defined situations: opening and closing periods. We remind 
the SP of the “opening period” situation is one of the starting contexts (i.e., time now is 7:00, today is 
not a weekend, today is not a national holiday, there is no reconstructions this month (it is not 
November), etc.). Thus, the following CE1 expresses the starting contexts. As for the EP, the ending 
contexts are represented with the CE2 (i.e., whenever one of the following is valid: time now is 21:00, 
today is a weekend, today is a national holiday, today is a vacation day, there is reconstruction works, 
etc.).24 
 
                                                
 
24 We want to precise that Esper Tech defines Date-Time functions result with numbers that start by zero. Hence, 
the months are 0-11 and the days of the week are 0-6. 
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³ CE Rule 1:  
SELECT * as OpeningPeriodSP –– Conceptually it is the ClosingPeriodEP as well 
FROM TimeDate_Events.std:lastevent(),  
Where (timeTaken.roundFloor('hour') == '7' and timeTaken.roundFloor('min') == '00') and 
 timeTaken.getDayOfWeek() not in ('5', '6') and 
 (timeTaken.getDayOfMonth()!= '13' and timeTaken.getMonthofYear() != '6') and 
 timeTaken.getMonthOfYear() != '10' 
³ CE Rule 2:  
SELECT * as ClosingPeriodSP –– Conceptually it is the OpeningPeriodEP as well 
FROM  TimeDate_Events.std:lastevent(),  
Where  (timeTaken.roundFloor('hour') == '21' and timeTaken.roundFloor('min') == '00') 
 OR timeTaken.getDayOfWeek() in ('5', '6') OR 
 (timeTaken.getDayOfMonth() == '13' and timeTaken.getMonthofYear() == '6') OR 
 timeTaken.getMonthOfYear() == '10' 
The technical recognition of complex events in ESPER is possible using Listeners. A listener 
is a monitoring function for complex events in a specified stream. Each listener can be associated with 
CEs in order to detect their occurrence. We are using update listeners. It is one of the Esper listener 
types that allow doing reactions upon the detection of CEs.  
Therefore, we attach CE1 and CE2 to an update listener inside the Context Manager. Upon the 
identification of one of them, the update listener will notify the SM by generating a new CE3. This 
CE3 includes two messages to the SM: the starting of one situation and the ending of the other one.  
In conclusion of this SM functionality, we want to give a bigger picture to the relationship 
between the SM agent, the Context Manager agent, the situations and the event sources. The Context 
Manager is the one detecting CEs that identify the SPs and EPs. Upon their identification, the Context 
Manager generates a new CE to the SM to inform the starting SP (or the ending EP) of a situation (cf. 
the sequence diagram, Figure 4.47).  
Figure 4.47: Sequence diagram of the interactions between event sources, the Context Manager, and 
the situation manager (including the starting and ending of each situation) 
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II.C.3. Situation Preservation 
We preserve a situation by keeping it alive from its starting points until its ending points (i.e., 
within its lifespan). Therefore, the preservation functionality for the SM aims at answering the 
following questions: 
i) How to create a situation or how a situation appears? 
ii) How to maintain the situation during its lifespan? 
iii) How to remove a situation or how a situation disappears? 
In Figure 4.48, we link each question with the relevant step that answers it. First, the Context 
Manager identifies the CEs composing the SP of a situation entity and informs the SM about it. This 
SP detection marks the real starting point of the processed situation. However, the situation at this 
moment is not created yet (i.e., physically) in our dynamic security system. Second, the SM detects the 
beginning of the situation and reacts by updating a java properties file (i.e., situations database) and 
adding the name of the situation with its value (e.g., Building 1R1 Situation = “Opening Period”). 
Third, the Context Manager identifies the CEs composing the EP of a situation entity and informs the 
SM about it. This detection of the EP also marks the real ending point of the processed situation. 
However, the physical ending of the situation is marked when the SM reacts by updating the java 
properties file and removing the value of the situation and adding the new value (i.e., as we 
mentioned, the EP of the situation is SP for another. Therefore, the update process could be considered 
also as replacing the situation of building 1R1 with a new one).   
Figure 4.48: Situation preservation process 
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III .  Representing the SCD Policy-Expression 
In Policy-Based Management, the management of the policy passes through a lifecycle. The 
first step of this lifecycle is the expression, the analysis, and the specification of the policy (i.e., what 
we presented to this point). The next step in the policy lifecycle is to represent the policy expression 
using a language. This language needs to be enforceable (i.e., there is a security management system 
that is able to enforce its decisions upon its evaluation). The final step then, is to implement and to 
enforce this represented policy using a technical architecture. (Zhang, Liu, & Wang, 2005) 
Based on our presented state of the art, we highlighted that ABAC is a generic approach to 
represent any security management policy using the notion of attribute. We found OASIS XACML as 
the only standard policy language that respects ABAC recommendations. Therefore, we believe it’s 
the best candidate as a technical language to represent our SCD policy expression: 
When  Situation  = Attributes 
And  Context   = Attributes 
Then  Decisions  = Attributes 
I I I .A .  D y n a m ic  X A C M L  P o lic y  o r ie n te d  b y  S itu a tio n s  
ABAC XACML is a generic, flexible, and abstract security policy language standardized by 
OASIS. XACML is used to describe general access and usage control requirements in terms of 
constraints on attributes. Specifically, attributes could be any characteristics of any category such as 
the subject, the resource, the action, or the environment in which the access request is made. Attributes 
have an identifier, which is a Uniform Resource Name (URN), and a data type, also identified by a 
URN. Considering attributes is what makes the language very flexible. Moreover, XACML is an 
XML-based language, and it is natively extensible. 
Thanks to category tags, XACML version 3.0 (XACML-V3.0, 2013, OASIS Standard) is no 
longer limited to elements (subject, resource, action, and environment). Attributes are manipulated 
through predefined data types and functions. Aggregation allows the use of abstraction (i.e., being 
close to requirements) to express groups of rules. We use this feature to aggregate rules by situations 
and with respect to business requirements. 
As a result, we are able for each one of the SCD triples to create an attribute category, and 
therefore each triple can have a corresponding representation in XACML. However, we need to define 
the SCD-XACML relationship: how these SCD attributes give dynamicity to the XACML policy?  
An Orienting Mechanism: 
By orienting the policy using situations, we mean providing the policy decision point (PDP) 
through the specified XACML policy, which includes situations as attributes, the ability to give 
dynamic authorization decision at each access request. 
Based on the XACML categories, the representation of the stable security policy is made 
possible using situations. The situations are defined as new category of attributes that aggregates the 
rules of the policy. Hence, each relevant situation to the management of security is associated with 
authorizations (conditions and decisions) and configurations (i.e., advice and obligations). 
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In Figure 4.49, the XACML policy structure presented in Chapter 2 is associated with the 
SCD expression structure. This association is to reflect where the situations, contexts and decisions are 
stressing the XACML policy.  
Figure 4.49: OASIS XACML v3.0 a security management policy oriented by situations 
The situations influence gets to the XACML policy from one door, which is the target. The 
XACML security policy is composed of policy sets in which there are several policies. We define any 
policy set, policy, or rules to be targeted by situations. We have chosen the target as the place where to 
represent situations because the target has access to control three levels using the following XACML 
elements: the policy set, the policy and the rules. Hence, one situation targeting a policy set is then 
orienting the decisions of several policies. Another situation targeting a policy is then orienting the 
decisions of all its rules. Finally, one situation targeting a rule is then orienting its conditions. As a 
result, by putting the situations at the level of the target we can orient the XACML policy from all its 
possible levels.  
Now, the context as we mentioned earlier represents the condition side of the policy. 
Therefore, we have two locations where we can represent conditions: inside the target and inside the 
rules’ conditions. Representing the context at the target location specifies the situation. For instance, 
the context (beginning of situation) specifies that the situation “reconstruction period” has just started. 
On the other hand, we represent the context at the rule’s condition location to specify in what 
condition the decisions should be delivered. For instance, the contexts (“Name (Person) = Bashar and 
Name (Action) = Enter”) specify that only if the person’s name is Bashar and the requested action is to 
enter, the decision of allowing the access request will be provided. As for the situation, it gives 
semantics for all contexts in both locations. For instance, the first context beginning of situation does 
not have sense if we don’t know that the situation is “reconstruction period”. Now, we understand that 
it is “the beginning of the reconstruction period”. For the second context, allowing Bashar to enter 
does not have sense if we don’t know that the situation is “opening period”, which means that building 
1R1 is opened. 
Finally, the remaining element to represent using XACML is the decisions among the SCD 
triple. XACML has two elements that can represent the decisions: Effect and Obligations. We use the 
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Effect element to represent the authorization decisions, because the outcome of this element covers the 
possible authorizations: allow or deny. For configurations, we need to specifying: who should do what. 
Using the XACML obligation expressions we can specify what to do. For instance, the alarm system 
should be activated. However, we use the XACML advice expressions to specify who will do the 
obligation (i.e., by default, it is the requesting PEP who should apply the obligation). 
As a result, we represented the following structure using XACML: 
When  Situation 
And  Context  
Then  Decisions 
As a result of using XACML target, we are able to orient the policy at several levels. We are 
able now to represent our example’s expressed SCD policy. Using XACML, the security management 
of the 1R1 building based on the specified security requirements will have the following 
representation: 
Policy: 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Name (Person) = Bashar & Type (Action) = Enter & Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Reconstruction Period” For 
Rule 2:  
IF Role (Person) = Worker & Type (Action) = Enter & Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” For 
Rule 3:  
IF Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Starting-Point” 
Then Permit  -- the continuity of this situation 
Apply Obligation: Deactivate the alarm system 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Closing Period” For 
Rule 4:  
IF Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Starting-Point” 
Then Permit  -- the continuity of this situation 
Apply Obligation: Activate the alarm system 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Reconstruction Period” For 
Rule 5:  
IF Situation-Status (Building 1R1) = “Starting-Point” 
Then Permit  -- the continuity of this situation 
Apply Obligation: Deactivate the alarm system 
Targeting Any Situation For 
Rule 6:  
IF Any Conditions  
Then Deny 
The enforcement of the previous XACML representation allows the management of the 1R1 
building’s security. We managed conflicts using the strategy of denying all other situations that are not 
targeted in the policy (rule 6). By comparing the SCD policy expression with the XACML policy 
representation, we highlight the exact number of rules. We succeeded in proving the concept of our 
policy expression using situations, contexts, and management decisions (i.e., permissions and 
configurations).  
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In conclusion, our policy is a stable set of rules expressed in a flexible way that allows 
external services, namely decision-making, to move between the rules in a selective manner to give a 
dynamic security management decisions (i.e., changing the decision with regard to the environment 
behavior changes, which are expressed as situations). Stability implies not changing the rules. So that 
upon the start of a situation, or during its lifespan duration (e.g., “opening period”), the decision-
making process will only start considering this situation whenever the policy evaluation takes place. 
This flexibility requires a generic expression methodology to express situation-oriented rules. That is 
why we choose to express the stable security policy using an attribute-based approach.   
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Chapter’s Conclusion 
The Chapter presents the dynamic stable security policy to be conflict-free. The policy is 
written in a comprehensive way in order to cover all the desired security requirements. Being 
comprehensive to get flexible expressions means that the processing of conflicts has been considered 
at an upper level that is closer to organizations. As we are using situations as a convergence term 
linking the requirements with the policy and the behavior (i.e., aggregate events and rules), our 
contribution assumes that conflicts become a matter for these situations.  
Nevertheless, it has been explained that having situations for the interest of security 
management defines them as conflict-free situations. That is, the identification of situations is 
concerned with judging an instantaneous access request in order to be authorized or not (i.e., with 
sending the appropriate configurations to apply the judgment decision). Therefore, the situations are 
only interesting to be consumed at the policy evaluation phase (i.e., at the access request moment). 
Hence, the situations are concerned about the current request for the current subjects to use currently 
available objects at the current time for the current environment. For this analysis, the conflicts are not 
subject to cause misjudgments of the security policy at the decision-making moment.  
However, even if situations got conflicted in a future analysis when requirements change, the 
solving of conflicts at the high level (where the conflicts are semantically more understandable) is 
much easier in terms of management than going through, technically, the low-level rules or 
configurations. 
We presented a dynamic security policy that is stable. We express the policy based on 
analyzing the system at the construction or design phase and following software engineering practices. 
Our stable security policy holds the expression of flexible SCD rules that give upon their evaluation 
(during an access request) dynamic decisions (i.e., authorizations and configurations). The dynamicity 
of our expression is provided thanks to the integration of the Situation Management paradigm. The 
technical implementation for SIMA was ensured through implementing an adaptable situation 
manager based on the complex event processing technology. Finally, the technical representation of 
our SCD expressed policy is ensured using XACML version 3.0.  
Figure 4.50 summarizes our contribution on the policy expression in this chapter. We 
presented two edition processes, where both are based on the specified security requirements. The first 
one is to express and represent the policies using our SCD structure. The second is to express contexts 
in order to identify situations. Through the chapter we demonstrated at several sections our 
understanding of the triple relationship (Situation, Context, and Decision). We proposed the 
management of situation as a conceptual paradigm to manage, identify and define situations. We 
presented our implementation on software modules that process contexts to deliver the relevant 
situations for our stable policy. Finally, we represented technically both sides of edition.  
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Nevertheless, the yellow arrow in the same figure shows that the SCD policy considers the 
situations during the policy evaluation, but we did not present how? Therefore, there should be a 
technical relationship between the presented XACML policy and our implemented situation manager 
architecture.  
In the next chapter, we demonstrate how we implement this relationship in order to implement 
the policy and enforce its decisions with consideration to different situations and contexts. 
Figure 4.50: Concluding the policy expression contribution 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter V 
Unified Adaptive Architecture  
The implementation of a security management policy entails always an 
architecture that applies its decisions (i.e., enforcing authorizations and setting 
configurations). Therefore, we contribute in this Chapter on implementing our 
SCD dynamic and stable policy with an adaptive and unified architecture. We 
intend to unify because we have different models to control a policy 
(outsourcing and provisioning). Thus, we need both models together in order to 
apply our SCD policy decisions (configurations and authorization). Moreover, 
the implementation of the situation management needs to be connected to the 
policy implementation. Also, we need to add adaptability to our architecture to 
perform dynamic reconfigurations. As the managed elements technology 
advances, their (re) configurations need to be dynamic and change frequently. 
As a result, we use an event-driven architectural solution to unify the two 
policy control models and also the situation manager architecture. Moreover, 
we added to this architecture a component-oriented architecture that allows the 
dynamic (re) configurations.  
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C h a p t e r  5 :  U n i f i e d  &  A d a p t i v e  
A r c h i t e c t u r e  
“The family is constantly changing, as each member changes. Some changes we recognize as 
developments, and the pleasure they bring usually makes us more adaptable. Some changes 
threaten, or disappoint other members, who may try to resist the change, or punish someone for 
changing.” 
Terri Apter 
Columbia World of Quotations 
 Retrieved November 19, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
Introduction: 
In this Chapter, we pursue our contribution on proposing a framework for the dynamic 
management of security. We succeeded in expressing the security management policy using the SCD 
structure: 
When  Situation 
And  Context  
Then  Decisions 
We represented this expression then using the 3rd version of the OASIS XACML standard 
language. Although we presented how to identify and manage situations and contexts using the 
Situation Manager (SM) architecture, we did not present the implementation of our stable SCD policy. 
Thus, we did not implement the consideration of the identified situations into the policy decisions. 
Studies state that the policy implementation entails two main steps: 1) the evaluation of the security 
management policy to make decisions, and 2) the enforcement of these decisions (i.e., applying the 
policy on the managed elements) (Sloman, 1994; Zhang et al. 2005; Mitropoulos & Douligeris, 2006; 
Bergstra & Burgess, 2007). 
We presented through Chapter 3 the different policy management approaches. We found that 
the Policy-Based Management (PBM) approach meets these two steps by defining two management 
agents: 1) the Policy Decision Point (PDP), which is responsible of evaluating the policy and 
providing relevant decisions, and 2) the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), which is responsible of 
enforcing PDP decisions into the managed environment.  
Nevertheless, we draw our motivation of this Chapter in Figure 5.51. Even though we were 
able to identify and preserve situations to be consumed during the orientation mechanism, we did not 
present how? Therefore, we need to implement the following bidirectional relationships in order to 
complete our thesis contribution: 
1. The SM-PDP relationship implementation: the SM architecture presented the last 
chapter is a set of independent software agents that works on preparing situations to be 
consumed by other agents (e.g., the PDP in our thesis work). Thus, the first direction 
of this relationship is to implement the SM architecture providing situations to the 
PDP in order to consider them during the decision-making process (i.e., the result of 
evaluating the SCD policy). The other direction is an optional one. The PDP may have 
the possibility of changing the situations to get back (or go further) to a more desirable 
situation. Therefore, we need to implement the PDP giving decisions to change the 
current situation(s) of one or different specific managed elements.  
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2. The PDP-PEP relationship implementation: there are different implementations in the 
literature for both PBM agents PDP/PEP (Boutaba, 2007). However, we need to 
implement different communication ways from the PEP to the PDP in order to 
provide the PDP with the necessary context (i.e., access-request-related) for the 
decision-making. As a result, we need to implement the PEP(s) to consider the 
situational decisions in both forms: authorizations and configurations.   
3. The PEP-SM relationship implementation: the SM architecture ensures three 
functionalities where one of them is recognizing the context for the Starting Points 
and Ending Points. The PEP(s) may participate in creating the beginning or the ending 
of a situation. For instance, the SM architecture made the situation “under attack” of 
the managed network available for the PDP. The PDP gives the decision of applying 
the configuration “block all accesses” to the edge gateway at the managed network. 
Once the PEP applies this decision, the SM architecture defines a new situation for the 
edge gateway as “closed”. Hence, we need to implement the SM architecture to be 
able to reach the PEP(s) activities (i.e., applied security management decisions). The 
other way of the relationship is to implement how the PEP(s) can have the possibility 
of including the beginning of situations (i.e., the SP as a contextual information) 
inside their communication with the PDP. For instance, the PEP can include in its 
communication with the PDP that the status attribute of the situation “opening period” 
has just started in order to deactivate the alarm system (i.e., refer to the policy, p. 101). 
Still, the above three relationships are strongly required to work in parallel, at the same time. 
These relationships as described complete one another, which means we cannot provide coherent 
decisions without relevant situations to be provided, we cannot apply effective decisions without 
considering the managed elements situations, and we cannot ensure the PEP to communicate with the 
PDP without the PEP having the necessary contexts. Hence, our final contribution in this thesis work 
is to unify all of the implementations for the three mentioned relationships, into a single security 
management architecture.  
Giving the previous introduction, this Chapter is structured with the following sections: the 
first section presents in depth our propositions to implement the three relationships using the same 
scenario already used in the previous chapter. We provide henceforth a big picture on the required 
architecture to be implemented that unifies all the three relationships. Then we propose our 
implementation of this unified architecture. Finally we conclude our implementation by summarizing 
results and findings on the architecture side of our contribution. 
Figure 5.51: View on the necessary implementations to apply our 
SCD policy 
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I .  Interrelations implementation 
At this point, our current possible options for technical implementations are the SM 
architecture, which we previously presented in Chapter 4, and the XACML technical PBM 
architecture that conforms to the XACML language version 3, which was also presented in Chapter 3.  
These solutions can be adapted to participate in implementing only the first two following 
relationships (cf. Figure 5.51):  
i. In order to implement the SM-PDP relationship, we have to create a technical link 
between the policy evaluation process and the situation identification process.  
ii. While the XACML architecture ensures one PBM implementation, we have to ensure 
that the situation oriented decisions, which are the result of the previous relationship, 
are applicable using this implementation.  
iii. For the third relationship, we need to link the PEP configurations coming from the 
PDP obligations toward the situation manager (e.g., change the situation of a 
particular entity). Moreover, the Context Manager of the SM architecture can provide 
interesting contexts, not only to the Situation Manager, but also to be included in the 
PEP requests. 
Therefore, we need to implement all these relationships and unify their functionalities to allow 
concurrent interactions between all our software agents.  
I .A .  T h e  S M - P D P  R e la tio n s h ip  
Given the orientation mechanism presented in Chapter 4, we demonstrated the need for 
situations at the moment of evaluating the SCD policy in order to provide a dynamic decision-making 
process. Hence, we link the XACML access control architecture to the SM architecture to ensure this 
need. It is essential to note that the work does not change the XACML architecture, and at the same 
time, the implementation respects the Amit abstract architecture.  
Following our analysis of the XACML architecture, we found that there is one logical position 
where we can connect the two architectures. The PDP is interested about the semantics reflected by 
the situations happening. In other words, the PDP needs complementary information about situations 
of the managed elements to make decisions. Therefore, we found the Policy Information Point (PIP) is 
the most suitable point to connect both architectures. 
As a result, we reuse the workflow of the architecture defined in Chapter 2 until the step 6 
(Figure 2.8). Afterwards, the consumption of the identified situations starts. That is, when the context 
handler requests the attributes (i.e., situations with other attributes) from a PIP, in parallel, the SM 
should have already stored the interesting situations for the PDP inside the situation database. Once 
the situations are stored, the PIP returns the situations, and the PDP decisions will take effect 
according to the behavior. After fulfilling steps 12 and 13, the SM detects the new changes (if any) 
and identifies the new situations caused by the PDP decisions. Then, the SM stores them to be taken 
into consideration when arriving at step 6 again. 
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I .B .  T h e  P D P - P E P  R e la tio n s h ip  
Following this combination of both architectures in Figure 5.51, we clearly find that the PDP-
PEP relationship is partially considered. The XACML architecture ensures only the authorizations 
decisions through the request/response standard and synchronized message exchanges. 
Nevertheless, we find that implementing the PDP-PEP relationship with consideration to the 
SCD decision defined in the previous chapter must include three possibilities of exchanges: providing 
context, applying security management decisions, and decisions requests/responses. 
I.B.1. Providing the Relevant Contexts 
In Figure 5.52, the PEP agent is responsible of informing the PDP about the relevant contexts 
occurring inside the managed elements. We highlight two words: relevant and contexts.  Given the 
SCD policy example in the previous chapter, we have three situations: opening, closing and 
reconstruction periods. The configurations expressed and represented for this example are applied 
once the beginning of each situation is detected. Therefore, we need the PEP to inform the PDP about 
the beginning of each one of the three situations (i.e., the relevant context) once it happens. Upon their 
happening, a relevant configuration should be applied: activating or deactivating the alarm system 
(i.e., the applying PEP agent is not necessarily the one sensing the context). We call the PEP agent at 
this part of the relationship a sensor. 
Figure 5.52: PEP agent as a sensor 
I.B.2. Asynchronized Security Management Decisions 
In Figure 5.53, the PEP agent is also responsible of applying any received decision from the 
PDP. Hence, the PEP should know and be able to apply this decision. We call such agent an actuator 
that acts by applying the decision once it arrives (i.e., asynchronized). The sent decisions from the 
PDP to the PEP are often called configurations (e.g., activate/deactivate the alarm system, configure 
the edge gateway to block all accesses, update the current authorization policy with new permissions, 
etc.). We call provisioning the action of sending the configuration from the PDP. It is requesting the 
PEP to perform the action of ‘configuring’ different managed elements.  
However, in order for the PDP to react by giving new security configurations, another (or the 
same) PEP should work as a sensor. Thus, the PDP first receives events expressing certain context 
from any PEP that works as a sensor. Upon these context changes, the PDP evaluates the SCD policy 
and sends relevant decisions to the targeted PEPs that work as actuators. Then, these PEPs are 
expected to perform whatever required actions expressed in the SCD policy (i.e., we consider that the 
targeted actuators already understand these actions and holds their technical implementations). 
Relevant ContextPEP PDP
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Figure 5.53: PEP agent as an actuator 
I.B.3. Synchronized decisions requests/responses  
In Figure 5.54, the PEP agent is also responsible of sending the access request manifested by a 
user and synchronously waits the decision as a response of the access request. We see this agent as a 
node of synchronized communication and we call it a smart node. Upon the receiving of a special kind 
of events (i.e., that we call an access request) from the PEP, the PDP evaluates the relevant context(s) 
accompanied with the event and returns a decision. We defined the decision as an authorization 
decision reflecting the permission and/or an obligation decision reflecting the necessary configurations 
to be provisioned (i.e., before or after the authorization decision). 
Figure 5.54: PEP agent as a smart node 
I .C .  M a s te r  P E P  C o n c e p tu a l  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Although we obtained our new combined architecture (cf. Figure 5.55) that supports the 
situations orienting mechanism, we only ensure the enforcement of a dynamic security policy in terms 
of authorization decisions only (i.e., XACML synchronized authorizations request/response). To meet 
our security management requirements, we are required to include and implement security 
configurations along with these dynamic authorizations. Thus, we need to implement and ensure the 
three previous functionalities: providing the relevant contexts, applying security management 
decisions, and ensuring decisions requests/responses. 
Now, XACML only supports the smart nodes implementations through its standard 
request/response communication paradigm. Therefore, all XACML PEPs can be only smart nodes. 
However, we want to keep using the standard and thus make use of the XACML communication 
paradigm, but we want also to implement our presented dynamic security management system. 
Therefore, we contribute in implementing a software agent that we call “Master PEP”. This 
agent is able to accept all three communications presented earlier, and therefore perform the three 
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required functionalities. Hence, our Master PEP can behave not only as a smart node but also as a 
sensor and an actuator.25 
In Figure 5.55, we present our Master PEP architecture. This agent is able to perform 
functionalities 1, 2, and 3 and therefore be a sensor in 1, an actuator in 2, and a smart node in 3. 
Hence, the PDP receives the situations through the PIP and use their semantics to know where to 
orient the request once it arrives inside our stable and dynamic SCD policy. When the Master PEP 
sends a normal XACML request, the PDP synchronically responds with a response after evaluating the 
policy. The evaluation is oriented automatically by the provided situations. This part is original with 
innovation at the PEP agent level.  
However, when another PEP detects a relevant context (e.g., an intrusion), the latter forwards 
the context to the Master PEP. The Master PEP by its role redoes the original part. Now, the 
received decision of the PDP to the Master PEP might or might not correspond to the same PEP 
that informed about the new context (i.e., works as a proxy). In case of the positivity, the 
communication between the Master PEP and the PEP is then synchronized. Otherwise, the 
communication is asynchronized. As a result, the Master PEP itself manages the synchronized 
communication and this produces functionality 3 (i.e., the Master PEP is a smart node). The 
asynchronized communication ensures the functionalities 1 and 2 (i.e., the Master PEP becomes either 
a sensor or an actuator).  
Figure 5.55: Conceptual architecture of a Master PEP 
  
                                                
 
25 We present the technical implementation of the Master PEP inside the upcoming underlying sections. 
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I .D .  T h e  P E P - S M  r e la tio n s h ip  
We noticed that the Context Manager might also recognize certain common contexts (such as 
attacks, intrusions, etc.) in order to define the SPs and EPs. Hence, the context beginning (or the 
ending) of situation can be seen as a PEP sensor to inform the PDP (e.g., the beginning of the opening 
period in our SCD policy). As a result, we figured that the Context Manager works as a PEP in this 
case for the Master PEP (i.e., works as a sensor). Moreover, the Master PEP (or the Context Manager 
PEP) may apply configurations from the PDP in order to change the situation of certain entities (i.e., 
we can imagine some entities with high security-sensibility or privacy-sensibility, therefore their 
situations need a permission in order to be changed). So, the Context Manager receives the Master 
PEP configuration of obligating the SM to change the situation of a specific managed element, and it 
transfers this configuration to the SM in form of SP or EP (we also accept that the SM works as a 
direct actuator in this case and considers the configurations as an SP or EP). Thus, we need to find a 
convergence technique to unify all types of agents: sensors, actuators and smart nodes. 
In Figure 5.56, we represent our last contribution as a missing puzzle piece. This puzzle piece 
we seek should unify the management of security using our SCD policy through the three mentioned 
agent types. At the same, the unifying solution should allow decoupling the agents by permitting many 
communications at the same time, and therefore be able to organize all the exchanges. Thus, next 
section presents our implementation of such architecture.  
Figure 5.56: The missing puzzle piece of our Master PEP architecture 
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II .  The Implementation of  a  Unified 
Architecture 
We want our architecture to implement, but not limited to, the scenario we used in the 
previous chapter. In Figure 5.57, we present how our earlier expressed and represented SCD policy 
(i.e., during the two edition processes: policies and situations) should be applied and implemented.  
Therefore, we need our architecture to be able of:  
 Having synchronized a request/response authorization from/to Bashar.  
 Provisioning asynchronized configurations to activate/deactivate the alarm system. 
 Exchanging contexts between the different parties: Bashar, alarm system, context 
manager, master PEP, and the 1R1 Building. 
As a result, we need to find the technology that allows us to cover the following points:  
 Implement different types of agents (mainly, sensors, actuators and smart nodes), and 
permits a unified environment where all types can exist together. Moreover, this 
implementation should permits to implement the grouping of all agents’ feature into 
one agent (i.e., Master PEP). 
 Implement all different types of mentioned communications: provisioning (relevant 
contexts and configuration decisions) and outsourcing (access requests). Moreover, 
the implementation should allow the necessary representation for these exchanges. 
Therefore, the following underlying sections are seeking to implement a convergence 
architecture that allows covering the two previous points.  
Finally, we contribute with adding a new value to our unified architecture. The last subsection 
of this section proposes a dynamic methodology of implementing security management 
configurations.  
Figure 5.57: Conceptual example of a unified architecture 
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I I .A .  A n  e v e n t- d r iv e n  a r c h it e c t u r e  
An event-driven architecture disseminates to relevant agents (human or software) what events 
are happening inside or around the technical managed environment. The relevant agents evaluate 
disseminated events, and may take actions if necessary. Therefore, it is crucial for the situation 
manager to be aware of the contexts (i.e., simple and complex events) so that SM can apply semantics 
to their occurrences. We used the events stream technology to receive and send all relevant events. As 
we are already using an event-driven architecture for the situation manager, we want to optimize our 
contribution by integrating this usage to be part of one architecture. But why? 
We used the events stream to group contexts into one place where several agents can select 
relevant contexts to their operations (i.e., the context manager, the situation manager, and the Master 
PEP). We indicated that there are some contexts that are relevant for the Master PEP (e.g., beginning 
of the opening period) and others that are interesting for the context manager (e.g., the number of 
access requests per 5 minutes). Moreover, we indicated that there are different agents communicating 
with each other using different communication manners. Therefore, we need a converging solution 
that could 1) integrate all these agents and communications 2) and employ the streams of events as 
well into a unique unified solution.  
We found that the enterprise service bus (ESB) technology meets these expectations. The ESB 
objective is to exchange messaging with wide acceptability of differences in used technologies and 
communications. ESB aims conceptually at grouping all different event-based agents and allowing the 
usage of each other services on-top of a unified way of communications (Etzion & Niblett, 2011, 
Pages 16, 308, 310; Chen, 2006). Therefore, this is what replaces conceptually the missing puzzle in 
Figure 5.56. 
Although the concept is abstract, we can specify more our requirements and our technical 
implementation for a specific ESB. Thus, we present our implementation by answering the following 
questions, where each one is a separated subsection: 
1. How to implement the three types of agents? 
2. How to implement the different communication types between them? 
3. With the situation manager architecture event streams and the bus technology, how to 
organize and structure the exchanging messages mechanism? 
Nevertheless, we start first by going more in-depth about “what is the enterprise service bus?”  
Event-driven architectural styles free the event notifications from having to be sent to a 
specific destination (component, agent, etc.). In security management, the enterprise service buses 
(ESBs) are event-based systems that aim at loosing the coupling of space, time, and synchronization 
and at providing a scalable infrastructure for information bus exchange. These systems are driven via 
event subscriptions and streams/channels. Events streams are technically provided through two types: 
queues and topics. The relationship between the architecture components is defined through 
subscriptions. The parties in this relationship are either producers/consumers and/or 
publishers/subscribers.  
The Producer/Consumer model is used when the producer needs to provide a service to a 
preregistered consumer. Therefore, there should be a sort of contract or engagement between both 
parties in the form of peer-to-peer to guarantee this service.  
However, the Publisher/Subscriber model is used without a predefined contract. It is sufficient 
for a subscriber to be interested in a channel of events, and then subscribes to start receiving 
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notifications from the publisher (Mühl, Fiege, & Pietzuch, 2006, p. 3). Channels in 
publishing/subscribing technique are either structured based on their events content (e.g., medical 
information) or classified based on their topics (e.g., policy instructions, sensor readings, etc.).  
We chose to use topic-based channels because they result in creating fewer event streams for 
our architecture (see Figure 5.58). Moreover, they are decoupled from the concrete scenario we are 
implementing. At the opposite, the content-based channels create multi-channels and require 
preliminary awareness of the events content we are processing.  
Figure 5.58: Topic-Based Enterprise Service Bus 
In our architecture, each publisher should send to a specific preconfigured topic. Each topic is 
associated with many subscriptions, where each is related to only one subscriber. For instance, 
Publisher 1 can publish a message (i.e., contains an event) to topic 1. The message is placed in all 
subscriptions queues (i.e., subscriptions 1 & 2). The topic 1 subscribers can consume the message 
based on retrieving rules that they specify (i.e., message filtering and processing rules). For instance, 
the rule could be to consume the received message only if it is from publisher 1. However, both 
subscriptions 1 & 2 contain the same number and order of messages.  
Finally, the power of an event bus in the ESB-based system is their conceptual flexibility 
(Schmidt, Hutchison, Lambros, & Phippen, 2005). Thus, there is no restriction in term of connections 
count. Therefore, an agent may have several connections to the bus. Moreover, no limits in term of 
agents number connecting to the bus. Hence, we need to manage the bus system with respect to the 
infrastructure limitation (i.e., in order to maintain the expected performance). In addition to managing 
the bus connections, exchanging messages should be universal for all parties. That is, inside the bus 
every agent type has different exchange reason (configuration, authorization, etc.), so we have to unify 
the representation of messages to be understandable by all these parties. Hence, we need to define a 
common language to exchange messages, but with conformity to our complex event processing in 
order to accept our contexts representations (see Chapter 4). However, the common language is only 
to represent our messages content, but the content is always an event. Moreover, as our architecture is 
an event-driven one, receiving and sending a message is an event. 
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II.A.1. Agents Implementations 
In Figure 5.59, we implement our three identified types of agents as the following:  
1) Sensors: software agents configured to monitor contexts and publish their 
observations to be consumed by the other agents. Therefore, the sensors are 
implemented to work as publishers into specific topics of our bus. 
2) Actuators: software agents able to apply the policy decisions by performing actions 
(i.e., configurations, etc.) on the managed elements. In order to receive these 
decisions, the agents need to listen by monitoring the policy decisions. Therefore, the 
actuators are implemented to work as subscribers to specific topics of our bus.  
3) Smart nodes: software agents configured to monitor relevant contexts (namely, 
access requests) and send them in form of authorization requests. Then, they are 
required to apply the decisions coming in form of authorization responses from the 
PDP. These agents are implemented to work as both publishers and subscribers. 
However, these agents follow the synchronized communication paradigm that we 
defined as outsourcing. Therefore, we need to maintain the relationship between 
publishing and subscribing. So, we implemented the smart nodes and developed each 
one to consider a sort of session-like solution. After each time the smart node 
publishes an access request, the smart node needs to be maintained a subscription 
session to receive the response to this request. Thus, we create synchronized 
communications with the bus. 
Figure 5.59: Implementation of the three agent types. 
We still have to implement our Master PEP agent. This agent as presented conceptually in 
Figure 5.55, ensures that security management decisions are provided in both a synchronized 
(outsourcing) and an asynchronized (provisioning) communication paradigm. Therefore, Figure 5.60 
shows our implementation by combining all the three previous implementations. The Master PEP 
needs to subscribe to the bus topics in order to 1) receive access requests, and to 2) receive relevant 
contexts. Moreover, the Master PEP needs to publish to the bus topics in order to 1) provision directly 
policy decisions, and to 2) respond with authorization decisions to the waiting smart node.  
Now as we implemented our agents, we need to specify the implementation for the 
communications between them. In next step, we present different possible communications and their 
implementations. 
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Figure 5.60: The Master PEP Implementation 
II.A.2. Inter-Agents Communications 
In Chapter 3, we presented during the architecture state-of-the-art two policy control models to 
describe the communication between the PEP and the PDP: outsourcing26 and provisioning27. We 
argued that any security management system is required to accept both models in order to perform 
configurations and authorizations. 
Therefore, in our contribution, we implement three communication modes between agents: 
outsourcing to perform authorizations, provisioning to perform configurations, and finally we 
contribute with a hybrid model for both configuration/authorization at the same time. We present each 
communication mode using our same example presented in Chapter 4. 
In Figure 5.61, we present our implementation for the outsourcing communication paradigm, 
which is a synchronized model of controlling our SCD policy. After the SM identifies the situation 
“opening period”, the PEP agent fixed on the door (i.e., it should be able to control its movement 
through, for instance, a badge system) publishes requests to the common topic with the Master PEP, 
whenever a person (Bashar) approaches to the door and presents his/her badge card. Through its 
subscription to the same topic, the Master PEP receives Bashar’s access request and performs a 
standard XACML outsourcing communication (i.e., request/response) with the PDP. Once the PDP 
gives the situation-oriented decision (i.e., influenced by the “opening period” situation, which is 
obtained by the PIP), the Master PEP publishes the authorization decision (i.e., allowing Bashar to 
enter building 1R1) to a common topic. Through subscribing to the latter topic, the PEP smart node 
agent (i.e., controlling the door system) gets the response, which holds the authorization decision. 
Finally, the PEP enforces the PDP decision of allowing Bashar to enter by opening the 1R1 building 
door.  
As a result, we were able to implement the authorization of the SCD policy, such as the rule: 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Name (Person) = Bashar & Type (Action) = Enter & Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then Permit 
  
                                                
 
26 Work on outsourcing presented in COPS (Durham et al., 2000, RFC 2748; “COPS-ODRA/DRA” Salsano, 
2001 & 2002)) 
27 Work on provisioning presented in COPS-PR (Chan et al., 2001, RFC 3084)) 
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Figure 5.61: The outsourcing SCD policy control model 
implementation 
In Figure 5.62, we present our implementation for the provisioning communication paradigm, 
which is an asynchronized model of controlling our SCD policy. After the Context Manager28 (i.e., 
PEP as a sensor) publishes the beginning of the “opening period” situation to a common topic between 
the Situation Manager and the Master PEP, the Situation Manager agent identifies and stores the 
situation “opening period”. Through its subscription to the same topic, the Master PEP receives the 
context (“opening period” SP) and performs a standard XACML outsourcing communication (i.e., 
standard XACML request/response paradigm) with the PDP. Once the PDP gives the situation-
oriented decision (i.e., influenced by the “opening period”), the Master PEP publishes the 
configuration decision (i.e., deactivate the alarm system) to a common topic. Through subscribing to 
the latter topic, the PEP actuator agent (i.e., alarm system controller) gets the configuration as an 
obligation to do. Thus, this PEP actuator calls the program that deactivates the alarm system.  
Figure 5.62: The provisioning SCD policy control model 
implementation 
                                                
 
28 The Context Manager is a smart agent that publishes and subscribes to the messages bus. It subscribes to 
events and publishes new complex events as new contexts, SPs, and EPs. 
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As a result, we were able to implement the configuration of the SCD policy, such as the rule: 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” For 
Rule 3:  
IF SP (Situation) = “Opening Period” 
Then Permit  -- the continuity of this situation 
Apply Obligation: Deactivate the alarm system 
Finally, we present our implementation for the hybrid communication paradigm, which 
combines both the outsourcing and the provisioning communication paradigms and we use 
synchronized and asynchronized models for controlling our SCD policy.  
Supposing that the security checks to authorize Bashar of entering the building is verified at 
two doors, and not only one as in Chapter 4. Hence, we can facilitate the entering of Bashar by 
controlling the access once (i.e., at the main entrance ‘N1’), and then configuring the next door (i.e., 
the Lab door ‘N2’) in the way to his/her office. As a result, we need to implement the hybrid side of 
the following SCD policy rule: 
Targeting Situation (Building 1R1) = “Opening Period” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Name (Person) = Bashar & Type (Action) = Enter & Name (Building) = 1R1 
Then Permit 
Apply Obligation: Open the next door (N2) 
In Figure 5.63, After the SM identifies the situation “opening period”, the PEP agent fixed on 
the door (i.e., it should be able to control its movement through, for instance, a badge system) 
publishes requests to the common topic with the Master PEP, whenever a person (Bashar) approaches 
to the door and present his/her badge card. Through its subscription to the same topic, the Master PEP 
receives Bashar’s access request and performs a standard XACML outsourcing communication (i.e., 
request/response) with the PDP.  
Figure 5.63: The hybrid SCD policy control model implementation 
Once the PDP gives the situation-oriented decision (i.e., influenced by the “opening period” 
situation, which is obtained by the PIP) this time consists of both configuration and authorization, the 
Master PEP publishes to a common topic the decision, we will explain in the next step how the Master 
PEP identifies the destination and how to divide the security management decision. Through 
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subscribing to the later topic, the PEP agent (i.e., as a smart node controlling the system of the door 
N1) gets the response, which holds the authorization decision. This PEP enforces the PDP 
authorization decision of allowing Bashar to enter by opening the 1R1 building door N1. At the same 
time, through subscribing to the same topic, the PEP actuator agent (i.e., controlling the door system 
N2) gets the configuration as an obligation to do. Thus, this PEP actuator calls the program that opens 
the door (i.e., until Bashar passes through N2). 
Nevertheless, these exchanges between agents are realized based on topics, as we explained 
earlier. Hence, we have to manage and define these topics. Moreover, we have to organize and 
structure the use of each topic and the messages circulating inside each one. Therefore, we still need to 
answer in the next subsection to the following remained questions: 
1. What are the used topics, the relationship between the topics and agents?  
2. How do we define topics and configure agents to know what topic to use?  
3. What are the types of messages permitted inside the topics? Who can retrieve each 
message?  
4. How do topics link agents between each other? How does each agent discover the 
other agent? 
5. How does the Master PEP agent analyze the XACML PDP responses and send each 
decision to the suitable agent?  
6. How to know which message goes to which agent and how to organize the exchanges? 
How to know how to read the structure of the message ? 
7. How does the Master PEP agent know the other existing PEP agents and which PEP is 
responsible for which managed elements? 
II.A.3. Managing Agents Exchanges 
We defined the different types of agents and how we implemented each type of them. We also 
presented the different communications possibilities between these agents. Now, we need to explain 
on what these communications are built on. Therefore, we need to explain how the agents are 
exchanging information and how we manage and implement these exchanges.  
Whenever we implement an agent, we download a configuration file that contains 1) the 
available topics names, 2) the description of each topic, 3) and finally the address for connecting to the 
bus (i.e., for publishing and/or subscribing). However, how we define topics? 
A topic means “a matter dealt with in a text, discourse, or conversation; a subject” (Oxford 
Dictionary, British & World English). Technically speaking, a topic-based communication is a 
modular approach towards a content creation, where content is composed around specific topics. 
Within a topic, we can mix contents and reuse them in different common contexts. Thus, we use a 
topic to unify several contents, our communications are done based on several topics, and we use the 
bus to unify topic-based communications into a unique event-driven architecture. 
Therefore, each functionality we provide treats a problem, and each problem needs a topic. 
Thus, we define the main functionalities that our unified architecture provides: the processing of 
complex events (i.e., to calculate the SPs and EPs) and the making of security management decisions 
(i.e., sending authorizations and configurations). Thus, we have mainly two topics used: complex 
events and policy decisions topics. 
The policy decision topic is used to exchange authorizations (including requests) and 
configurations (i.e., security management decisions). Thus, the participating agents in this topic are 
mainly:  
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1) The Master PEP as a publisher for security management decisions and as a subscriber for 
new authorization requests  
2) The smart node PEP agents as publishers for authorization requests and as subscribers to 
receive the security management decisions  
3) The actuator PEP agents subscribes to this topic waiting for configuration obligations 
coming from the Master PEP, and finally  
4) The Context Manager (or directly through SM) agent as a subscriber for receiving policy 
obligations about changing the situations status (start or end) 
The complex events topic is used to exchange detected contexts. We defined the context as the 
processed events (e.g., motion detection sensors detect 0 person in the room alpha, the context is the 
room alpha is empty). Thus, we identify the participating agents to be:  
1) The Context Manager agent as a publisher to this topic for contexts in form of SPs/EPs for 
both agents the SM and the Master PEP  
2) The SM then working as a subscriber for this topic to identify situations 
3) The Master PEP working as a subscriber for this topic to obtain relevant contexts with the 
policy, for example, the startings/endings of “opening period”. 
Nevertheless, the processing of the complex events requires applying operations on the simple 
unprocessed events (e.g., sensor readings). Hence, we need another topic where all technical sensors 
can send their raw events in order to be processed by the Context Manager. For instance, in the 1R1 
building, we may have motion detection sensors associated with the alarm system. Thus, the readings 
coming from these sensors are not processed yet, and therefore are sent to the raw events topic. 
We mentioned earlier that the Master PEP needs to know the available other PEP agents 
(sensors, actuators, and smart nodes). Thus, we need a sort of “social milieu” to exchange identities of 
each connected agent29. Therefore, we use a similar approach to the COPS-PR management approach 
in recognizing connected PEPs. That is, the PEP initiates the connection with the PDP only once at the 
first time, and then, the PDP starts provisioning the relevant configurations to this PEP whenever 
needed.  
Likewise, all of our agents must publish to our last topic (called “Connections initiation”) at 
least once. The published message contains at least two attributes and their two values: the PEP ID and 
its functionality(ies). For instance, the alarm system actuator agent publishes once to the initiation 
topic that its ID is the ActPEP1 and its first functionality AlarmControl (i.e., it is possible to have 
more than one functionality). The Master PEP retrieves all these information by subscripting to this 
topic and stores them as a form of list (each PEP and its information). The Master PEP maintains its 
subscription to the topic active as long as it is running in order to be updated whenever a new PEP 
agent is connected. 
Finally, the Master PEP keeps in touch with registered PEPs once a security management 
decision concerns one of them. In case the decision contains an authorization, the Master PEP replies 
by publishing to the PEP who first sent the request. In case the decision contains configurations, the 
Master PEP browses its list and matches the configuration with the available functionalities. Once a 
match is found, the Master PEP asks the matched PEP to perform the configuration. But how? 
                                                
 
29 Ideally, we have to manage the identities of agents. Thus, we have to verify that an agent has the identity it 
publishes. Hence, we need to apply mechanisms such as the Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). However, this is 
not in the scope of this thesis and we will explain it in a future work. 
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Now, we have four topics used in our architecture illustrated in Figure 5.64. However, we still 
need to present how we manage the exchange of messages in term of: knowing who sent the message, 
how to recognize the messages elements, and when to know that a message is relevant to an agent. 
That is, all agents subscribing to a topic will receive all messages. However, they can write their own 
subscription rules to filter messages and get what is interesting for them. 
Figure 5.64: Our available topics for the messages bus. 
There will be many messages (e.g., configurations) sent from the Master PEP to the other PEP 
agents. Thus, we need to define a structure for the messages in order to know how to recognize the 
messages elements. Moreover, with numerous configurations sent, the PEP agents need to know which 
one of them need to perform a retrieved configuration.  
In Figure 5.65, we answer to all the remaining questions with concern to the exchanges of our 
agents. First, all our topics in the bus can only contain text messages. Topics are queues that hold a 
stream of messages (i.e., known as channels) sorted by the arriving order. Thus, we need to explain 
how we exchange events inside text messages.  
We unify the message format and provide a formal structure. Therefore, any publishing and 
subscribing operation needs to respect this structure. Moreover, defining a format for messages 
permits controlling and securing the exchange. So, we identify each message by identifying each 
source agent who is sending the message.  
All software agents of our contribution are connected to the Message Bus technology to 
exchange events (i.e., implemented using ActiveMQ Bus). We define the following standard Backus-
Naur Form (BNF) specification to be respected by all messages30. Each event is therefore structured in 
a MESSAGE as following: 
<Message> ::= <ID> <Event> 
 
<ID> ::= <Sender> [<Receiver>] 
<Sender> ::= < Single-Attribute > 
<Receiver> ::= < Single-Attribute > 
 
<Event> ::= <Attribute-List> 
<Attribute-List> ::= <Single-Attribute> [<Attribute-List>] 
 
<Single-Attribute> ::= <Attribute-Name> <Attribute-Value> 
<Attribute-Name> ::= function 
| sender-ID 
                                                
 
30 IETF standards: RFC733, RFC822, RFC2616 & RFC2811.  
For more information http://marvin.cs.uidaho.edu/Teaching/CS445/grammar.html 
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| destination-ID 
| configuration 
| authorizationDecision 
| … 
<Attribute-Value> ::= ActPEP1 
  | AlarmControl 
  | Activate 
  | Deactivate 
  | Allow 
  | Deny 
  | … 
Therefore, each topic contains messages that have two elements: ID and Event. The ID is the 
identification of the message and it is composed of both the sender and the receiver (destID) identities 
(i.e., the destination ID is not a required field in the message, as sensors for example are not required 
to know who will use their readings). On the other hand, the event is structured in form of sequences 
of an attribute and its value.  
An example on the messages that are sent to the connection initiation topic only once from 
each new agent: 
<Message>  ::= senderID ActPEP1 function AlarmControl 
The following message is an example on a normal message. It is sent from the Master PEP to 
the alarm system in order to deactivate its functionality: 
<Message> ::= senderID MasterPEP destID ActPEP1 configuration deactivate 
We defined the allowed structure and content of our messages. Now, we need to present how 
an agent knows that a sent message into one of its subscribed topics needs to be retrieved. To do so, 
we use the ID value to filter the messages in a subscription relationship through rules. Thus, the rules 
allow the agents to retrieve only interesting messages from the topic queue. 
In Figure 5.65, we illustrate an example on the management of exchanges. The Master PEP 
publishes to the topic “policy decisions” three types of messages (i.e., for the Master PEP these 
messages are decisions and for the receiving agents the messages are events): 1) configurations, 2) 
authorization (AuthZ) response on a previous request, and 3) provisioning a new context(s). The 
Master PEP and all other agents are associated with a configuration file that contains: the ActiveMQ 
URL, the topics names, and description on each topic. Moreover, all agents subscribed to the topic will 
be able to receive all messages. Therefore, they have the possibility of using rules to filter messages in 
order to receive only the interesting ones. 
First, let’s assume that the current situation of building 1R1 is “reconstruction period”. 
Therefore, the Master PEP sends configurations at the beginning of this situation to deactivate the 
alarm system (i.e., using the earlier configuration message). The alarm system based on its 
subscription rules will get the messages with destID equal to ActPEP1. Now, this agent can respond to 
the policy obligation by applying the configuration “deactivate the alarm system”. 
Second, the Master PEP receives an authorization request from the door system asking to 
allow Bashar to enter. The Master PEP publishes the authorization response to the topic “policy 
decisions” that says to deny Bashar to enter (i.e., the current situation is “reconstruction period”). 
Thus, the door system will deny Bashar’s request and the door should stay closed. 
Third, the situation “reconstruction period” ends normally at the 30th of November as we 
specified. Let’s assume that the workers have finished the reconstructions before this date. Therefore, 
this new context is detected by the Context Manager and forwarded to the Master PEP. The latter can 
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take a security management decision to keep the building closed until the agreed time comes. Thus, 
the Master PEP sends a new context “end reconstruction period” to the responsible agent. This is an 
end-point for the situation “reconstruction period”. So, we have two possibilities. Either to declare this 
functionality for the Context Manager, then it will transfer it through the topic “complex events” to the 
Situation Manager. Otherwise, we can directly include the Situation Manager in this process and 
consider this decision as an ending-point (EP) to the situation “reconstruction period”. Thus, it will 
remove this situation from the database. 
Indeed, it is more efficient to connect the Situation Manager directly. However, we keep both 
possibilities because not all contextual decisions from the policy may end or start a situation. Some 
decisions participate only in the SP or EP and therefore needs the Context Manager to process the 
event (i.e., the policy decision) with others in order to create the expected SP or EP. 
Figure 5.65: Example on the management of exchanges 
Following these techniques, we can now present our complete event-driven XACML 
architecture that aims at identifying situations, orienting the dynamic security policy decisions by 
these situations, and unifying the enforcement of these decisions by giving the possibility to outsource 
dynamic authorizations and provision adaptive configurations. 
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III .  SCD Unified & Adaptive Architecture 
We presented our architecture in several steps. First, we presented a conceptual view on our 
architecture (the Master PEP architecture) with the necessary agents, the relationships between them 
and the possible communication paradigms to be implemented. Second, we present the technology we 
are using based on an event-driven architecture (i.e., messages bus implemented using Active MQ). 
Third, using this technology, we implemented the different agents, their inter-communications, and 
their exchanges techniques.  
I I I .A .  T h e  S C D  U n ifie d  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Now, we want to make a coherent presentation to the complete architecture in order to 
demonstrate its unification feature (i.e., unifying the three presented interrelations). We claim that our 
SCD unified architecture is generic and can give a solution to implementing any dynamic security 
management system (i.e., with respect to our earlier expression methodology).31 
In Figure 5.66, we present the full view of our SCD unified architecture. For the ease of 
explanation, we divide the architecture presentation into parallel management phases: 1) initiation in 
dark blue, 2) situations management loop in violet, 3) decision-making management loop in yellow 
(i.e., authorizations and obligation decisions), and 4) decision-application in light blue (i.e., enforcing 
authorizations and applying configurations). The green arrows mean subscribing (collecting messages) 
and the orange arrows mean publishing (sending messages).  
Figure 5.66: The full view on the SCD Unified Architecture 
Nevertheless, all steps are indispensable one for another in our architecture. The architecture 
contains four topic-based streams⎯JMS messaging streams (Java Messaging Service) built inside a 
                                                
 
31 We will make proof of this claiming in the next Chapter 
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messages bus implemented using the Apache ActiveMQ framework. The framework launching steps 
are the following (i.e., after expressing and representing all presented steps in Chapter 4): 
i. Messages Bus: we launch the bus on a server and we can administrate and monitor 
the bus through the local link: tcp://localhost:61616. However, the agents 
configuration file contains the remote link address (http://IP.Address:Port/). 
ii. Situation Management & Policy Management Architecture: We launch the agents 
for both management loops at the same time: Master PEP, Situation and Context 
Managers, and PDP (including its PIP).  
iii. Management Agents: We launch finally all the agents that are controlling the 
managed elements: alarm system, door systems (N1 & N2), technical sensors and any 
other event sources.  
The architecture implementation passes by six parallel steps (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). Having the 
same step with the two or three different colors means that the step is done in parallel in several phases 
(e.g., steps 2 and 6). We present our implemented architecture functionality by first presenting the 
initiation step. This is the first step that occurs after each time of launching our framework: 
All the software agents publish their initiation message described earlier with their 
ID and functionality. The Master PEP and the Context Manager collect this 
information and build two lists holding all the management agents (i.e., alarm 
system, door systems, etc.). However, this step can be repeated whenever a new 
management agent is added to the managed environment. For instance, we deploy a 
fire alarm system. Hence, the new management agent needs to do the self-identify. 
After the initiation step, we have the second step that passes in parallel by three phases:  
The Context Manager subscription starts monitoring all types of events circulating 
inside the exchanging channels of the three topics: 1, 2, and 4. 
The Master PEP subscription rules allow to retrieve messages from two topics 1 & 2 
that concern messages with relevant context to the policy or access requests. 
The management agents start their functionalities either as a sensor, actuator, or a 
smart node. For instance, technical sensors publish their raw readings to the topic 4. 
The door system N1 starts sending access requests (if any). 
After the management agents start publishing their readings, the Context Manager 
can now identify complex events. If any context matches the SP or EP for the 
Situation Manager, the Context Manager sends this SP or EP to the topic 1. 
The Master PEP subscription rules should allow the retrieval of any relevant context 
through topic 1 or any access request in the topic 2. Upon any detection, the Master 
PEP sends a standard XACML request to the PDP to check the SCD policy decision.  
At this point, the Situation Manager subscription rules allow to retrieve SPs and EPs. 
In case the message is relative to an SP, the situation manager will create a new 
instance in the database to mark the start of an entity’s situation. Otherwise, it will 
update the database and delete the situation corresponding to the received EP. This is 
the final step concerning the situation management loop. Afterwards,  steps 2, 3, & 4 
in violet continue to be repeated as long as the framework is working. 
Through its PIP, the PDP gets the new situations relevant to any XACML request 
made by the Master PEP.  
The PDP evaluates the XACML request based on the SCD policy and with 
consideration to the new situations. As a result of this evaluation, the PDP sends 
back the XACML decision to the Master PEP. 
3 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
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5 
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Once the Master PEP receives the PDP response, it processes the response finding 
the destinations of this response and divide the decision to publishable messages. 
Hence, if there is inside one XACML response only one-authorization-decision to a 
pending request (synchronized) from a smart node (e.g., the door system N1), the 
Master PEP sends the decision response. Otherwise, if there are any obligations, the 
Master PEP obligates each destination (i.e., actuator or smart node agent retrieved 
from its initiation list; any of the alarm system, the door system N1 and the door 
system N2) to apply configurations on their managed elements. 
Through their subscription rules, the management agents retrieve messages 
concerning configurations and authorizations. The actuators receive configurations 
from the Master PEP and apply them on their managed elements. The smart nodes 
receive authorizations and enforce them on the accesses requestor. The smart node, 
however, may receive configurations as well accompanied with the authorization 
decisions. Then, the smart node needs to apply the configurations as well on their 
managed elements. 
In conclusion, we presented our architecture that unifies different types of agents and different 
policy control models with the help of event-driven architecture and technologies. Our complete 
architecture is able to implement successfully any policy expressed and represented using our SCD 
methodology (explained in Chapter 4). We claim our architecture to be generic in the sense of being 
applied on whatever information system case study. We proof this claiming in the next chapter by 
providing, expressing, and implementing different use cases. 
Nevertheless, we said that our architecture is adaptive, but our agents are static and cannot be 
upgraded. Any changes to the PEP agents require a phase of recoding and stopping our security 
management system. Thus, we present in the next section how we can conceptualize and implement 
adaptive PEPs that accept dynamic upgrading of security management configurations. 
I I I .B .  A d d in g  th e  a d a p ta b ility  f e a tu r e  
Now, security configurations are possible with the new XACML v. 3.0 obligation expressions. 
However, the obligations are included inside the policy in a static manner, and upgrading the 
configurations to adapt to technological advancement requires the interruption of the security 
management system and the modification of the security policy, which contradicts with what we are 
presenting in this thesis. Therefore, we first present how to tackle the adaptability problem of security 
configurations, and then we present the adaptability solution unified with the dynamic XACML 
architecture. 
For instance, if the technologies used for deploying the alarm systems are renewed, the 
technical configurations should be changed. However, the policy itself does not require us to change it 
because the configurations are externalized and dynamic. Therefore, the security management system 
will not be interrupted and we can only change the implementation of this configuration, but not the 
representation inside the policy. 
III.B.1. Defining Adaptability Notions 
In systems and networks management, security management solutions should meet the 
requirements during behavioral changes to any given situation inside the environment. A system is 
believed to be “adaptive” as it is able to meet the security requirements whenever the conditions and 
the circumstances are changed. Consequently, any dynamic security management system is said to be 
adaptive whenever it performs security changes to the managed elements in compliance with 
identified situations. Therefore, the previous situation awareness permits DSMS to identify situations. 
6 
6 
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Upon undesired changes, the DSMS should apply adaptable security configurations. This process is 
defined in literature as the adaptation process.  
Formally speaking, the adaptation process aims at changing a system to respond to new 
monitored changes inside its environment. Given the multitude of definitions related to this concept, 
we have chosen to retain one that is both generic and reduces ambiguities by its formal approach 
(Subramanian & Chung, 2001). In addition, we fix the objective of applying the adaptation approach 
to fulfill a dynamic adaptability of the system (Fox & Clarke, 2009). Therefore, in the light of our 
contribution, the adaptation of an authorization system is the ability to change this system, because it 
no longer meets the dynamic behavior of the environment. The new situations (i.e., representing the 
dynamic behavior) inside the environment consequently represent a new environment⎯suggesting a 
new requirements definition⎯may also cause the creation of a new environment. To meet the 
requirements connecting the system with its environment, the monitoring process notifies the system 
about the new changes. Consequently, the creation of a new system takes place by dynamically adding 
or modifying the old one (i.e., without interruption to its functionality) with the aim of either meeting 
the new requirements or adapting the new environment’s situations to the requirements (Cheaito, 
2012, p. 43). 
III.B.2. Current XACML PEPs 
We present a simple scenario to illustrate the need of adaptability at the PEP side. Let us 
consider a policy that grants subjects with role R to access service S. The PEP has been designed to 
catch any request to service S and transform it into an XACML request that it sends to the PDP 
(Figure 5.67). When someone with role R requests access to service S, the decision of the PDP sent to 
the PEP only contains the effect (PERMIT in this case – Figure 5.68, a). At some time, the security 
administrator wants to log the granted accesses. She modifies the rule by adding an obligation to 
inform the PEP having to log granted accesses (Figure 5.68, b). However, this obligation did not exist 
when the PEP was designed, and then the PEP does not provide any functionality to enforce this 
obligation. 
Figure 5.67: Messages exchanged between the PEP and the PDP 
  
PDP
PEP
Service S
Request={
role=R
action-id=access
resource-id=S}
Response
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(a) Response sent by the PDP when no obligation 
 
(b) Response sent by the PDP including an obligation 
Figure 5.68: Responses sent by the PDP  
As a consequence, we can formulate the following requirements about the ideal PEP: 
 Req1: The PEP must be able to enforce any XACML decision. Whatever the response 
of the PDP is, the PEP must be able to enforce it. 
 Req2: The PEP must be dynamically adaptable. The policy can change over time and 
new requirements may appear. The PEP must be able to adapt at runtime. 
 Req3: The PEP must be XACML v3 compliant. The XACML Request/Response 
protocol must not be changed. 
 Req4: The PEP must provide interfaces to be integrated to an application/service. In 
this example, the PEP controls the access to service S. The PEP transforms specific 
service S data into an XACML request and enforces the Permit/Deny decision into 
service S. Thus, there must be an interface to allow programmers to integrate the PEP 
with service S. 
 Req5: The adaptation feature must not complicate the task of PEP programmers. 
Currently, requesting a decision from a PDP is implemented by methods like 
getDecision(). Using our adaptive PEP must not be more complicated. 
III.B.3. A Dynamically Adaptable XACML v3 PEP 
We present in this section the description of our adaptable PEP architecture. We have 
followed a service-oriented component approach that takes advantage of integration and dynamicity 
from service-oriented architectures and of reusability and dependency management from component-
oriented models.  
The service-oriented architecture promotes modeling solutions in terms of provided services 
described by contracts. It is based on the idea of composing applications by discovering and invoking 
available services to accomplish some tasks (Papazoglou et al., 2007). The general pattern of service-
oriented solutions consists in service providers, service consumers, and a service registry. Service 
providers publish services at runtime and service consumers’ requests for a specific contract. Different 
service providers can offer the same service, and the consumer can choose one of them based on the 
contract⎯since the framework allows service consumers to be dynamically notified of new registered 
services and unregistered services. 
Component oriented programming focuses on making reusable, logical blocks of software that 
implement one or more interfaces. A component-oriented software is then an assembling of 
components. The notion of interface is very similar to the notion of service interface, and component-
oriented programming has been used to implement services. A service can be implemented by one or 
more components. 
<Response>
   <Decision>Permit</Decision>
 </Response>
<Response>
   <Decision>Permit</Decision>
   <Obligations>
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   </Obligations>
</Response>
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Adaptable enforcement of security management configurations needs a dynamic mechanism in 
order to be compatible with the existing heterogeneity between different technical infrastructures. 
Therefore, exchanging between components, plugins, or any other software modules on top of a 
technical environment, the service-oriented component (SOC) creates a dynamic approach aimed at 
delivering loadable and unloadable services to complex environments with consideration for managed 
elements’ heterogeneity (Cervantes & Hall, 2004). The approach combines the advantages of the 
service-oriented architectures (SOA) in terms of integration and dynamicity with the advantages of 
component-oriented models (SOM) in terms of reusability and dependency management (Laborde, 
Barrère, & Benzekri, 2013). The following subsections explain both the SOA and the SOM 
approaches. Afterwards, the framework used to implement SOC in the thesis contribution is presented.  
III .B.3.i  Service-Oriented Architecture 
The Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) aims at providing solutions through modeling 
contracts of described services. To accomplish some tasks, SOA essentially offers discovering and 
invoking available services to compose applications (Papazoglou et al., 2007). Any service-oriented 
solution generally consists of a service provider, a service consumer, and service registry patterns. 
Service providers publish services at run time and service consumers' request services for a specific 
contract. Different service providers can offer the same service, and the consumer can choose between 
them based on the contract, since the framework allows service consumers to be dynamically notified 
of new registered and unregistered services. 
Briefly, SOA software architecture is based on the key concepts of an application front-end, 
service, service repository, and service bus (Sprott & Wilkes, 2004). A service consists of a contract, 
one or more interfaces, and an implementation. A service in SOA is an exposed piece of functionality 
with three properties: 
i. The interface contract to the service is platform-independent. 
ii. The service can be dynamically located and invoked. 
iii. The service is self-contained. That is, the service maintains its own state. 
III .B.3.ii  Component-Oriented models 
Programming using a component-oriented approach means building reusable logical blocks of 
software (i.e., components) that implement one or more service interfaces. A component is a contract 
with the realizer. Any component-oriented software represents components assembly. A service can be 
implemented by one or more components. An interface is a contract with a client, describing a set of 
behaviors provided by a component object. It defines a list of operations, their signatures, and 
semantics.  
III .B.3.ii i  OSGi Framework 
One way to implement service-oriented component architecture is using the OSGi framework. 
Created initially for Java-based systems, OSGi offers a framework for modular systems. OSGi gives 
the possibility of declaring dependencies between individual modules. It allows users to manage the 
lifecycle and dynamically adapt each component of the system. 
The term “OSGi” is only a specification. However, the implementations can vary and are 
mostly taken by Equinox, Apache Felix, and Knoplerfish. The OSGi implementations are based on the 
JVM and provide mechanisms for service management, component definition, execution, control, and 
life cycle management of modules.  
Unified	and	Adaptive	Architecture	 Ch.	5	
 
— 131 — 
The bundle is the most essential OSGi concept. It is the component that builds and draws the 
OSGi structure. At the deployment level, an OSGi bundle is interpreted as a Java jar file. Nevertheless, 
there are major differences between the “bundle jar file” and the regular one. One can recognize them 
by referring to the OSGi specific manifest definition and some OSGi specific classes.  
Another important concept of OSGi is services. Services specify the interaction between the 
bundles. Two sides represent these services: (a) the definition of interfaces and (b) the registration to 
an implementation that performs these interfaces. Service registration is stored within a service 
directory. As with SOA, services make OSGi-based systems more decoupled and independent. 
Moreover, OSGi makes it possible to adapt components and to interchange between them during the 
runtime.  
Finally, any OSGi framework offers a platform to manage the lifecycle of bundles. Every 
bundle holds its own OSGi configuration. The configurations are mainly the dependencies needed to 
run the bundle. The OSGi framework knows through the configuration files the order of execution, 
and therefore the lifecycle management is applied to each of the components with a given order. 
Remarkably, the two main classes that help the management of the lifecycle are the “Activator” and 
the OSGi “interface”. 
  
 — 132 — 
III .B.3.iv  An adaptive PEP Architecture 
Our architecture drawn in Figure 5.69 consists of the following components: 
 The core PEP is the corner stone of our architecture. This component: 
o Calls service getDecision to get a PDP response from a PDP access point 
o Calls service applyObligation if any in the response of the PDP. 
 Install obligation modules at runtime. 
 A PDP access point implementation. This component allows the PEP to contact a PDP 
from various methods. 
 Obligation implementation components. Each obligation component publishes the urn of 
the obligation it implements allowing the CorePEP to differentiate them. 
All these components have been implemented in the OSGi framework.32 Making the OSGi 
framework cooperate with a pure Java application is a hard task (Hall, Pauls, McCulloch, & Savage, 
2011) (e.g., they use different class loaders). However, PEPs must be integrated into applications, 
which may not be pure OSGi. Thus, we have created a Java class ExtensiblePEP that launches a 
customized OSGi environment and communicates with the CorePEP seamlessly from any Java 
application. 
Figure 5.69: Our adaptive PEP architecture 
Adaptation specification 
The corePEP is able to install new obligation components. However, a mechanism is required 
to inform the PEP about (a) what component implements what obligation and (b) how to install and 
configure it. We have decided to provide this information in the policy itself. XACMLv3 provides the 
concept of advice that provides supplemental information to the PEP. In addition, advice can be 
ignored by the PEP. Hence, advice is a good way to provide information about obligation components. 
The second benefit of sending obligation components information inside advices is that this 
information is sent in PDP results alongside obligations. Thus, no extra protocol is needed. 
                                                
 
32 OSGi, http://www.osgi.org/Main/HomePage, last access April, 2014 
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We propose to employ two advices for enforcing obligations: 
 The first advice, called installation advice, provides information about where to 
download the component. It must have an id that equals to 
urn:siera:management:obligation. This advice must have attribute 
urn:siera:obligationId set to the URN of the obligation. Attribute 
urn:siera:bundle:file:location indicates the location of the component and attribute 
urn:siera:bundle:file:name contains the name of the component file. For example, the 
advice of Figure 5.70 states obligation urn:siera:example:obligation:log-access:file is 
implemented by component FileAccessLog_1.0.0.201306191231.jar that is available 
in directory obligation-store. 
 The second advice, called configuration advice, provides the configuration of the 
component. The adviceId must be the same as the obligationId. Attributes within this 
advice are specific to the component. In our example, the component logs requests 
and results in a file. The advice sets the path file. 
 
Figure 5.70: Extract of the obligation expression for the “auditing” functionality 
As a result, the global process of the PEP is the following (Figure 5.71): 
 Step 1 – The CorePEP receives the result from the PDPAccessPointImpl. For each 
obligation, the CorePEP tries to call service applyObligation.  
 Step 2 − If the service is not available, the CorePEP looks at the installation advice for 
that obligation. It downloads the component file. 
 Step 3 – The CorePEP installs the component in the OSGi environment and sends the 
configuration advice to the component. 
 Step 4 – The CorePEP calls service applyObligation.  
This approach fulfills our requirements since: 
 Req1 – The PEP can be upgraded with a new obligation component if needed. 
 Req2 – Our PEP is adaptive. Obligation components are installed and configured at runtime. 
 Req3 – We use XACMLv3 features only. 
 Req4 – The PEP can be easily called from any Java program using method getDecision(). 
 Req5 – Adaptation is managed transparently.   
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Figure 5.71: Process for upgrading the PEP 
I I I .C .  A d d in g  a d a p ta b ility  to  a g e n t  im p le m e n ta tio n s  
Using our previous presentation to the adaptability feature, we can upgrade any agent with this 
feature by instantiating the Java class Extensible PEP inside this agent. Then, we can use the 
functionalities presented earlier upgrading new configurations (see Figure 5.72). 
Nevertheless, in our unified architecture we identify three types of agents that can accept the 
upgrading feature: actuators, smart nodes, and Master PEPs. Thus, in Figure 5.72 we can replace the 
“Agent” by any of these three types. In case of the actuator, the alarm system is now decoupled from 
the deployed infrastructure technology. Hence, any upgrading to the configurations can be 
programmed and added to the agent without stopping our security management system. Likewise for 
the smart node “door system N1”, the agent accepts new configuration upgrades.  
Figure 5.72: Upgrading agents with adaptability 
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Finally, upgrading the Master PEP allows having a local PDP, an adaptive PEP actuator to 
apply dynamic configurations directly, and an adaptive PEP smart node to use requests/response 
locally and apply dynamic configurations directly. By this upgrading of the Master PEP, we are closer 
to the MAPE agents (Monitoring, Analyzing, Planning, and Executing). However, we ensure the 
monitoring, the analyzing and the execution functionalities, but we still need to implement the 
planning functionality (i.e., as a future work). 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion  
We have presented in this chapter our dynamic security management system that expresses 
authorizations and configurations that need special enforcement. The existence of two policy control 
models to enforce the policy causes the implementations to choose the outsourcing or the provisioning 
approach. Therefore, our usage of both authorizations and configurations invited a unified 
enforcement of the dynamic security policy. Moreover, the need for configurations to adapt to 
technological changes invited us to implement an adaptive policy enforcement point. 
As a result, we introduced a unified architecture with adaptive enforcement that respects the 
dynamic security policy. In Figure 5.73, we summarize the outcome of applying our contribution to 
the architecture. Supposing that we have six situations. Specific events represent the behavior changes 
of the managed elements and change the nominal situation 1 to either start (SP) situation 2 (s2) or 
situation 3 (s3). In case of s2, the fact of having an access request (rq1) would get the denial response 
and may be accompanied with obligations that start situation 4. However, being in s3 will grant rq1 
the permission to access and may also apply some obligations to start situation 5. Otherwise, 
configurations might be provisioned during s3 to start situation 6. 
Nevertheless, the red arrows represent events coming from the environment that express either 
behavior changes of managed elements or access request from the latter. The blue arrows represent the 
dynamic synchronized authorization decisions that resulted from evaluating the dynamic security 
policy with the orientation of situations. Finally, the green arrows represent the adaptive enforcement 
of configurations. These configurations could be either synchronized (i.e., when accompanying the 
peer-to-peer authorization decisions) or asynchronized (i.e., when provisioned to the managed 
elements) (Figure 5.73). 
Figure 5.73: State diagram representing our DSMS enforcement logic 
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In conclusion, Figure 5.74 demonstrates the implementation of all the interrelations we 
presented between the PDP, the PEPs, and the SM architecture using our unified architecture. We are 
able to implement different communication paradigms (i.e., outsourcing, provisioning, and a mix of 
them) between all necessary agents: actuators, sensors, and smart nodes. Moreover, we implemented 
and managed a uniform exchanging approach upon our messages bus. We introduced and 
implemented a new smart PEP agent that we named “Master PEP”. We used this agent as a control 
point of exchanges between all connected agents and the situational-oriented decision-making process.  
Finally, we presented our complete architecture in-depth and we added a new feature to our 
actuating agents that we described as “adaptability”. We defined what is adaptability and how we 
implement and upgrade PEP agents with dynamic configurations. Then, we demonstrated how we 
could use these upgrading into these agents and the possibility of having local PDPs (i.e., inside each 
adaptive PEP). Technically, we implemented this architecture using different available technologies, 
but all agents are implemented using Java language. The ESB messages bus is implemented using 
apache Active MQ (i.e., it provides an interface to monitor subscriptions, queues and messaging 
exchanges). The SCD policy and the authorization response/request are represented using the standard 
OASIS XACML version 3.0. The PDP is implemented based on an existing open source 
implementation from WSO2. We modified the Balana’s implementation in order to meet our 
requirements (i.e., Balana implementation eases the handling of the new obligation expressions of the 
XACML v 3.0) [Balana – XACML Info, August 2012]. The Situation and Context Manager are 
implemented using the Esper technology (i.e., implementing complex event processing engines and 
their EPL configuration language) [ESPER Tech. Inc., 2006]. All messages exchanging (publishing or 
subscripting) are implemented using Java Messaging Services (JMS). The adaptability feature is 
implemented using OSGi framework for Java (namely, using the bundles).  
Figure 5.74: Conclusion view on our SCD unified architecture 
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Chapter VI 
Proof of Concept: 
Three Different Scenarios  
We expressed and implemented our contribution on the SCD policy. 
The framework, which we have demonstrated through one trivial 
example in the previous two chapters, does not prove its “generic 
nature”. Therefore, we focus in this chapter on proofing this generic 
concept by choosing different scenarios in term of problem nature. The 
first scenario tackles exceptions with highly dynamic environment. Fast 
reactions and bypassing security should be tolerated to save lives. The 
second scenario tackles managing authorizations of virtual parties 
accessing one shared resource. The dynamic state of this resources 
implied having dynamic authorization decisions. The third scenario 
tackles pure management problem. Organizing and scheduling the 
submission of jobs require being efficient in term of energy usage. Thus, 
managing the security of the job submission process, should not only 
ensures the process efficiency, but its respect to the security policy. 
Summary 
I. First Scenario:  
Ø Security Management of Healthcare Information Systems 
o Case Study: Break The Glass 
II. Second Scenario:  
Ø Security Management of Virtual Organizations 
o Case Study: Workflow Management 
III. Third Scenario:  
Ø Security Management of Job Submission in grid computing 
o Case Study: Energy Management 
IV. Framework Evaluation 
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C h a p t e r  6 :  P r o o f  o f  C o n c e p t :   
T h r e e  D i f f e r e n t  S c e n a r i o s   
“It is very unfair to judge any body’s conduct, without an intimate knowledge of their 
situation. Nobody, who has not been in the interior of a family, can say what difficulties 
of any individual of that family may be.” 
Jane Austen 
Columbia World of Quotations 
 Retrieved November 10, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
Introduction: 
It is difficult to prove the generic nature of an architecture and stating it is applicable to any 
system in which its objective is ensuring dynamic security management. In this chapter, therefore, we 
seek to proof our framework (i.e., language and architecture) can be applied to three examples of our 
choices.  
The idea of proposing the first scenario is to demonstrate a specific security problem in 
healthcare known as Break the Glass. Through this problem, we are able to present bidirectional 
relationship on how situations orient security decisions, and how security decisions configure 
situations. Thus, we present the added value of using a meaningful feedback, of using this feedback to 
orient the decision-making, and of optionally using the decision outcome (i.e., provisioning 
asynchronized configurations) in stimulating changes to this feedback (e.g., put an end to an ongoing 
situation or start a new one). Moreover, we demonstrate with such highly dynamic environment how it 
is possible to express dynamic authorization policies to consider exceptions (e.g., emergencies) 
without modifying or updating the rules. 
The idea of proposing the second scenario is to demonstrate the use of our framework into a 
security-oriented case study. The management of workflow for collaborative production of shared 
specification documents should be ensured with compliance to the management of security. Thus, 
there are two parallel management paradigms in this case study: workflow and security. The added 
value of implementing this scenario is to demonstrate 1) one directional relationship on how changing 
situations orients the security decisions, 2) the flexibility and simplicity of our security management 
framework when using situations, and 3) the effective of using our conceptual methodology to 
engineer the scenario’s situations and policy.  
The idea of proposing the third scenario is to prove that our framework has generic nature in 
term of its application domain. The previous two scenarios aim at managing security of managed 
elements with security objectives only. However, through this third scenario we demonstrate that 
managing the security of management nature scenario involves ensuring management functionalities 
(i.e., configurations). Unlike the first scenario, management operations are obligations that must be 
fulfilled in addition to the authorization decision. Thus, the added value of this scenario is to 
demonstrate the usefulness of having both synchronized (outsourcing) and asynchronized 
(provisioning) management communications in our framework. 
For each scenario, we present the scenario specification, picking from it the relevant situations 
and model them with association to contexts and decisions, representing the SCD policy, technically 
identifying the situations, and using the SCD architecture to integrate new scenarios’ agents. 
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I .  1 s t Scenario:  Break The Glass 
In Healthcare, “Break The Glass” (BTG) is a good example that treats the dynamic 
authorization problem through bypassing traditional authorizations (static). In emergency 
circumstances, unauthorized doctors can break the policy to get rights to access information that they 
could never have in an ordinary case. Well-known solution for BTG is giving entities administrative 
rights to break policy and modify rules when it comes to patients’ life. Our scenario is the following: 
Emma is a doctor in a modern hospital. Access to patients’ information by doctors is 
controlled. The intervention should be legalized by a reason, e.g. treatments. Therefore, 
only doctors with reasons are allowed to access. Patients in such hospitals are observed 
through many sensors that send information about: fever, pulse, blood pressure, 
conscience status and numerous bio-medical signals. Contextual sensors (CSs) are 
connected to capture physical movements and positions: room occupancy, patient’s 
position and doctors’ position. CSs are connected to an alarm system. Once an alarm is 
launched expressing an emergency situation, a notification message is sent to the doctor 
in charge in such situation for the concerned patient.  
 
Assuming that one-day connected sensors to patient Joe show urgent need for a doctor. 
While his responsible doctor is not available, Emma was ready to involve. 
Unfortunately, Joe is not one of her patients. Traditionally, she won’t have access. The 
BTG solution gives Emma rights in emergency situations to break general policy in 
order to saves Joe’s life. 
Breaking the general policy is required to change the authorization. To change rules (break the 
policy), one should have administrative permissions to do so (in the worst case Emma can change the 
current policy). Emma will break the policy and give herself authorization to access Joe’s files. 
It is important to highlight the importance of this example for our thesis work. The objective of 
this contribution is to avoid Emma from having administrative permissions, which does not belong to 
her role as a doctor. All what Emma should concern about is Joe’s life. 
I .A .  M o d e lin g  B T G  S itu a tio n s  
Giving the BTG scenario, we choose three situations extracted form the following scenario 
specifications: Patient needs a doctor, patient health is normal, and the medical-record33 is broken 
when the BTG permission is granted. We believe that modeling three situations is enough to ease and 
present the expression and implementation of the BTG scenario. 
Initially, the healthcare authorization system evaluates the access requests to PI based on the 
stable policy oriented by a normal situation (i.e., when all systems elements are in normal situations). 
Within these situations, Emma is not permitted to do any of the following actions: accessing Joe’s PI, 
BTG request to Joe’s PI and ending the BTG request.  
When Joe’s health become worse and there is no available responsible doctor nearby to save 
him is found around, Joe will be in an urgent need for a doctor (i.e., the situation named “Doctor 
Needed”). As Emma is the only available doctor, she will receive a notification to take in charge the 
                                                
 
33 MD is the electronic record that contains the patient’s information 
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treatment of Joe. Emma cannot access Joe’s PI directly, so she will present a BTG request to Joe’s PI. 
Logically, she won’t have permission to end the BTG request, as it is not placed yet.   
Once the glass is broken “BTG Situation” (i.e., the situation of the PI), Emma can access Joe’s 
PI, but she cannot place another request to BTG again (i.e., as it is already broken). Once Joe 
treatment is done, Emma can end the BTG situation on his PI. As a result, the situation of Joe’s PI will 
get back to normal and the cycle is completed.  
Figure 6.75: State diagram of the BTG management in Healthcare Information Systems 
I .B .  R e p r e s e n tin g  S C D  P o lic y  
By considering these four-modeled situations, the policy expressing the dynamic authorization 
can be represented by the six rules below. The first rule states: if the doctor requesting access to PI is 
one of the persons responsible of the patient who owns this information. PRPL is the List of Persons 
Responsible who has access to the Patient’s information (with the patient himself). In order for Emma 
to be able to place a request to break the glass (i.e., BTG Request), the system should be in situation 
that needs an external doctor (during the urgent need for a doctor: “Doctor Needed”). In this case only, 
she can break the policy using the second rule. The third rule expresses the configuration of a new 
message concerning specific situation. That is, at the beginning of the “Doctor Needed” situation, an 
email is sent to doctors to alert them about the urgent situation of the patient, Joe for example. The 
fourth rule is to ensure that only doctors who placed a BTG request can access the Patient Information. 
The objective of this rule is to avoid other doctors taking advantage of such situation. The fifth rule is 
to let Emma end the BTG process or request on Joe’s PI once she finishes the treatment. Finally, to 
manage conflicts we declare a default sixth rule that denies all other access requests. 
Using XACML version 3.0, we represent our SCD policy for the BTG scenario with 6 rules. It 
is easier with the provided state diagram (associated with contexts and decisions) and the specified 
SCD rules to write our XACML structure-like policy expressions.  
XACML Policy: 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “Normal” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Type (Resource) = MD-Patient ∧ Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧  
Type (Action)= Access∧ ID (Subject) ∈ PRPL (Resource) 
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Patient) = “Doctor Needed” For 
Rule 2:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource) = MD-Patient ∧  
Type (Action)= BTG Request 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Start-BTG Bundle at the following (file path) 
Rules: 
-  Deny end BTG on this patient's MD
- Notify all doctors about this situation 
- Allow any doctor to request BTG on 
    this patient MD
 - Allow any doctor to only view 
    if his/her patients' MD
Rules: 
          - Allow any doctor to view PI on his/her
               patients' MD
                - Allow any doctor to view PI on this 
               MD & to end BTG
         - Deny any doctor request BTG on this MD
Rules: 
 - Only allow any doctor to view PI 
    of his/her patients' MD
 - Deny any doctor to request BTG 
    on this Patient MD
-  Deny any doctor to end BTG on 
    this patient's MD
Patient:
Doctor Needed
MD-Patient:
BTG Granted
 Doctor ends 
his/her BTG request
Patient:
Normal
Doctor places 
a BTG Request
- Urgent need for replacing doctor
- Sensors show dangerous readings
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Apply Obligation: Start the BTG Situation of the resource 
Targeting Situation (Patient) = “Doctor Needed” For 
Rule 3:  
IF SP (Situation) = “Doctor Needed” 
Then Permit  -- the continuity of this situation 
Take Advice: Find the Patient-Alarm Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Notify doctors about this patient urgent need for intervention 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “BTG Granted” For 
Rule 4:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource)= MD-Patient ∧  
ID (Subject) = BTG Requester (MD-Patient) ∧ Type (Action)= Access 
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “BTG Granted” For 
Rule 5:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource)= MD-Patient ∧  
ID (Subject) = BTG Requester (MD-Patient) ∧ Type (Action)= End BTG 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the End-BTG Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: End the BTG Situation of the resource 
Targeting Any Situation For 
Rule 6:  
IF Any Conditions  
Then Deny 
I .C .  Id e n tif y i n g  B T G  s itu a tio n s 
Each event type should have at least values describing one element of the system (Subject, 
Resource, Action and Environment). We have defined a set of ten types of events with ESPER. Events 
Types are: 
Table 6.11: Supported healthcare event types that the context manager can identifies. 
Event Type Event Description 
FevEvt Patient’s Fever, 
StatEvt Patient’s Status, 
PlsEvt Patient’s Pulse, 
PPosEvt Patient’s Position, 
OccEvt Room Occupancy, 
DrPosEvt Doctor’s Position, 
BtgRqEvt BTG Request, 
AlrmEvt Alarm Detection, 
AccRqEvt Access Request, 
SitEvt Situation Detection 
The instances of these event types are generated and structured in event streams using events 
simulator (sensors agents simulating physical sensors). The agents generate events from the mentioned 
types (Table 6.11) and keep trace inside text-like files. We exchange all events with the structure that 
we defined in Chapter 5, for example we store the event value of the following message in a file:  
senderID FeverSensor destID ContextManger EventType FevEvt PatientName Joe 
FevDegree 40 SensroID PCM2340 TimeStamp 130915221345 
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There are two examples of Complex Event types or patterns that aggregate events from the ten 
event-types mentioned earlier. In order for the complex event to be triggered, it should meet the 
conditions of a query that represents either a pattern, as the sliding window (Mozafari, Zeng, & 
Zaniolo, 2012), or a simple SQL-Like query:  
z CE1 – Patient In Danger: the Fever should be high, the status of the Patient is claiming and 
there is no one responsible near her/his.  
select *  –– it is the Patient in Danger SP, but also the EP of the Normal situation 
from  EventPatientFeverAlert.std:lastevent() as FevEvt, 
EventPatientStatusAlerts.std:lastevent() as StatEvt, 
EventPatientPlaceChange.std:lastevent() as PPosEvt, 
EventRoomOccupation.std:lastevent() as OccEvt  
where  FevEvt.patientID = PPosEvt.patientID and  
PPosEvt.patientID = StatEvt.patientID and  
PPosEvt.newRoomID = OccEvt.roomId and  
FevEvt.alertMessage = 'Dangerous' and  
OccEvt.presonsInside = '0' and  
StatEvt.newStatus = 'Claiming' 
z CE2 – Urgent need for a Doctor: The Context Manager should check the position of the 
doctor if not in the hospital. Thus, a threshold is assigned to the number of persons inside the 
room, e.g. zero. This threshold is triggered only if the patient is claiming and one of his 
sensors’ readings (fever or pulse) is set to high. Finally, this complex event is called whenever 
the patient is unconscious.  
Whenever one of the following (CE2) or the previous (CE1) compositions is detected, the 
Context Manager sends SP of the situation “Doctor Needed” (i.e., this ends the situation 
“Normal” of the patient automatically by the Situation Manager). 
select *  –– it is the Doctro-Needed SP, but also the EP of the Normal situation 
from  EventPatientFeverAlert.win:time(1 sec) as FevEvt 
EventPatientStatusAlerts.win:time(1 sec) as StatEvt, 
EventPatientPulseAlert.win:time(1 sec) as PlsEvt, 
EventPatientPlaceChange.win:time(1 sec) as PPosEvt, 
EventRoomOccupation.win:time(1 sec) as OccEvt,  
where   PPosEvt.patientID = StatEvt.patientID and  
StatEvt.patientID = PlsEvt.patientID and  
PlsEvt.patientID = FevEvt.patientID and  
PPosEvt.newRoomID = OccEvt.roomId and  
((PlsEvt.alertMessage = 'High' or FevEvt.alertMessage = 'High' and 
OccEvt.presonsInside = '0' and StatEvt.newStatus = 'Claiming')  
or StatEvt.newStatus = 'Unconscious') 
Whenever a BTG request is accepted by the PDP during the situation “Doctor Needed”, the 
BTG status of the patient medical record should be changed to the “BTG Granted” situation. If a 
doctor got accepted on his/her BTG request, the SCD policy obligates the BTG Manager to start the 
situation “BTG granted”. Thus, the BTG Manager fulfills the obligation by sending a simple event to 
the Context Manager (ordering the “BTG Granted” situation to start). The Context Manager generates 
the SP of “BTG Granted” and sends it to the Situation Manager (i.e., this ends the situation “Normal” 
of the patient’s MD). Likewise, whenever the doctor who requested the BTG finishes the treatment, 
(s)he can end the “BTG Granted” situation. The BTG Manager fulfills the SCD policy obligation by 
sending a simple event to the Context Manager (ordering the “BTG Granted” situation to end). The 
Context Manager generates the EP of “BTG Granted” and sends it to the Situation Manager (i.e., this 
starts the situation “Normal” of the patient’s MD again). 
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I .D .  S C D  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Based on our unified and adaptive architecture presented in the previous chapter, we implement 
the BTG SCD policy using this architecture and by implementing the following three types of PEP 
agent (see Figure 6.76).  
Figure 6.76: Technical implementation of the BTG prototype based on our framework 
We remind the global process we presented earlier, where phases are happening in a sequential 
manner ordered by numbers. The colors distinguish the type of processing. However, having the same 
number with different colors means that the processing is happening in parallel (for example, the step 
two in blue, yellow, and violet).  
First, all PEP agents publish their initiation message described earlier with their ID and 
functionality. The Master PEP and the Context Manager collect this information and build two lists 
holding all the management agents (i.e., the BTG Manager (PEP 2), the PI system (PEP 1) and all the 
events sensors: fever, pulse, etc.). 
I.D.1. Event Sensors 
Event sensors publish their readings of the defined events type to the technical events topic. We 
configured the sensors to generate events through an automated simulation process. PEP sensors create 
six streams to be generated with around 20 events in each. Approximately 120 events are from the 
following six types: Fever, Pulse, Status, Patient Position, Doctor Position and Room Occupancy.  
During the detection of events, the Context Manager composes events and listens to both access 
and BTG requests. Once CE1 (patient in danger) or CE2 (urgent need for a doctor) is detected, the 
Context Manager sends SP to the Situation Manger that a doctor is needed for the patient (Joe).  
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Through the management of situation process, the prototype identifies three scenarios based on 
the exchanged events: there is no situation concerning Joe, Joe is urgently needs a doctor and BTG 
granted on Joe’s PI. This is the final step concerning the situation management loop. The situation 
manager stores and manages all three situations in the database (i.e., “Normal”, “Doctor Needed” and 
“BTG Granted”). 
Supposing that software sensors has published readings in step 2 (the blue phase) concerning 
Joe’s health situation. Thus, through the violet phases, the context manager identifies the readings, 
identifies CE2, and forwards it as SP to the situation manager. The latter gets the SP and stores the 
corresponding situation: “Doctor Needed” to be used by the PDP. 
I.D.2. BTG Manager 
This PEP agent has the ID PEP 2. Its role is to receive BTG requests from doctors and forward 
them to the Master PEP. Upon any detection of an access or a BTG request, the Master PEP sends a 
standard XACML request to the PDP to check the SCD policy decision.  
Assuming that the sensors detected what are necessary to match CE1 or CE2, then Joe is now in 
Doctor Needed situation. Emma was available to treat Joe and she knows the policy rules. Joe is not 
her patient, so she knows her need for a specific authorization to engage with his treatment. Emma 
places a BTG request on PI of Joe to PEP 2.  
Upon the acceptance of Emma’s BTG request, the Master PEP sends an obligation to PEP 2 to 
start the BTG Granted situation on the MD of Joe. Thus, PEP 2 publishes a new context (stating the 
start of the BTG period) to the context manager (step 7, blue phase). The context manager forwards 
the new context to the situation manager about Joe’s MD. The situation manager changes the current 
MD situation to become “BTG Granted” (violet phase, step 4). 
Any ongoing BTG request ends through two ways: either the doctor ends the treatment of the 
patient or the doctor places a BTG end request. If the BTG end request was accepted or a relevant 
context detected (referring that Emma ended the treatment), the Master PEP obligates PEP 2 to end the 
BTG. Likewise, PEP 2 sends new context to the context manger (step 7, blue phase). The context 
manger forwards the new context that states the ending of BTG. The situation manager removes the 
BTG granted situation from Joe’s MD. 
I.D.3. PI System 
The PI system is responsible of publishing regular access requests, if any, to the Master PEP. 
For instance, any doctor can place an access request on his/her patients’ PI to PEP 1. 
Otherwise, and after accepting the BTG request of an available doctor (Emma) on the PI of Joe, 
the current situation of Joe’s MD should be BTG Granted. Emma has now BTG permission and can 
access PI of Joe. At the blue phase, step 2, Emma publishes a request to access through PEP 1. The 
yellow phase treats this request as explained from step 2 to 6. Then, the response gets back to PEP 1 
(to Emma). Then, PEP receives the decision (blue phase, step 6) and allows therefore Emma to view 
Joe’s PI.  
As for the identification of in danger situation by the violet phase, it is very similar to the 
“doctor needed” afterward. However, the differences is that Emma can, but not obligated, to request 
BTG on Joe’s MD to PEP 2. Thus, if Emma places in step 2 (blue phase) a view request to PEP 1, the 
yellow phase will return a permit decision from the Master PEP to PEP 1 (yellow phase, step 6). 
Emma can view directly Joe’s PI and at the same time, the BTG manager (PEP 2) receives obligation 
from the Master PEP (step 6, blue phase). This obligation is caused by Emma access request to PEP 1. 
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PEP 2 then sends SP of BTG Granted to the situation manager (step 7, blue phase). The situation 
manager changes Joe’s MD situation to BTG granted (step 4, violet phase). Likewise, the end of the 
BTG Granted situation is done either manually (Emma places an end request) or automatically (the 
treatment is finished). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st Scenario’s Conclusion 
Therefore, we proved that our approach enforces dynamic 
authorization by implementing “Break Glass” scenario. Moreover, we 
proved that our approach creates the small PREDYKOT loop by 
automating the management of the situations. We used the policy 
obligations to adaptably configure the situation manager and control 
situations, with human intervention (i.e., Emma requesting BTG on Joe’s 
MD during “Doctor Needed” situation) or without any human 
intervention (i.e., automatically change Joe’s MD situation to “BTG 
granted” during “patient in danger” situation).  
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II .  2 n d Scenario:  Workflow Management 
The scenario aims at ensuring that the security management of workflows respects the IAM 
business requirements inside virtual organizations (VOs). VOs are concerned about network and tool 
evolution that promotes collaborative work. Multipartite projects need to federate experts on different 
areas and information systems toward completing the common objective. Communications between 
distributed parties brings many security issues. Under certain circumstances, administrators have to 
unlock some of the security doors of parties’ information systems. During a past European project 
called VIVACE (Laborde, Kamel, Barrere, & Benzekri, 2007), the work had proposed to add an 
attribute describing the shared-documents status in order manage the dynamic authorization. Using 
situations, we generalize the proposed solution, which was dedicated to solve the specific use case.  
As shown in Figure 6.77, the workflow management scenario deals with security management 
in VOs and needs dynamic authorizations and configurations. We summarize it as follows: 
People from different aeronautical companies wish to collaborate in producing a 
technical specification document. Each organization has people with specific skills and 
software to complete specific tasks. The technical document has to be created by an 
analyzer, then designed and finally validated. This sequence of tasks is structured by a 
workflow, controlled by a conductor. The collaboration is formalized by a contract that 
states which company provides what kind of employees. Each company is responsible 
for managing its people and no constrains on who is doing the job. The contract also 
specifies access control policies on the shared documents. During design task, only 
people with designer role are permitted to access (read/write) the shared documents. 
The same for the analyzers and validator roles, they access only when their tasks starts. 
However, any VO members can read the results when all tasks are finished. A workflow 
engine (WFE) acts as a conductor. During the design task, the engine enables the set of 
rules that concerns the current document status and when it is completed, workflow 
engine disables them and enables another. Finally, when the process terminates, the 
engine informs participants and grant the “read permission” to all roles on the shared 
documents. 
 
Nevertheless, errors may produce during the production of the document. Therefore, the 
WFE should react to such exceptions. As during the design task, designers can signal 
error of analyzing. The WFE should return the document to the analysis phase. 
Likewise, during the validation task, any validator can signal analysis or design errors. 
Based on the error, the WFE should return the document to the responsible company, 
and consequently to the relevant phase. 
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Figure 6.77: Workflow management in the VO scenario for the VIVACE project 
I I .A .   M o d e lin g  W o r k flo w  M a n a g e m e n t S itu a tio n s  
We will demonstrate the state diagram of the VO Workflow Management scenario.  The state 
diagram with association to the workflow management policy is demonstrated in the Figure 6.78. 
During situation “await-analysis” there are two permissions for the employee of the Dutch company 
with an analyzer role: 1) view and edit the shared document, and 2) finalizing the analyzing task. 
During the “await-design” situation, the permissions for any designer working at the German 
company are: 1) view and edit the shared documents 2) Notify analyzing errors in the shared 
documents and email the WFE about them, and 3) Finalizing the design task. During the “await-
validation” situation, any validator at the French company can: 1) view and edit the shared documents, 
2) Notify analyzing and/or designing errors in the shared documents and email the WFE about them, 
3) Finalizing the validation task. Situation “Finish” permits all employees from the three companies to 
view the shard documents only. Finally, the function of finalizing the task could be any contact form 
(e.g., email) with the WFE in order to declare the end of the editing process. 
Figure 6.78: State diagram of the Workflow Management 
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I I .B .  R e p r e s e n tin g  S C D  P o lic y  
By considering these four situations, the policy expressing the dynamic authorization can be 
represented by the five rules below. Rules 1, 2 and 3 ensure that a user can access the shared 
document with read or write permission if his or her role matches the current situation of the shared 
document represented by its situation (i.e., if he or she is a designer during the await-design situation, 
if he or she is an analyzer during the await-analyzer situation, and if he or she is a validator during the 
await-validation situation). The fourth rule means that a user can access the shared document with 
read-only permission if he or she has the role any (designer, analyzer, or validator). That is, the rule is 
selected when the document’s situation is identified as finish. Finally, to manage conflicts, we declare 
a default sixth rule that denies all other access requests not relevant to the other seven previous rules. 
Based on the provided design of situations and their association with contexts and decisions, it 
is easer to express the XACML policy. However, the expression will follow the presented orientation 
structure with respect to the Figure 6.78:  
Policy Set: 
  Policy: 
Targeting Situation (Resource) = “Await-Design” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Role (Subject) = Designer & Company (Subject) = Germany &  
Name (Action) = Read / Edit / Finalize  
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Resource) = “Await-Analysis” For 
Rule 2:  
IF Role (Subject) = Analyzer & Company (Subject) = Netherlands &  
Name (Action) = Read / Edit / Finalize  
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Resource) = “Await-Validation” For 
Rule 3:  
IF Role (Subject) = Validator & Company (Subject) = France &  
Name (Action) = Read / Edit / Finalize  
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Resource) = “Finish” For 
Rule 4:  
IF Role (Subject) = Any & Name (Action) = Read  
Company (Subject) = Germany/Netherlands/France &  
Then Permit 
Targeting Any Situation For 
Rule 5:  
IF Any Conditions  
Then Deny 
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I I .C .  Id e n tif y i n g  W o r k f lo w  M a n a g e m e n t S i tu a tio n s 
We have implemented our Workflow Management to prove the concept of dynamic 
management of workflow using our situation-orientation approach. The ESPER engine will detect 
situations and monitor employees’ activities on the shared documents. The engine will react on 
situations by updating the values in database. We have defined a set of six types of events with 
ESPER. Events types are: 
Table 6.12: Supported VO event types that the context manager can identifies. 
Event Type Event Description 
DocStatEvt Document Status, 
AnlystActEvt Analyzer Activities, 
DsinrActEvt Designer Activities, 
VldtrActEvt Validator Activities, 
AccRqEvt Access Request, 
SitEvt Situation Detection 
There are two complex event types that aggregate events from the mentioned event types. In 
order for the complex event to be triggered, it should meet the conditions of specific Esper EPL.  
z CE1 – Analysis Errors: the participant event types to this complex event are analyzer, 
designer and validator activities. The CE1 is identified whenever the designer submits an 
analysis error (or more) on a shared document and that an analyzer receives back this shared-
document. Moreover, the CE1 is identified also whenever the validator submits an analysis 
error (or more) on a shared document and that an analyzer receives back this shared-
document. 
select *  –– it is the await-analysis SP, but also the EP of the current situation 
from  EventAnalyzerActivities.std:lastevent() as AnlystActEvt,  
EventDesignerActivities.std:lastevent() as DsinrActEvt, 
EventValidatorActivities.std:lastevent() as VldtrActEvt,  
where   (DsinrActEvt.activity = ‘SubmitAnalysisError’ and  
AnlystActEvt.activity = ‘RecivedDocumentWithErrors’ and 
DsinrActEvt.docID = AnlystActEvt.docID) or 
(VldtrActEvt.activity = ‘SubmitAnalysisError’ and  
AnlystActEvt.activity = ‘RecivedDocumentWithErrors’ and 
VldtrActEvt.docID = AnlystActEvt.docID) 
z CE2 – Design Errors: the participant event types to this complex event are designer and 
validator activities. The CE2 is identified whenever the validator submits a design error (or 
more) on a shared document and that a designer receives back this shared-document. 
select *  –– it is the await-design SP, but also the EP of the current situation 
from  EventDesignerActivities.std:lastevent() as DsinrActEvt, 
EventValidatorActivities.std:lastevent() as VldtrActEvt,  
where   VldtrActEvt.activity = ‘SubmitDesignError’ and  
DsinrActEvt.activity = ‘RecivedDocumentWithErrors’ and 
VldtrActEvt.docID = DsinrActEvt.docID 
Giving the events in Table 6.12 and the previous two complex events, we can define the SPs 
and EPs for each situation as following: 
 SP for the situation “Await-Analysis”:  
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o Whenever an analyzer is allowed to create a shared-document, the Master PEP 
should start this situation. (AccRqEvt) 
o Whenever the context manager identifies a CE1. 
 EP for situation “Await-Analysis” and SP for the situation “Await-Design”: 
o Whenever an analyzer requests finishing the analysis task. (AccRqEvt) 
o Whenever an analyzer labels the shared-document as finished (AnlystActEvt). 
o Whenever the context manager identifies a CE2. 
 EP for the situation “Await-Design” and SP for the situation “Await-Validation”: 
o Whenever a designer requests finishing the analysis task manually. (AccRqEvt) 
o Whenever a designer labels the shared-document as finished (DsinrActEvt). 
 EP for the situation “Await-Validation” and SP for the situation “Finish”: 
o Whenever a validator requests finishing the analysis task manually. (AccRqEvt) 
o Whenever a validator labels the shared-document as finished (VldtrActEvt). 
I I .D .  S C D  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Using our unified and adaptive architecture, the workflow management implementation passes 
by the same six parallel steps and during three phases: yellow, violet and blue (in addition to the initial 
phase and its steps). Likewise, we repeat the first initiation phase, as it is the same for all scenarios. 
However, this scenario has same essential agents that self-identify themselves to new agents: VO PEP 
in each country that controls the access to shared documents: Germany, France and Netherlands).  
Figure 6.79: Technical implementation of the Workflow Management prototype based on our framework 
VO PEP agents send, receive and enforce the access requests on the shared documents. Every 
VO PEP agent publishes an initiation message described earlier with an ID and functionality(ies). The 
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VO PEPs start publishing access requests, if any. For instance, a designer places an access request on a 
shared document to the VO PEP. 
The Context Manager composes events and listens to access requests going to the VO PEPs. 
Once the CE1 detected by the Context Manager, it forwards an SP to the Situation Manger stating that 
an analysis error is discovered on one of the shared documents. On the other hand, the detection of 
CE2 by the Context Manager results in forwarding an SP to the Situation Manager stating that a 
design error is discovered on one of the shared document. 
Analyzers, designers and validators can present an access request to the responsible VO PEP in 
their company in order to process shared documents. At the same time, the situation manager stores 
and manages all four situations in the database (i.e., “await-analysis” “await-design”, “await-
validation” and “Finish”). Through the management of situation process, the prototype identifies 
several possibilities:  
- Any created shared document is currently either in analysis, design or validation task. 
Thus, this shared-document’s situation is await-analysis, await-design, or await-validation. 
However, the transition from one to another is detected automatically by the Situation 
Manager (WFE) once the Context Manager identify that one of the roles finalize a task. 
For example, the analyzer requests finalizing the analysis on a shared document. Once the 
analyzer is permitted, the Context Manager detects the analyzer activity and sends SP for 
await-design, which is also EP for the await-analysis. 
- Any document in the await-design situation may be returned to the analysis task (i.e., after 
receiving CE1 from the Context Manager) and therefore becomes in await-analysis 
situation. 
- Any document in the await-validation situation may be returned to the analysis or the 
design tasks (i.e., after receiving the CE2) and therefore becomes in await-analysis or 
await-design situations. 
- Any document in the await-validation situation may be finalized by the validator and 
therefore becomes in the situation finish.  
Based on their subscription rules, the VO PEPs retrieve messages concerning authorizations. 
These smart nodes enforce them on the accesses requestor (to be an analyzer, designer or validator) by 
allowing or denying them to process shared-documents based on their situations. 
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2nd Scenario’s Conclusion 
This scenario illustrates yet another added value of our framework. 
Beside the features of the first scenario in managing dynamic 
authorization and configuring the situation manager, we presented a 
simple implementation for such complex scenario. We were able to 
easily and externally manage complex transition between situations 
without any complexity on the security policy. Furthermore, we keep the 
security policy dynamic in term of giving decisions oriented by these 
situations. Moreover, externalizing the complexity of situations design 
prevents having effects on the policy management and simple 
expression. That is, keeping the complexity of expressing the semantics 
inside the policy effects the policy management through modifying the 
policy rules. In addition, it removes the expression simplicity through 
expanding conditions to reach the expected semantics (see Chapter 4). 
In summary, we managed the workflow of tasks in parallel with the 
management of security. We use the outcome of tasks changing by 
orienting the security policy toward expected authorization decisions.  
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III .  3 r d Scenario:  Job Submission 
The management of energy consumption in order to reduce CO2 emission, costs, etc. is a 
management best-practices to optimize energy usage inside information systems. Managing security, 
while applying these practices, entails not only security requirements, but also obligations on energy 
usage. We consider applying our framework to such type of scenarios is a challenge. Succeeding this 
challenge is an added value and additional evidence of the generic nature of the thesis framework. 
We choose to manage security of the job submission process on grid-computing infrastructure 
as part of a cooperative project34. Indeed, we obligate the respect of energy management best practices 
during managing security. As a result of our choices, we need to manage authorizations through 
synchronized communications (outsourcing) and to manage configurations through asynchronized 
communications (provisioning). Therefore, we think this scenario is a good choice also to prove 
unification feature of our architecture. 
To prove the unity of our contribution, we defined this use case where we apply the proposed 
language and architecture. The scenario represents a sort of heterogeneity in requirements: security 
and energy. Expressing the SCD policy for both requirements reflect its flexibility and generic nature. 
Moreover, the scenario consists of highly dynamic environments where situations are complex and a 
matter of frequent changes. Handling these changes highlights the consideration of dynamicity in our 
architecture. On the other hand, applying different configurations (with considering authorizations) 
dynamically highlights its adaptive and unification natures. The use case is regarding access and 
energy management in grid computing, where only authorized users can submit jobs to the submission 
service to be launched on authorized servers during authorized time-slots and with respect to energy 
saving recommendations. Our scenario is the following: 
Authorized employees launch their jobs on authorized servers every day and night. 
Updating, migrating, and rebuilding the index of databases, the data warehouse 
statistics operations, and other heavy jobs are launched on several types of servers, 
during: daylight or nightshift periods. 
 
The job scheduler is an external service that receives, organizes and manages the 
submission and the execution process. In certain contexts, jobs are not authorized to 
start on specific servers. The security management system should be dynamic enough to 
identify and manage such contexts. For instance, in term of reducing energy 
consumption, a long-duration job XYZ with more than six hours of execution time will 
consume the servers during the daylight. This may affect the execution of other more 
important jobs. Hence, the job scheduler should check the possibility (e.g., priority) of 
postponing the launching of this job to the nightshift period (i.e., if the submitter 
accepts, if the job priority is low, etc.). 
 
Launching jobs at night consume less energy in most European countries. Therefore, 
the job scheduler verifies each time the possibility of postponing any job launching to 
the nightshift period.  
                                                
 
34 This project is initially proposed as part of a cooperative work between IRIT, France and DERI, Ireland. It is 
partially funded by EU ITEA2 under the project 10104 PREDYKOT and the Lion II project supported by 
Science Foundation Ireland under grant number SFI/08/CE1/I1380 Lion-2. 
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I I I .A .  M o d e lin g  th e  J o b  S u b m is s io n  S itu a tio n s  
Any keyword, i.e., has a significant appearance or importance, in the documents is recognized 
as a situation if it is possible to define conditions and circumstances (aggregation of phenomena) 
about a specific subject. This should declare the start time-slot of it. It has definitely an end of its 
duration by also conditions and circumstances (aggregation of phenomena). Therefore, we identify 
two situations from the scenario where the policy decision should be dynamic: “cheap” and 
“expensive” periods. The “cheap period” has significant importance and bounded with contexts that 
declare its start (SP) and its end (EP) (i.e., nightshift context starts at 8 pm and ends before 7 am). The 
“expensive period” is therefore the inverse context (i.e., dayshift starts at 7 am and ends before 8 pm). 
Based on these two situations, we will demonstrate the state diagram of the job submission 
management scenario. The state diagram with association to the job submission policy is demonstrated 
in the Figure 6.80. We can always identify one-and-one policy (i.e. expressed in XACML as a rule, a 
policy, a policy set) associated for each situation. Hence, during the situation “expensive period” all 
clients with the role employee are allowed to submit jobs. However, the submitted jobs during the day 
context are only launched if they meet the following configurations: 1) jobs must have high or normal 
priority 2) in term of performance, jobs must be with modern or light size of tasks and processes, and 
3) jobs must have short or modern duration for their estimated execution time. Otherwise, if none of 
these configurations are met, the job is submitted also but the execution is postponed to the night (i.e., 
night-launching-possibility context). 
Now, the situation “cheap period” permits clients with role employee to submit jobs without 
any constraints on their configurations. Thus, any submitted job is allowed for launching directly.  
Figure 6.80: State diagram of the Job Submission in grid-computing environment 
  
Rules: 
- Allow to submit any job
- Launch any submitted job
Rules: 
- Allow employees to submit all jobs
- Launch submitted jobs with day context
- Postpone submitted jobs with night-
launching-possiblity context
Cheap Period
Dayshift contexts
Nightshift contexts
Expensive Period
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I I I .B .  R e p r e s e n tin g  S C D  P o lic y  
By considering these two situations, the policy expressing the dynamic authorization and 
management of the submission process can be represented by the four rules below. The rules 1, 2 and 
3 ensure that clients (authorized employees) can submit jobs on servers during day and night. 
However, the first rule entails that clients’ jobs are launch during daylight if their jobs respect certain 
contexts (i.e., job has normal/high priority, light/moderate size and short/moderate execution 
duration). Otherwise, the second rule postpones this job to be launched at night (i.e., at the beginning 
of the nightshift duration, for instance, at 8 pm). The third rule entails that clients’ jobs are launched 
during nightshift within any context. Finally, to manage conflicts, we declare a default fourth rule that 
denies all other submission requests not relevant to the previous three rules. 
Based on the provided design of situations and their association with contexts and decisions, it 
is easier to express the XACML policy. However, the expression will follow the presented orientation 
structure with respect to the Figure 6.80:  
Policy Set: 
  Policy: 
Targeting Situation (Environment) = “Expensive” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Role (Subject) = Employee & Type (Resource) = Job & Type (Action)= Submit 
 Size (Job) = Light/ Moderate & Priority (Job)= Normal / High & 
 Duration (Job)= Short / Moderate 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Job-Launcher Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Launch the job at (the specified time in the submission request) 
 
Targeting Situation (Environment) = “Expensive” For 
Rule 2:  
IF Role (Subject) = Employee & Type (Resource) = Job & Type (Action)= Submit 
 Size (Job) = Heavy & Priority (Job)= Law & Duration (Job)= Long 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Job-Launcher Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Launch the job at the nightshift SP 
 
Targeting Situation (Environement) = “Cheap” For 
Rule 3:  
IF Role (Subject) = Employee & Type (Resource) = Job & Type (Action)= Submit 
 Size (Job) = Any & Priority (Job)= Any & Duration (Job)= Any 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Job-Launcher Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Launch the job at (the specified time in the submission request) 
 
Targeting Any Situation For 
Rule 4:  
IF Any Conditions  
Then Deny 
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I I I .C .  Id e n tif y i n g  th e  J o b  S u b m is s i o n  S itu a tio n s 
We have implemented our job submission to use our framework in managing the security of a 
pure management-oriented (configuration-oriented) scenario. The ESPER engine should detect 
situations and monitor clients’ submissions to the Master PEP (i.e., it is role is also a job scheduler as 
it analyze jobs and plans new timing for jobs). The engine reacts on situations by updating the values 
in database. We have defined a set of four types of events with ESPER (Table 6.13). 
Table 6.13: Supported grid-computing event types that the context manager can identifies. 
Event Type Event Description 
TDEvt Time & Date Readings, 
SubRqEvt Submission Requests, 
LaunchActEvt Launching Activities, 
SitEvt Situation Detection 
We want to stress in this final scenario that the situation gives semantics. The context to be at 
day or at night is not what gives the meaning of paying less or more. It is 1) choosing the right 
expression from the requirements “cheap” and “expensive”, 2) defining what causes the identification 
of cheap and expensive energy usage costs in each country (finding the surrounding contexts of EPs 
and SPs), 3) correctly represent and use the meaning of cheap and expensive inside the SCD policy to 
group rules, and finally efficiently apply this meaningful-contained SCD policy using PEP agents. 
Therefore, at each of the three scenarios, we used four sections match these four steps. 
There are two complex event types that aggregate events from the mentioned event types. In 
order for the complex event to be triggered, it should meet the conditions of specific Esper EPL.  
CE1 – Beginning of the “Expensive Period”: this complex event should contain all contexts 
that cause the cheap period to start. For simplicity, we have chosen only the dayshift context. 
The dayshift context is defined by the first working hour (i.e., as it depends the country, we 
consider in this scenario 7:00 am is the first hour of the day). However, one can imagine other 
contexts to identify the cheap period. Thus, the CE1 and the next CE2 are flexible in term of 
defining their queries. 
select *  –– it is the expensive SP, but also the cheap EP as well 
from   TimeDate_Events.std:lastevent() as TDEvt,  
where   TDEvt.roundFloor('hour') == '7' and TDEvt.roundFloor('min') == '00' 
CE2 – Beginning of the “Cheap Period”: this complex event should contain all contexts that 
cause the cheap period to start. For simplicity, we have chosen only the nightshift context. The 
nightshift context is defined by the first non-working hour (i.e., as it depends the country, we 
consider in this scenario 8:00 pm is the first hour of the night).   
select *  –– it is the cheap SP, but also the expensive EP as well 
from   TimeDate_Events.std:lastevent() as TDEvt,  
where   TDEvt.roundFloor('hour') == '20' and TDEvt.roundFloor('min') == '00' 
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I I I .D .  S C D  A r c h ite c tu r e  
Using our unified and adaptive architecture, we are able to implement the management of the 
job submission through passing by seven parallel steps and during three phases: yellow, violet and 
blue (in addition to the initial phase and its steps). 
In Figure 6.81, there are several agents that we need to implement as PEPs and to integrate in 
our presented unified and adaptive architecture. The first agent is the executer. It executes jobs on 
available servers of the gird-computing infrastructure. These configurations express obligations to be 
respected while launching in term of time, allocated resources, etc. The second type of agent is the 
client PEP agent. Agent of this type sends submission request with their jobs details in order to get 
their jobs executed. The third type of PEP agent is sensor agent. The sensors collect information, for 
instance, about the current time and date, if the job execution is finished so results will be send to the 
corresponding client who submitted the job35.  
Figure 6.81: Technical implementation of the job submission prototype based on our framework 
All the three types of PEP agent publish their initiation message described earlier with their ID 
and functionality(ies). The Master PEP and the Context Manager collect this information and build 
two lists holding all the management agents. 
  
                                                
 
35 We also use sensors for other objectives as well such as collecting information about the grid-computing 
servers status (overloaded, etc.). However, for the simplicity of the scenario, we were limited on stating only 
what proves the concept of the architecture generic nature. 
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III.D.1. Event Sensors 
After the event sensors start publishing their readings, the Context Manager identifies complex 
events by composing events and listening to submission requests. Once the CE1 or CE2 detected by 
the Context Manager, it forwards an SP to the Situation Manger stating that the expensive or the 
cheaper period has started. The situation manager stores and manages all two situations in the 
database. 
Moreover, event sensors monitor the execution process of each job. They play the bridge 
between the Context Manager and the client once an authorization decision of launching the job is 
given. 
III.D.2. Job Submission Clients 
Users submit their job through PEP Clients, which generate submission requests and publish 
them to the Master PEP. For instance, a user wants to submit a job for execution during the dayshift 
context with certain settings (e.g., high priority). Thus, if the current situation is expensive period, the 
Master PEP allows the submission. However, if the job meets the night-launching-possibility context, 
the Master PEP obligates the executer to launch the job during the nightshift context. The clients only 
receive only the authorization decision of approving or denying the submission. 
III.D.3. Job Executer 
The executer PEP receives jobs from the Master PEP. It executes these jobs if there is no 
postpone obligation. Otherwise, it creates a timer for postponed jobs. Once the timer informs the 
starting of the nightshift context, the executer launches the postponed jobs. 
After the executer finishes executing the job, it sends the results to the specified destination 
inside the job settings. The client who submitted the job is notified by email. 
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3rd scenario’s Conclusion: 
We assume that implementing this scenario provides a good 
contribution to the energy management in terms of security management 
and power consumption saving. In term of expression, our contribution 
does not address rules management (i.e., add, modify and remove, when 
situations change). As we saw, a good system analysis avoids rewrite or 
modify the policy, and therefore keep it stable. This stable policy is 
enforced in a dynamic architecture. Based on this architecture, 
evaluating the rules provide dynamic management decisions that ensure 
security and save energy. By implementing this architecture, we 
demonstrated how it is possible and simple to provide dynamic 
authorization and configure energy saving obligations with very simple 
policy.  
Briefly, we presented a security and energy management solution, 
particularly considering grid computing. We observed and evaluated 
how the impact of the system’s application comes out with more energy 
saving and high performance. The scenario implementation does control 
the submission process and the usage of energy resources. As a result, 
we used our framework to solve a pure management-oriented scenario 
and that requires essentially configurations to ensure the management of 
security. 
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IV.  Framework Evaluation 
This thesis was part of a European project, where the main objective was to propose a proof of 
concept regarding a dynamic authorization architecture supporting the move from one configuration to 
another when events occur. Therefore, we focus on the use case studied in Chapter 6 that intend to 
demonstrate the methodology of expressing and implementing our framework. Through the first 
scenario, we successfully managed to test the performance of our framework regarding its essential 
propositions by calculating the average, minimum and maximum time to: 1) situation identification 
and storage, 2) providing an authorization decision (deny or permit), and 3) applying an obligation 
from the PDP by the Master PEP that requires additional bundles.  
To realize these tests, we used a MacBook Pro laptop configured with 2.4 GHz, core i5 
processor and 8 Gb of RAM. We ran the performance testing on top of a virtual machine using Ubuntu 
Linux operating system (version 10). This VM is configured with 3 Gb of RAM and using 80+ of the 
execution capacity of the actual machine. We evaluated this test using the running sample data 
included inside an Excel file (see the Appendix). As a result of this evaluation, we calculated the 
average processing time of each one of the three calculation points, the minimum processing time 
registered and the maximum one. The total average time to process each point is approximately 427 
milliseconds. 
We explain our test scenarios for each evaluation point based on the following policy: 
XACML Policy: 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “Normal” For 
Rule 1:  
IF Type (Resource) = MD-Patient ∧ Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧  
Type (Action)= Access∧ ID (Subject) ∈ PRPL (Resource) 
Then Permit 
Targeting Situation (Patient) = “Doctor Needed” For 
Rule 2:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource) = MD-Patient ∧  
Type (Action)= BTG Request 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Start-BTG Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Start the BTG Situation of the resource 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “BTG Granted” For 
Rule 3:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource)= MD-Patient ∧  
ID (Subject) = BTG Requester (MD-Patient) ∧ Type (Action)= view 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the Logging Access Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: Start logging activities of the relevant doctor 
Targeting Situation (MD-Patient) = “BTG Granted” For 
Rule 4:  
IF Role (Subject) = Doctor ∧ Type (Resource)= MD-Patient ∧  
ID (Subject) = BTG Requester (MD-Patient) ∧ Type (Action)= End BTG 
Then Permit 
Take Advice: Find the End-BTG Bundle at the following (file path) 
Apply Obligation: End the BTG Situation of the resource 
Targeting Any Situation For 
Rule 5:  
IF Any Conditions  
Then Deny 
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 At the first point, we want to test the performance of our architecture through handling 
requests concerning the provided policy. Therefore, we choose to test the response time for 200 
requests by evaluating two rules: 1 and 5. Matching rule 1 conditions gives the “Permit” permission. 
However, we intentionally reach the rule 5 matching by providing contradict values with rule 1 to get 
the “Deny” permission. Thus, we evaluate the response of our architecture for both types. 
Table 6.14: Performance testing of the authorizations queries (200 Sequence) 
Authorization Type Average Minimum Maximum 
Rule 1: Permit Permission 0.462 0.101 1.866 
Rule 5: Deny Permission 0.387 0.100 0.980 
 
 
Figure 6.82: Rule 1: Testing 200 requests with Permit permission 
 
Figure 6.83: Rule 5: Testing 200 requests with Deny permission 
At the second point, we want to test the performance of our configuration mechanism. As a 
recall, our configuration process inside the Master PEP passes by four steps: 1) Retrieving the PDP 
decision, 2) extracting the obligation part from the decision, 3) verifying if the requested service is 
supported by the Master PEP, 4) finally locating the corresponding bundle to use. The final step is the 
most interesting step to test in order to calculate the necessary time to apply configurations. The step 
four has two cases: either the required bundle exists already, then the Master PEP should only install 
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the bundle and apply it, otherwise the required bundle does not exist locally and the Master PEP 
should download the bundle to the local repository, then install and apply the bundle. We tested this 
operation to evaluate the performance with sequence of 50 times. We have for the BTG scenario three 
bundles. So, we applied this test on each one (BTG-Start, BTG-End, and Logging Access). We 
explained earlier in the thesis the functionality of each one. 
 
Figure 6.84: BTG-End Bundle: Ready to apply 
 
Figure 6.85: BTG-Start Bundle: Ready to apply 
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Figure 6.86: Logging Bundle: Ready to apply 
 
Figure 6.87: Logging Bundle: Download & Apply 
Figure 6.88: BTG-End Bundle: Download & Apply 
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By evaluating the presented figures, we can calculate the average, minimum and maximum 
processing time (in milliseconds) required to use each bundle (i.e., through both cases). 
Table 6.15: Performance testing of the configuration mechanism (50 Sequence) 
Configuration  Average Minimum Maximum 
Name Application Method       
Logging Access Install 0.059 0.034 0.153 
Download & Install 0.408 0.321 0.702 
BTG Start Install 0.133 0.044 0.426 
Download & Install 0.878 0.506 1.202 
BTG End Install 0.085 0.044 0.204 
Download & Install 0.906 0.630 1.441 
At the third and final point, we want to calculate the beginning of situations and the necessary 
time needed to process their outbreak (storing the situation in order to be used by the PDP decisions). 
Thus, we calculate the main event participating in creating the necessary context to start a situation 
(BTG-Granted, Normal, and Doctor-Needed). In our scenario, we have two points to calculate these 
contexts.  
 
Figure 6.89: Performance control points to measure the processing time for obligations going to the SM 
 
Figure 6.90: Situation: BTG Granted 
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Figure 6.91: Situation: Normal 
The previous two situations are associated with bundles. The PDP obligates the change of the 
current situation through the bundles BTG Start and End. However, the last situation is identified 
using our Esper simulating sensors. Thus, we find the last raw event from sensors participating in 
creating a complex event (context) that causes the starting of the doctor-needed situation. 
Table 6.16: Performance testing of the situation identification (50 Sequence) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.92: Performance control points to measure the identification time of situations 
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Figure 6.93: Situation: Doctor Needed 
We can provide an extract of the test to demonstrate the sequential relationship of the previous 
figure. The following sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between different agents in order to 
identify the situation and calculate the time needed to be ready for the consumption by the decision-
making point. 
Figure 6.94: Sequence diagram showing the measurement of complex events detection and the start of new situations  
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In terms of the volumetry, we will mention two work efforts demonstrating the capacity and 
the scalability of the CEP environment we are using (Esper) for processing and handling events. 
During the Lion II Project in DERI-DGSIT, we tested event processing and semantics association of 
the third scenario during 2012/2013 in Ireland. We used a MacBook pro Core i7 2.2 Ghz and 8 Gb 
RAM. We installed ActiveMQ on an external server and the platform was able to manage more than 
23 476 events stored inside the different topics. The events were generated from more than 20 sensors 
distributed and 5 controllers (raw events gathering points from these sensors). 
Nevertheless, this work was unfortunately not published yet. Therefore, we make reference to 
published work implemented to the same project for measuring events processing time. Our listener 
clients (publisher/subscriber) were able to process 70 to 90 events per minute (Mehdi et al., 2013). 
Through the same platform that we used to perform the third scenario for exchanging complex events, 
the work of (Hasan & Curry, 2015) presented the ability of handling 48,000 different subscriptions. 
In an internal confidential document made Nextel from Spain (one of the PREDYKOT 
partners), Nextel made performance testing of Esper capability on CPU: Intel Core 2 Duo T6670 2.20 
Ghz, Memory: 4GB (3GB usable), Operating system Windows 7 Professional (32 bit), JVM Version: 
1.6.20 with the following configuration: -Xms512m -Xmx1536m, and the Esper version is 3.4. Tests 
conducted launch up to 2 million events of the same type on one thread and creating two sliding 
windows in parallel. The treatment took 3.6 seconds. We took their permission to mention their 
registering of the ability of Esper to manage more than 500,000 events per second (FASYS36, 
"Performance Testing", Chapter 8.10, 2010). 
Now, our main objective of performing the performance testing was to demonstrate the 
feasibility of our framework. For standalone PC with mentioned configurations, a doctor would have a 
semi-instantaneous37 response (around half of second) for his authorization or configuration request. 
Feasibly, getting this result for all elements running on one machine is considered sufficiently fast 
(i.e., the VM configuration is shared with all the following elements: Situation Manager, Context 
Manager, PDP, PIP, PEPs, Master PEP, Sensors, and the ActiveMQ Bus).  
We noticed a test design similar to ours that performs performance testing on the generic AAA 
architecture (Messoud et al., 2004). It is then possible to compare their results with ours as a way to 
evaluate our testing approach and outcome. At this work, there have been several test scenarios for 
measuring the response time. The closest one was by launching 200 requests with time results in the 
range between 300 milliseconds and 700 milliseconds.  
Moreover, in a more complex and realistic scenario, MasterCard declared processing more 
than 160 million transactions per hour. Performance testing returned an average network response time 
of 130 milliseconds. An authorization request is measured from its processing start-time until it gets to 
the merchant. The authorization decision is provided in seconds (average more than one second).38 
Therefore, we believe that our results are promising and interesting. However, we still need to 
evaluate whether these results are interesting particularly in other domain of healthcare where this 
scenario should be deployed. So, we first calculated the Standard Deviation (i.e., the mean of the 
                                                
 
36  The FASYS Spanish project is an abbreviation for FABRICA ABSOLUTAMENTE SEGURA Y 
SALUDABLE (ABSOLUTELY HEALTHY AND SAFE MANUFACTURING) 
37 "The basic advice regarding response times has been about the same for thirty years (Miller 1968; Card et al. 
1991) that 0.1 second is about the limit for having the user feel that the system is reacting instantaneously, 
meaning that no special feedback is necessary except to display the result." 
38 http://blog.unibulmerchantservices.com/tag/transaction-authorization/ 
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mean) in order to study the feasibility of these calculations and the Standard Error to measure its 
degree of correctness. 
From Table 6.17, we can interpret and conclude the performance testing results through these 
two concepts: standard deviation (STD) and error (STE). One can see that the more our measurements 
are spread apart, the more the STD and the STE are relatively large. Ideally, the more the value is 
small, the more the test is accurate, and the value 0 of both concepts reflects having the exact response 
time.  
Table 6.17: Clarifying the standard deviation and error of the measurements 
Performance testing of the situation identification (50 Sequence) 
Situation Name STD Deviation STD Error 
Normal 0.0723 0.0102 
Doctor Needed 0.0134 0.0019 
BTG-Granted 0.0340 0.0048 
Performance testing of the authorizations queries (200 Sequence) 
Authorization Type STD Deviation STD Error 
Rule A: Permit Permission 0.2362 0.0167 
Rule A: Deny Permission 0.1532 0.0108 
Performance testing of the configuration mechanism (50 Sequence) 
Configuration STD Deviation STD Error 
Name Application Method 
  
Logging Access Install 0.0273 0.0039 
Download & Install 0.0721 0.0102 
BTG Start Install 0.0949 0.0134 
Download & Install 0.1365 0.0193 
BTG End Install 0.0421 0.0060 
Download & Install 0.1209 0.0171 
 
There are several international and national laws that have been proposed for protecting the 
patients information such as: Helsinki declaration (Helsinki, 1964), the act of privacy (Privacy Act, 
1974), the act of HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability) (HIPPA, 1996) and the act 
of patient rights and healthcare systems quality in France (Loi 2003‐303, 2003). HIPPA is one of the 
most repudiated organizations for healthcare systems. Thus, we went searching for similar researches 
respecting HIPAA in order to compare the response time of their requests. 
The work on optimizing the authorization policy framework (Mohan & Blough, 2010) 
measured the response time for authorization requests. It registered 0.5 second for 8 rules of an 
XACML policy handling one of the healthcare motivating scenarios. Therefore, our performance 
testing results is promising and not far from reality. Hence, this encourages the use of our framework 
to explore more scenarios with realistic data within industrial environments. 
As a conclusion, the assessment of our SCD architecture examines the use case held under the 
PREDYKOT project. In this use case, we considered the need to provide access to health data on a 
patient in a critical situation. (For example, an emergency physician who by nature is not the 
responsible doctor needs to perform anesthesia and therefore needs to know any allergies that a patient 
may develop). We called such situation "Break The Glass" (BTG), where an access to data decision 
must be made usually by overstepping the rules.  
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The performance testing results presented earlier are summarized as the following: 
1) We measured the mean time, the minimum time and maximum time elapsed for a 
response (i.e. positive or negative decision after a request for access to a resource). To 
do this we have launched 200 times the performance measurement of the same query 
toward an authorization server. 
2) In this use case we also measured the time taken between an application of PEP and the 
implementation of a decision including an obligation. This allows us to measure the 
time taken by a PEP extension to download, install and use an implemented service in a 
bundle. 
3) Calculating the time that elapses between an event correlation (defining the beginning 
of a situation) and whenever the situation is created and stored in the basic situations. 
We demonstrated that these results are encouraging. Now, we are aware that these results were 
not obtained in the context of a real system and thus a commit in a more complex context is necessary. 
However, the objective of the project was to provide PREDYKOT a proof of concept without going 
further in the TRL levels. 
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Chapter’s Conclusion 
We have presented in this chapter three distinctive scenarios. For each scenario, we use after the 
scenario specification the same methodology: 
1. Modeling relevant situations 
2. Representing the SCD policy 
3. Identifying relevant situations 
4. Applying the SCD architecture 
As a result, we can argument that our framework and its methodology are with generic nature. 
Through this thesis manuscript, we intentionally used a trivial example to concentrate on explaining 
the research, the technologies, the findings, and the results of our thesis work. However, we see this 
chapter as a proof of concept for our “generic nature” claiming.  
The first scenario is usually includes extreme situations that defines healthcare emergencies in a 
form of exceptions. Such critical situations change rapidly and interfere with the patients’ life, are 
difficult to manage and cause often some policy modifications. We overcome the modification of the 
policy with our SCD policy. Moreover, we overcome the highly dynamic of situations changing with 
our engineering methodology and its steps of analyzing, designing, and expressing these situations. As 
a result, we put the effort on the engineering step, and we obtain simpler use of our solution 
afterwards. The second scenario usually requires implementing a management mechanism to calculate 
the status of the documents and manages each update on this status. Our new implementation in this 
thesis reduced the complexity and integrated the need of implementing the WFE engine (i.e., the 
situation manager fulfill the role). At the end, we delivered the same expected results of providing 
dynamic authorization for collaborative work inside the virtual organizations. The third scenario is an 
obligation-oriented scenario. This scenario is usually implemented using energy management solution 
that uses obligation policy. Thus, we were able to simply implement a job submission solution that 
manages energy and security using obligations. 
Finally, we find with all our demonstrations that the relationship between the policy, situations, 
contexts, and decisions is clear (see Figure 6.95). Through the three scenarios, we noticed how each 
time the context identifies the happening (beginning and ending) of situations, the situations give 
meaning to the detected context, the situations give meaning to the use of rules and group several 
rules, using situations orients the policy to give the corresponding decisions to the detected context, 
and finally the decisions change the context to stay always with conformity to the security 
management requirements (i.e., changes that may implies changing the situations as we saw in the 
BTG scenario). We evaluated this scenario at the end of this chapter with encouraging test results.  
Figure 6.95: SCD Policy Lifecycle 
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General	Conclusion	
“I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the 
conclusion is false. The hundredth time I am right.” 
Albert Einstein 
Quote number 40559  
 Retrieved June 19, 2015, from Quotes.net 
Security management aims at ensuring that business requirements are always respected inside 
each element of the managed environment. Security management is conceptualized using two sides: 
downward (security governance task) and upward (security supervision task). We demonstrated at the 
beginning of this thesis the crucial need for connecting both sides together using intelligence (i.e., 
analyzing monitored data). Our thesis work proposed an implementation of this automatic connection 
through the previous chapters (Figure 7.96), in which ours is one of several implementations proposed 
as part of PREDYKOT project. 
We have connected the upward and the downward together using the notion of situations. 
Hence, through the two earlier chapters, our objective was to demonstrate how to identify these 
situations, how to consider situations inside the policy (i.e., our Situation-Context-Decision policy), 
and how to apply and implement this situation-oriented policy. 
Figure 7.96: Linking our contribution chapters with our security management framework 
The expression of our SCD policy requires two edition processes. The first edition process 
interacts with the policy-based management paradigm in aim of writing the high-level policy (the box 
in blue). The second edition process aims at extracting the relevant situations to model them based on 
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the security specifications (the box in mauve). Thus, we use the recognized situations with the created 
model in order to express SCD policy rules (the yellow arrow).  
We used the event-driven architecture and implemented three types of agents: sensors, 
actuators and smart nodes. Using the three of them together, we implemented a new agent that we 
called Master PEP. We used the bus in order to converge different message exchanges and different 
agents together with respect to the interest of each agent (i.e., through using topic-based approach). 
Finally, we proved the generic nature of our architecture by presenting three different scenarios in the 
following domains: healthcare, virtual organizations, and energy management. 
I .  Research Questions 
At the beginning of this dissertation, we anticipated three interesting points to question about 
(i.e., concerning accepting the situation term as a feedback). As we did not answered them yet, we 
state at the following each question and its answer: 
RQ 4: “First point to question comes at the connection between the behavior feedback and the 
specified requirements. Studies hold variety of policy expression languages and models. 
The question is therefore how to unify all existing policy expressions in one solution that 
represents the behavior feedback and the heterogeneous requirements?” 
We argued in chapter 2 & 3 the existing of several languages to express the security 
management policy: obligation policy (through ECA rules structure) and authorization policy 
(through CA rules structure). We demonstrated in the same chapters that the management community 
is interested on monitoring the behavior changes through events in order to provide obligations (as a 
high-level description) and translate them to technical configurations. However, the security 
community is interested in observing only access requests (among the behavior changes) in order to 
respond by applying authorizations. 
In Chapter 4, we confirmed through a simple example the complexity of using ECA or CA to 
express the policy that considers the behavior changes. Moreover, we confirmed that decisions should 
not be obligation-oriented or authorization-oriented only for the security management policy. 
Therefore, we proposed the Situation-Context-Decision structure to express the behavior feedback 
and the heterogeneous (management and security) requirements: 
When  Situation  
And  Context  
Then  Decision 
RQ 5:  “The reasoning box is the innovation point that represents the observing of behavior 
changes and sends them as a meaningful feedback. Therefore, the question is how to 
express such a meaningful feedback and how to manage the lifecycle of the policy? Does 
the feedback representation help bringing closer the expression of the high-level 
requirements with the low-level policy rules? Why reacting on raw or simple events is not 
enough anymore as a feedback?” 
We proposed in Chapter 4 to express the behavior feedback using the term situation. We 
presented how this term brings two features that the event notion fails to fulfill: semantics and 
abstraction. We demonstrated that the semantics side of situation is to bring meaningful feedback 
about the behavior and not only technical readings. The definition of these situations is extracted 
directly from the security requirements specification. Therefore, it is usage created a link between the 
SCD policy and the security requirements.  
As a result, we defined our management of the policy lifecycle through a new engineering 
methodology. We start by analyzing the security requirements specifications to extract situations. We 
model these situations with their permissions and configurations. We translate this model into a policy 
 — 174 — 
expressed using the SCD structure. This process should be done once at the beginning of designing 
the security management system. There is no need to change the policy unless there is a change 
request on the security requirements. 
RQ 6:  “Current infrastructures are heterogeneous and incompatible with each other. Therefore, 
the enforcement of policy decisions once taken should be adaptably enforced to overcome 
such heterogeneity. So, the third point is what enforcement architecture could apply both 
authorization and configuration decisions into any technical environment?” 
To meet the security management definition, we needed to express using our SCD policy both 
the obligations with management-oriented objectives and the authorizations with security-oriented 
objectives. However, there is no implementation for our SCD policy that accepts both decisions 
possibilities: authorizations and configurations. Therefore, we implemented a unified architecture that 
combines both policy control models (outsourcing and provisioning) in order to permit the application 
of authorization and configuration decisions. Moreover, we upgraded our architecture with 
adaptability features in order to accept new changes faces the infrastructure technological advances. 
II .  Future Work 
We provide future directions for which this thesis could be considered as the foundation stone 
on unified and dynamic authorization based environments. We stress on our presented thesis as a 
work that should be continued. At the following, we present some of the future works that should 
imperatively be pursued on two points of view: specification and architectural. 
I I .A .  S e c u r ity  M a n a g e m e n t S p e c ific a tio n  
Obviously, situation is the heart of our contribution on the security management. In chapter 2 
& 4, we presented the efforts carried on the notion of context-aware in different domains such as 
ubiquity and mobility. In addition to our thesis work, these efforts were concentrating on recognizing, 
identifying, calculating, and other complex operations in order to find the contexts and situations. 
What we did not sufficiently discussed in this thesis work is the trust.  
We believe our identification process of contexts and situations is pertinent, but how do we 
put confidence that the identified events, contexts and situations are trustworthiness. Thus, there 
should be a future work that adds sort of metadata to our specification process of the situation-
oriented policy. For instance, we recognize these metadata and then use them as the following: 
1) In SIEM tools, OSSIM (Alien Vault) has a risk measurement process in order to 
calculate an indicator that helps evaluating the collected information. Thus, the risk 
measures help prioritizing and classifying security events and incidents using a 
scoring process. The risk measures are calculated using the following formula: 
Risk= (asset  * reliability * priority / 25) (AlienVault Users Manual V 1.0, 2011) 
2) In XACML profiles and language structure, there is a main step to verify the 
information we insert in side each attribute through defining an authorized source of 
attribute. Thus, at each collecting of contextual information, the policy recommends 
the specification of the issuer of attributes. If the issuer is an authorized source, then 
we trust the information provided. (XACML V 3.0, 22 Jan 2013) 
3) Through a French ANR project called INCOME (Arcangeli et al., 2012), there were 
several efforts on defining and measuring the quality of context (QoC). To measure 
the quality, INCOME project refers to the several indications (meta-data) to provide 
the calculation such as up-to-dateness, accuracy, completeness, associated to context 
information. An interesting ongoing work to consider has generalized the QoC 
concept (Marie et al., 2015). 
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We seek in a future work to integrate the work of these three axes to identify the context that 
marks the SPs and the EPs of situations. Thus, we want to verify the level of trustworthiness we put in 
assuring the veracity of situations. 
Moreover, advanced technologies are seeking to reach prediction in all security applications. 
There are many research domains interested in such feature such as multi-agent systems, machine 
learning, expert systems, and essentially pervasive computing (or ubiquitous computing). A future 
effort should be on finding whether predictions introduce an added value to our framework, keeping 
or logging history of previous situations is necessary, and the evolution of degraded situations.  
Finally, we proposed through this thesis work one methodology in which it contains one step 
of modeling situations of the security specification. However, we believe that the research effort spent 
on extracting situations from the specifications is not sufficient. We need a mechanism of analyzing 
the specifications, recognizing relevant abstraction and semantics, and defining situations to be 
modelized. Thus, we need one step of specification analysis for the necessary orienting situations. The 
specification analysis must resolve any situations conflict. Moreover, we expect the analysis 
mechanism to recognize the situations hierarchies (similar to roles hierarchies). For example, the 
situation X has the permissions {p1, p2}. An exception (of the situation X) belongs to the same 
hierarchy would be therefore the delta (the difference of permissions) {p3, p4, p5}. As a result, we 
expect of this future work to simplify the specification of the situation-oriented policy.  
I I .B .  S e c u r ity  M a n a g e m e n t A r c h ite c tu r e  
In our thesis work, our framework implementation is based on a management architecture 
solution that follows the policy-based management paradigm. We have chosen the one-to-many 
relationship (presented in Chapter 3) because it respects general policy-based management through its 
classical centralized architecture. We mentioned in Chapter 3 the existing of two other types: many-
to-one and many-to-many. Many-to-one is when the management architecture aims at distributing 
policies as configurations to one PDP from several PDP sources. The many-to-many is when the 
management architecture aims at having communications between PDPs. However, both relationships 
need the implementation of many PDPs.  
Therefore, our future work on the architecture side should consider implementing an 
environment that permits a more intelligent way of communication between not only the PDPs, but 
also all our SCD architecture agents. We did use an event-based architecture that is famous with the 
decoupling feature of its terminals. Using the Bus, we can ensure the multiple communications 
between agents. However, we need more intelligence of our agent in order to build discussions 
between each other (i.e., socialize). The functionalities that our agents are providing to ensure the 
security management are mainly: PDP, PIP, PEP, and Configurations. 
By approximating these functionalities from the MAPE control loop, we can match each 
generic management-functionality with the corresponding security-specific-functionality. The MAPE 
functions are the following: Monitoring, Analyzing, Planning, and Execution. So, we implemented 
and upgraded the Master PEP with the adaptability feature (i.e., using the core PEP). Thus, our sensor 
functionality meets the monitoring, our actuating functionality meets the execution, and finally using 
our sensor or smart node functionalities we meet the analyzing.  
Today, we are able to implement our agents as MAPE agents. Actually, the access requests 
are analyzed by the Master PEP in order to extract and construct the XACML corresponding request 
and then the authorization decision (also obligations if any) is analyzed in order to whom the response 
should be delivered. So, the only missing piece from the loop is the planning functionality. We 
interrogate the PDP through standard XACML request/response. However, through our core PEP 
implementation, we are able to integrate locally or remotely the PDP inside the Master PEP. 
Therefore, we meet the MAPE planning function by upgrading the Master PEP with the making-
decisions feature. As a result, we obtain an agent-based architecture implemented using component-
oriented services (framework presented Chapter 5). This will allow exchanges between independent 
MAPE agents. 
 — 176 — 
Figure 7.97: Our conception for a MAPE Agent 
Nevertheless, accepting such new types of agents would require a social environment to 
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example, to get specific updates (situations) or new planning (configurations). We found some studies 
exploring this problem within the domain of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) (Huebscher et al., 2008; 
Truszkowski et al., 2009). Therefore, we believe it is interesting to bring our work closer to these 
studies, namely in what concerns the dialogue between agents. For example, the Master PDP can 
discuss with a remote PDP (through requesting specific service) in order to request configurations for 
updating its local SCD policy. 
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